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“When are men, living in the same place, to be regarded as a single 
city - what is the limit? Certainly not the wall of the city, for you 
might surround all Peloponnesus with a wall. Like this, we may say, 
is Babylon, and every city that has the compass of a nation rather 
than a city; Babylon, they say, had been taken for three days before 
some part of the inhabitants became aware of the fact.”
   Politics, by Aristotle (350 BC). Book 1:3
The question of how to defi ne the boundaries of a city seems to be both essential and 
so far unresolved. Statistical reports on urban population, econometrics analysis on 
the performance of urban nodes, urban and even national institutions hardly map the 
same cities within the same boundaries. As a consequence, it is increasingly diffi cult 
to understand how all these variables are actually interconnected in the urban realm, 
even less to generate meaningful comparative studies among different cities. But if 
the blurriness of urban boundaries in the collection of data challenges the validity 
of inter- and even intra-urban comparisons, it is even more diffi cult to compare the 
content and strategies of different social movements that rely on a fuzzily defi ned 
polity and a contested geography. Of course, this contestation of urban boundaries is 
no surprise in a world where urbanization is covering ever more territory, and urban 
nodes are immersed in a multidimensional global network. Likewise, as more and more 
people migrate to cities and urban life spreads beyond traditional urban boundaries, 
urbanization encompasses a wider diversity of social and geographical conditions. 
The paradox is that, precisely at the moment when urbanization has become one of 
the most meaningful entry points to understand the transformations that are affecting 
contemporary societies in both developed and underdeveloped nations — and that 
can illuminate the connections between local and global forces of change — cities 
are becoming increasingly harder to map. 
But let us go back for a moment to the beginnings of the western twentieth century 
and we will fi nd that a need for new urban categories is a typical symptom of a rapidly 
changing society. If we look at cities then, we will fi nd them rapidly growing at the pace 
of the new industrial economy, with new factories demanding concentrated capital to 
afford them, crowds of labor to operate them, and masses of products to amortize them. 
We will also fi nd that the presence of this new crowd is disruptive to the old social 
order and that sovereign nation-states are creating institutions for managing the rapid 
growth of industrial cities. Finally, we will fi nd that social thinkers are developing novel 
theories that can explain the forces behind the social changes that cities render visible. 
Yet, regardless of the success of these early thinkers in portraying modernization, as 
the twentieth century progresses, these categories become less and less meaningful. 
From a social evolutionary perspective, the rapid growth of metropolises in both 
developed and undeveloped nations questions the assumption that urbanization is a 
good proxy for national development. In addition, the changing geography of industrial 
production blurs the Weberian distinction between productive and consumerist cities 
(Weber, 1958). Likewise, the appearance of new urbanization patterns, such as gated 
communities, edge cities, urban slums, and hollow urban centers, outdates much of 
the urban-suburban growth model of the Chicago School (McKenzie, 1925), and the 
validity of the psychological traits that Stanley Milgram attributed exclusively to urban 
LI
B
ER
TU
N
8PROJECTION
S 6 M
ISM
A
TCH
ED
 B
O
U
N
D
A
RIES
dwellers (Milgram, 1970). Moreover, the nation-state sovereignty, which was one of 
the key enablers of the capitalist economy that fed the growth of modern cities (Tilly, 
1988), is being superseded by the multiple transnational networks in which these 
capitalist cities are embedded. Thus, a century of urban expansion trespassed over 
the geographical boundaries of cities and gave rise to metropolis of unprecedented 
size and to a network of instant communication among world cities (Castells, 1996); 
and, in this process, it forces us to revise many of the conceptual tools we use to 
describe what does and what does not belong to the urban realm.
As meaningful social, political, and economic exchanges are sustained — or broken — 
regardless of the proximity of their participants, Durkheim’s organic solidarity should be 
tested at a global scale (Durkheim, 1883). From online communities that ﬂ ow seamlessly 
over jurisdictionally boundaries, to gated communities that retrench in a controlled 
territoriality, a myriad of decentralized, bottom-up — albeit not necessarily democratic 
— practices are creating a multiplicity of urban boundaries. As a consequence, and 
as we shall soon see, mapping the urban territory becomes a cause for conﬂ icting 
interactions. It is not by coincidence that famous utopian and ideal cities have had 
clearly delineated boundaries. In Utopus, Thomas More imagined a wise and despotic 
conqueror, who built an artifi cial island so to prevent his people from abandoning the 
superior society he created (More, 1624).  Also, in their studies of ideal community 
types, early modern thinkers imagined them with fi xed, static boundaries. Ferdinand 
Tönnies Gemeinschaft was a closed social unit (Tönnies, 1921). Likewise, Max Weber 
identifi ed the fortress as one of the 
fi ve defi ning elements of the ideal 
western city (Weber). Thus, following 
Louis Marin’s interpretation, the social 
function of utopias is producing a 
critique of the actual society in which 
their authors are embedded, and in 
that sense utopias are like inverted 
mirrors of the time and place in which 
they were created (Marin, 2001). For 
instance, Tönnies’ detailed description 
of the harmonious life of pre-industrial 
communities is an evident critique of 
the capitalist organization that was 
taking throughout Germany at the end 
of the nineteenth century. Therefore, 
by defi nition, utopian places depend 
on clearly demarcated boundaries that 
allow creation of this virtual ideal world, 
in stark contrast to a real one. This 
condition of utopian thinking should 
have been problematic for the modernist 
designers who wanted to embrace 
modernism both as a normative practice 
as well as a transcendental ideal - all 
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FIGURE 1. Thomas More’s Utopia.  Source: 
More, Thomas. The common-vvealth of Vtopia 
[electronic resource] Printed by B. Alsop & T. 
Fawcet, London, 1639. Series: Early English 
books online.
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the more so when the utopian project of modernism is one that poses continuous and 
boundless progress as one of its foundational ideals (Tafuri, 1979). Not surprisingly, 
most paradigmatic modern urban utopias did not address the question of urban 
boundaries. Both Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse, and Frank Lloyd Wright’s Broadacre 
were quite oblivious to the borders of the ideal cities they proposed, fading them into 
grids that could be repeated ad infi nitum (Le Corbusier, 1929; Wright, 1935). 
From the outset, boundaries were both a need and a challenge for the modern urban 
project, which aimed to show both a patent discontinuity with anything that was non-
modern as well as the potential for boundless expansion. But the problem of modern 
urban designers became a well of theories for modern urban sociologists who saw in 
the tension between the old and the new urbanization modes the engine that could 
explain urban expansion. Beginning with the ecological models of the Chicago School, 
the growth of the city was stylized as a consequence of the changing needs of urban 
populations. (McKenzie, 1925; Burgess, 1925; Gans, 1962). Only later would political 
economists suggest that urban expansion was the consequence of the needs of 
capitalists (Gordon, 1984; Harvey, 1973) or of the ‘growth machine’ of local politicians 
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FIGURE 3. Plan and perspective of Frank Lloyd Wright’s Broadacre City.  Source: De Long, 
David G. (ed.)  (1999) Frank Lloyd Wright and the Living City, Weil am Rhein, Germany: Vitra 
Design Museum, pp. 33, 43.
FIGURE 2. Axon and plan of Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse.  Source: Le Corbusier (1967).  
The Radiant City, New York: The Orion Press, pp. 204-205.
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(Logan and Molotch, 1987)  Still, it was this continuous expansion of the city that made 
obsolete many of these urban growth explanations. The expansion of cities beyond the 
control of their originating institutions and the size of their jurisdictional boundaries 
(thus merging the capitalist need for ever growing markets with the modernist vision 
of infi nite growth) undermined the effectiveness of the dialectic categories used to 
describe early modern urbanizations, such as urban-suburban, central–peripheral, or 
developed-underdeveloped. 
In many ways, a frenetic construction and deconstruction of boundaries is one of 
the characteristics of our early twenty-fi rst century. On one hand, there is an overall 
sense of living in a boundless, seamless world, one where territorial limits are less 
and less relevant. By now, we are all aware of the dense and resilient net of instant 
messages that links people regardless of their physical location. From cell phones 
to personal blogs, from outsourcing to e-commerce, new social and economical 
relations are questioning the meaning of national sovereignty. But also, there is an 
opposite feeling, an awareness of being the subject of heightened surveillance of our 
bodily movements. Increasingly, territorial boundaries are being enforced with more 
and more force. Airport checkpoints, visa controls, hidden cameras, state armies, 
state police, private police, have all increased the limitations on individuals’ freedom 
of circulation. In a way, this has created a division between the geography of the real 
and of the virtual spaces in which each of us live, where the former is the subject of 
more and more restrictions while the latter is less and less subject to be controlled. 
This tension between the virtual and the real geographies of social interaction brings 
to another dimension: the question of mismatched boundaries, not only because 
people are participating in these two territorial organizations at the same time, but 
also because social action is constantly connecting the two of them.  As we shall 
see in many of these papers, local actors are likely to rely on global interactions for 
advancing their territorial claims, while many local claims have their origins in global 
or foreign occurrences.
So now, which criteria or institutional hierarchies are being used to demarcate the 
limits of urbanized territories? What special conditions affect urban boundaries? 
And fi nally, how are conﬂ icts of boundaries negotiated in the urban space and its 
institutions? The papers presented in this issue of PROJECTIONS revolve around these 
questions.  As the seven papers and the three research briefs published in this issue 
reveal, there are multiple origins for ‘mismatched boundaries’ that is, having two or 
more incompatible principles of organization applied to the same space.  Mismatched 
boundaries could be the outcome the geographical ambiguity of borderlands, of a 
conﬂ ict of power between two sovereign institutions, of historical transformations, or 
simply of the superposition of different spatial planning principles on the same plot of 
land.  
Three papers in this issue focus on the specifi c planning practices that borderlands 
demand. In ‘Contingency Planning & the Border Space’, Sergio Peña presents the 
case of the frontier between United States and Mexico as one that requires special 
agencies for the effective management of the unique set of hazards of this bi-
national boundary. Issues such as terrorism, economic migrants, and environmental 
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pollution cannot be solved without a coordinated effort at all institutional levels, from 
transnational agencies to nation states to local governments. However, since the 
organization of planning agencies on both sides of the border follows the traditional 
nation state hierarchy, they lack the ﬂ exibility to accommodate the special challenges 
posed by international boundaries. This same frontier is the subject of study of Giusti, 
Larson, Ward, de Souza, and May. In their paper on the practice of providing land titles 
in the Colonias along the Texas-Mexico Border, they disclose the multiple causes 
behind informal urbanizations in these lands. By surveying the impact of a major land 
title regularization reform on informal households along the Texan border region, the 
authors show that legality is not the only issue facing these borderland settlements. 
Although legal titles certainly improved the livability of these communities, the border 
land condition of these populations brings unique economic and social problems that 
transcend the issue of land ownership. Once more, there is a need to tailor planning 
institutions to the special conditions of binational boundaries.  The question of 
binational regions is also the subject of study of Lena Poschet’s paper on the case of 
Dajabón and Ouanaminthe. These two cities on the two sides of the frontier between 
Dominican Republic and Haiti contain multiple institutions involved in the formation of 
binational communities. Yet, at the same time, there is a historical resistance to the 
merging of these two nations into a single entity. As this paper reveals, there is a sharp 
distinction between the actual shared use of borderland regions and the perception of 
closed national spaces. 
Another take on the question of urban boundaries does not involve binational territories 
but the historical succession of national identities within single cities. In her essay 
on transnational spaces, Els Verbarkel explores this notion of the layering of national 
and transnational identities trough a historical study of the landscapes of battle in 
Flanders Fields at the start of the World War I. Through examining the architecture 
of the city, she analyzes how the legacy of nationalist discourses conﬂ icts with and 
calls into question the current construction of a pan-European identity. This tension 
between the national symbolism of European urban architecture and the postmodern 
discourses that promote a transnational identity is also central in the formulation of the 
imaginary for the rebuilding of war torn cities. In her paper on the reconstruction of 
Mostar after the end of the Bosnian war, Allison Stewart shows how the end of ethnic 
violence is followed by the imposition of a foreign, fuzzily defi ned, global architecture 
for the city.  As she argues, this practice does not heal the scars of war but only denies 
the conﬂ ict of claims within the urban territory. Lastly, this same idea of the urban 
imaginary as a terrain of contestation appears in Gary Doherty’s research brief on 
the strategies used to demarcate citizenship and public space in Northern Ireland. 
Paradoxically, the occupation of virtual territories, such as graffi tis and street images, 
may set up the scenarios for political negotiations, and in this sense has the potential 
of advancing more peaceful outcomes. 
But the question of mismatched boundaries does not necessarily imply conﬂ icts 
of national sovereignty. Other conditions of tensions of urban boundaries can take 
place even within the national context. In their study of Buenos Aires, Abal Medina, 
Cingolani, and Romero map the tensions between the actual metropolitan geography 
and the territorial division of the institutions managing it. While some of these 
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institutions take as a unit a region of sharp social constraints, others make distinctions 
among regions that present an almost seamless urban continuity. As a consequence, 
the management of the metropolis becomes a collection of institutional fragments 
that lack adequate forms of coordination. The relevance of institutional boundaries in 
determining urbanization, and vice versa, is also the subject of Fransje Hooimeijer’s 
exploration of the design of Dutch polder cities. By crisscrossing the history of urban 
design and hydraulic engineering with that of the city map, she unveils how urban 
boundaries are also the outcome of the professional culture of urban planners. 
The role of urban planners in forming and interpreting urban boundaries is the subject 
of Daniel Hess’s research brief on “Incompatible Zone Systems. He fi nds that planners 
tend to resolve the discrepancy between divergent geographic zones by overly 
simplifying spatial data, which leads to inaccurate assessments. Lastly, the idea of 
borders and cities has another connotation, which is that of the last frontier, an exotic 
realm, an escape from the ordinary. In Midori Taki’s research brief, “Desirescapes/
Borderscapes,’ this notion is present in the geography of international tourist 
destinations. Through mapping of the tourist-landscapes  of Venice, Barcelona, Tokyo, 
and Las Vegas, her brief depicts urban borderlands as sites where the everyday local 
and the exoticism of tourist destinations get negotiated. Hence, the demarcation of 
urban boundaries varies according to  the user, either the foreign visitor or the city 
resident. 
To conclude, each of these essays presents a particular interpretation of urban 
boundaries, of mismatches, and of territoriality. Together, they allow us to better 
understand the multiplicity of variables and institutions that shape urbanization, such 
as nation-states sovereignty claims, the geography of transnational networks, the 
symbolic realm of national identity and consumption culture, and the technologies that 
can modify the environment. Often, as these essays reveal, the practice of drawing 
boundaries constitutes an act of violence against the surroundings, which therefore 
brings contestation and hence mismatched boundaries.  Yet, for all the confusion and 
pain they may trigger, the blurriness of urban boundaries also carries the promise of 
change and improvement; the messy juxtaposition of different logics and institutions 
open possibilities for innovations, and therefore the possibility of transcending existing 
conﬂ icts. Ultimately, only by accepting the messiness of real urban life can we move 
beyond the walls of utopia. 
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ABSTRACT
The following questions are the focus of this article:  How have the U.S. and Mexico 
managed the risk of old and new threats at the border? What is the process that 
contingency planning at the border has followed? What are the main challenges 
that contingency planning faces at the border? It is argued that the U.S.-Mexico 
experience with crossborder planning best resembles an incremental approach to 
planning, where new institutions, in addition to the existing ones, emerge as a way to 
respond and adapt to new circumstances, contexts, and societal values.  Contingency 
planning is analyzed through a comparison of levels of analysis starting at highest level 
of analysis, which is the global or transnational, then  specifi c binational agreements, 
and, fi nally, national, state, and local efforts to implement crossborder contingency 
planning. It is concluded that the institutional framework is complex at border areas 
because borders add another layer of institutions (international), which makes the 
institutional design especially diffi cult and lengthy and raises transaction costs. 
Another conclusion is that risk management is more diffi cult when populations with 
different incomes, tastes, and preferences live side by side, as in the case of the U.S.-
Mexico border. Therefore, defi ning and prioritizing risks and hazards around which 
plans can be developed is particularly diffi cult and complex.  Finally, the border space 
and its resources need to be seen as a binational public good in which both countries 
have a stake and, therefore, cooperation is seen as a necessary although not suffi cient 
condition to successfully manage future natural and anthropogenic risks.
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INTRODUCTION
Urban planners face greater obstacles than usual when trying to implement 
crossborderi planning.  Crossborder planning in this article is conceptualized as an 
institution-building process in which actors cooperate to achieve mutually benefi cial 
outcomes. The objective of these institutions from the perspective of contingency 
planning is to facilitate and improve collective decision making in regard to how the 
built environment (i.e., binational conurbations) can best be organized to prevent, 
react, and recover from a natural or man-made disaster. 
Key questions to be analyzed in this article are:  How have the U.S. and Mexico 
managed the risk of old and new threats at the border? What is the process that 
contingency planning at the border has followed? What are the main challenges 
that contingency planning faces at the border?  It is argued in this article that the 
U.S.-Mexico experience with crossborder planning best resembles an incremental 
approach to planning (Lindblom, 1996). In other words, new institutions, in addition to 
existing ones, emerge as a way to respond and adapt to new circumstances, contexts, 
and societal values (Bromley, 2006).
The specifi c objective of this article is to analyze crossborder planning with regard 
to natural and man-made contingencies and the challenges that urban planners 
encounter when improving the quality of life for millions of people living in binational 
conurbations1 along the U.S.-Mexico international border (see Map 1).  
To accomplish the above objective, the remainder of the article is divided into four 
sections.  The fi rst section offers a contextual account of the main policy changes in 
PEN
A
MAP 1. U.S. Mexico Main Urban Agglomerations.  Source: Elaborated by author.
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the two countries and their spatial effects with emphasis on the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The next section focuses on defi ning and conceptualizing contingency planning and 
identifying the main natural and anthropogenic threats or contingencies that exist at the 
border.  An analysis of the institutional framework by levels of analysis follows.  Finally, 
the article demonstrates the importance of contingency planning and illuminates the 
challenges that mismatched borders pose to urban planners. 
THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER CONTEXT 
In the last three decades, Mexico’s northern border has experienced dramatic 
demographic, economic, and urban changes as a result of two unrelated processes: 
1) the creation of the Border Industrialization Program (BIP) in the mid-1960s and 2) 
structural adjustment policies (SAPs) in the 1980s in Mexico.  The BIP, which started 
the maquiladora2 program, was created as a strategy to diversify the border region 
economy and to create employment.  The economic crisis that Mexico experienced 
at the beginning of the 1980s due to mismanagement of public fi nances forced the 
government of President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) to undertake SAPs, which 
were continued by his successor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994).  
SAPs were an important causal factor in the transformation of Mexico’s economy from 
an import-substitution model into an export-oriented model.  International trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) expanded substantially on the U.S.-Mexico Border. The 
maquiladora industry not only served as a source of employment, but played a critical 
role in the economic strategy.  Maquiladoras employed only 67, 214 workers in 1975 
but, by 2000, total employment had multiplied 19 times (1,261,261), faster than any other 
economic sector. Mexico’s border states and cities concentrate about 77% (INEGI3; 
Lorey, 1990) of the maquiladora employment; manufacturing has shifted from central 
Mexico to the north  (Garza, 1994). 
The boom of Mexico’s northern border cannot be explained without taking into 
consideration the economic changes that took place in the U.S., the main source of FDI 
in Mexico.  The oil embargo of the 1970s and the stiff competition American corporations 
faced during the 1980s forced them to re-evaluate their business practices. Terms 
such as “just on time,” “lean manufacturing” and “outsourcing” became part of the 
lexicon in the business world. Corporations adopted the strategy of relocating some 
functions of production process overseas to areas where labor costs could be more 
advantageous, to give them an edge.  American corporations and others around the 
world seeking easier access to the biggest consumer market in the world were eager 
to invest in Mexico when it opened up its borders to FDI and embraced globalization. 
In summary, globalization gave a locational advantage to the U.S.-Mexico border. 
The new strategy strongly impacted not only the social and economic spheres, but 
also the ways that activities and populations were redistributed in the territorial space. 
The economic and demographic changes in the border region have had a substantial 
impact on the natural, social, and built environments. Negative externalities in the 
natural environment (air, water, etc.) have been the primary focus of attention on the 
U.S.-Mexico border (Blatter, 2000). However, few scholars (Herzog, 1990, Herzog, 2000, 
Herzog, 2000a) of the U.S.-Mexico border have paid attention to the built environment 
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and even fewer to the linkages among the built, natural, and human environments and 
how urban planning can help to mitigate and manage the externalities and possible 
contingencies. 
The border region shared by Mexico and the U.S. has played a key role in the economic 
integration of the two economies. The integration has intensifi ed the ﬂ ows of goods, 
services, people, investment and capital between the two countries (see Figure 1). 
The ﬂ ows taking place at the border put the population that lives in the binational 
conurbation at high risk to such things as exposure to spills of hazardous materials that 
cross the international border. Contingency planning needs to play a key role to mitigate 
the exposure of the border population to natural and man-made contingencies. 
RISKS, THREATS + CONTINGENCY PLANNING AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
In this section, contingency planning is discussed. First, contingency planning is 
defi ned, with an emphasis on why it is important to discuss it from the perspective of 
crossborder planning. Second, possible natural and anthropogenic hazards along the 
U.S.-Mexico border are identifi ed. 
Contingency planning relates to the institutional response to an event, natural or human-
made, having effects on public health, safety, property and the environment that can 
be of extraordinary dimensions.  The institutional response could be private, public, 
or social. An example of a private response might be emergency plans developed by 
a specifi c corporation. The different plans and programs that governments have in 
place to prevent, act upon, and react to an extraordinary event are an example of a 
public response. The social response refers to the role that civil society plays, either 
organized or spontaneous (see Figure 2).  Furthermore, the institutional response 
can be of two types — proactive or reactive (Siegel, 1996). A proactive institutional 
response focuses on the preventable aspects of a possible event by minimizing the 
risk — ex ante — whereas the reactive response focuses on dealing with the effects 
in the best way possible — ex post. 
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FIGURE 1. Mexico Total Exports and Imports (1980-2005).  Source: INEGI.
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Various authors (Delgadillo-Macías, 1996; Perez-Campos, 1999; Rodríguez-Velazquez, 
2001; Rodríguez-Estevez, 2002; Benson & Clay, 2004) have emphasized the relationship 
between disasters, urban settlements, and development. Natural events such as 
hurricanes, tornadoes, etc. have always existed, but what makes the difference 
regarding the magnitude of vulnerability is the built environment.  Delgadillo-Macias 
(1996) and Rodríguez-Esteves (2002) have demonstrated the different effects of natural 
hazards on developed and developing countries in terms of the loss of human life 
and economic impacts. The difference lies in the fact that developed countries not 
only have more resources to allocate to mitigate the impacts but also more effective 
institutions to prevent and respond to contingencies.  Land use policies, building 
codes, and enforcement of the laws make the difference between a chaotic vulnerable 
urban space and a well-planned and less vulnerable urban space capable of resisting 
natural forces. 
Natural hazards can be classifi ed into two broad groups — hydrometeorological (e.g., 
drought, rain, hurricane) and geophysical hazards (e.g., earthquake, volcanic eruption). 
Anthropogenic or human-induced hazards can be grouped into a few categories: 1) 
originating from waste disposal, 2) derived from alteration of land and water, and 3) 
derived from industrial and agricultural activities. These hazards can also be classifi ed 
in terms of their geographic scope (local, regional or global). They can be rapid-onset 
(explosion) or slow-onset (water pollution) events. The impact of the anthropogenic 
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hazards depends on several factors such as population concentration, magnitude of 
the event, ecological sensitivity, poor decision-making or ineffective institutions, and 
technical or human error (Siegel, 1996). 
ANTHROPOGENIC HAZARDS ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
The literature on hazards along the U.S.-Mexico border focuses primarily on 
anthropogenic hazards, especially hazardous materials (Sanchez, 1990; Guhathakurta 
et al., 2000; Rubio, 2003), and, to a lesser degree, on natural hazards such as rain (Bocco 
et al. 1993). The work of Rodríguez-Esteves (2002), who calls attention to contingency 
planning for geophysical hazards, specifi cally earthquakes, merits special distinction. 
The likelihood and location of these hazards are presented in Map 2.
The focus on hazardous waste materials (HAZMATS) as a primary contingency issue 
at the U.S.-Mexico border is understandable because of the exponential growth the 
maquiladora industry has experienced since the adoption in 1965 of the BIP. The 
strong relationship that exists between HAZMATS and the maquiladora industry can 
be explained based on the type of production and the legal regime that regulates 
the industry. The generation of hazardous waste is proportional to industrial output 
simply because certain industrial inputs (e.g. chemicals) needed to produce output 
are transformed into byproducts or hazardous waste — ceteris paribus.   More 
importantly a large percentage of the inputs, some of which become HAZMATS, used 
by the maquiladora industry are brought into Mexico with very little control over their 
transportation, treatment, disposal, and storage, thereby posing a high risk to public 
health, safety, the environment, and property of the border communities (Guhathakurta 
et al. 2000; Reed, 1998). 
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According to a progress report produced under the Border XXI Program, a cooperative 
effort of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Mexico’s environmental ministry 
SEMARNAT, 38 cases of chemical accidents were reported through the Emergency 
Response Notifi cation System in 1996 and 77 in 1998; the binational conurbation of El 
Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua was the most vulnerable region4.  
Contingency planning for HAZMATS is perhaps the most complicated issue because 
it requires a series of actions involving a broad spectrum of actors and agencies. For 
example, it requires developing a better information system to track shipments across 
the border. Although maquiladoras are required to return HAZMATS for disposal to 
the U.S. in accordance with Annex III of the La Paz agreement — this issue will be 
discussed in length in the last section of this article — there is a gap between what 
comes in and what is being returned. According to Reed (1998) the ratio of what comes 
in to what goes back is about 20 to 1 or 30 to 1; according to the same author, citing 
Mexican authorities, about 75% to 88% of HAZMATS are confi ned with very little 
regulation.  That is, the public institutional response, mainly on the Mexican side, has 
been surpassed by the magnitude of the problem of HAZMATS. 
Contingency planning also requires building facilities capable of managing the storage 
of HAZMATS, facilities that are in short supply in Mexico. In other words, the private/
market response in Mexico to the management of HAZMATS also has been slow to 
respond to the challenges posed by increasing trade. Reed (1998) identifi ed only three 
HAZMATS storage sites: Monterrey, Nuevo Leon; Torreon, Coahuila, and Hermosillo, 
Sonora. According to SEMARNAT (2002), only 10% of the HAZMATS generated 
are disposed of properly; oils, lubricants, and acid solutions are the materials most 
commonly received.  Complicating matters, there is strong public opposition, such as 
in Hermosillo, Sonora, to construction of HAZMATS storage facilities in Mexico due to 
the perception that Mexico has become a dumping ground for HAZMATS from the U.S. 
(Sanchez, 1990).  Better institutions are needed to monitor and enforce the disposal of 
HAZMATS as is adequate planning for the transportation of the materials within the 
city and across the border by designing routes and times in such a way as to reduce 
the risk of an accident. 
Contingency planning for HAZMATS would involve local government offi cials from 
Proteccion Civil (civil protection) in Mexico, emergency response teams housed 
under the U.S. Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), environmental agencies such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Mexican counterpart Secretaria del 
Medio Ambiente y Recusos Naturales (SEMARNAT), transportation planners, health 
offi cials, maquiladoras, and private entrepreneurs to mention a few. HAZMATS are 
of particular interest in San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja California,  Nogales, 
Arizona-Nogales, Sonora;  El Paso, Texas-Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua; and Laredo, 
Texas-Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. These regions concentrate the largest number of 
maquiladoras (mainly Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez) and are where international trade 
plays an important role.  Within the NAFTA framework the Hazardous Materials Land 
Transportation Standards Working Group, Group 5 of the NAFTA Land Transportation 
Standards Sub-Committee under the Offi ce of Hazardous Material Safety, is responsible 
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for implementing a work program to make compatible the relevant hazardous materials 
standards within the United States, Canada and Mexico, including transportation5.  
Human-induced hazards are the area where planning can have the most impact in terms 
of managing the risk and likelihood of the event taking place. An increasing number 
of old tires have been imported into Mexico from the U.S., many of them improperly 
disposed of.  According to the EPA, there are an estimated 40 million waste tires along 
the border in Mexico. This issue has caught the attention of border authorities and 
environmentalists in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua; Mexicali, Baja California; and Tijuana, 
Baja California, the largest Mexican cities at the U.S. border. According to information 
from the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), there are 3 million 
scattered tires in Ciudad Juarez alone, constituting a public health and safety hazard6. 
The Centinela site near the City of Mexicali has a pile of about 1.2 million tires. The 
main concerns regarding the inappropriate disposal of tires are the possibility of fi re 
and of becoming potential breeding grounds for mosquitoes and other organisms such 
as West Nile virus7.  
The cause of the problem is multi-dimensional. Importation of used tires to Mexico 
responds to economics, providing a cheap alternative to new tires for many border 
residents and businesses. Laxity in applying the laws by customs authorities in Mexico 
has contributed to the problem as well, by allowing a larger number of than allowed 
by law. Recently, an effort has been made by Mexican authorities to solve the problem 
by signing an agreement   with the environmental agency in Mexico (SEMARNAT), 
Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX), one of the main cement producers worldwide, and 
the municipal authorities to clean up tire sites.  CEMEX will be allowed to use the old 
tires as fuel. This is a typical case of the law of thermodynamics, where matter is not 
destroyed, only transformed; burning old tires would solve the problem of solid waste 
disposal, but it would transform it into an air quality problem.   
Planning can be the best preventive alternative to this type of human- induced hazard. 
Land use planning plays an important role in this area; the most proactive approach 
can be to relocate the local undesirable land uses, also known as LULUs, as far as 
possible from the border. There are several examples of LULUs located within a 
short distance of the border. In the binational conurbation of El Paso, Texas-Ciudad 
Juarez, Chihuahua alone there are several facilities. On the El Paso side, at the border, 
ASARCO, a copper smelter that has been closed since 1999, is applying for the proper 
permits to reopen.  A cement quarry and a petroleum refi nery are also located less 
than a mile from the river that forms the international boundary, and railroad tracks 
along the border transport HAZMATS (see Map 3).  
In Ciudad Juarez, one of the sewage treatment plants is located a few hundred 
meters from the border, affecting air quality on both sides.  There are no agreements 
between local governments to receive input from their counterpart across the border 
regarding the location of LULUs close to the border; efforts to coordinate land use 
policy across the border are limited due to legal constraints (Peña, 2002). In this 
regard, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) has  played a very 
important role to facilitate crossborder communication and planning; in addition to 
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requiring transborder environmental impact statements BECC provides technical 
assistance to border communities to implement infrastructure projects related to 
air quality, sanitation, drinking water, solid waste disposal, and sewage.  BECC, a 
binational institution, certifi es the projects, making them eligible for funding through 
the North American Development Bank (NADB). Both institutions were created as the 
result of a side agreement of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Out of 105 
certifi ed projects a great majority deal with wastewater, followed by drinking water 
and conservation, and a small minority deal with air quality8.  BECC since its creation 
has granted technical assistance equivalent to $30.24 million dollars and benefi ted 
a total of 131 communities in the U.S.-Mexico border9.
NATURAL HAZARDS ALONG THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER
Institutional efforts related to contingency planning along the U.S.-Mexico border 
have paid more attention to HAZMATS and less to other hazards such as earthquakes 
or massive ﬂ oods, technical failures, human error, and the new threat of a terrorist 
attack. The administration and allocation of water is perhaps one of the most studied 
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and analyzed aspects of crossborder planning because the desert climate makes 
water a very scarce and valuable commodity for the region (Mumme, 1986; Mumme & 
Brown, 2000; Mumme, 2000). 
However, very few academic studies have focused on natural and anthropogenic 
hazards related to water, such as the contingency protocols and plans in place to 
prevent or deal with a scenario of a hurricane, technical failure, or terrorist attack that 
could severely damage the dams located along the Rio Grande, the river that forms 
the international boundary for 1254 miles, a scenario that would put border cities 
and residents at risk. There are two main reservoirs on the Rio Grande, Amistad and 
Falcon (see map 4) that could affect the border region in case of a massive failure; 
combined, these reservoirs have a capacity of 10,000 million M3 (about 8.1 million acre 
feet), enough to ﬂ ood a large area10.  Amistad is located less than 10 miles from Ciudad 
Acuña, Coahuila and Del Rio, Texas, with a population projected to be close to a quarter 
of a million by 2010; Falcon is located about 60 miles from the binational conurbations 
of Reynosa, Tamaulipas-McAllen, Texas with a population projection of 1.3 million by 
2010 (Peach & Williams, 2000). The impacts that a major failure of a dam could have on 
the people, property, and environment of the U.S.-Mexico border would likely include a 
disruption to drinking water supply, energy supply, agricultural production due to lack 
of irrigation, as well as property loss, among others.   
Different agencies with different functions would most likely coordinate to respond 
to this scenario. The International Boundary and Water Commission, United States 
(IBWC), and its Mexican Section, known as CILA, is responsible for managing the 
Rio Grande ﬂ ood control projects, including levees and the two international dams 
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on the Rio Grande. IBWC reported that in 2002 it conducted a series of operation and 
maintenance activities at both dams with special attention given to security issues by 
providing training to power plant personnel (IBWC, 2002). The Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Group (CIPG) is an interagency group on dam safety that has responsibility 
for dams in the U.S. In addition, CIPG has the responsibility of developing contingency 
plans. In the likelihood of an event taking place, the response such as evacuation 
plans, rescue missions, and medical services, would involve local emergency services 
teams.  The Critical Infrastructure Protection group for critical infrastructure in the 
border region is binational, with participation from Mexican agencies as well.
An earthquake of severe magnitude is another catastrophic scenario in the border 
region related to a natural hazard. Both the U.S. State of California and the Mexican 
State of Baja California are located on the San Andreas fault, which makes the area 
prone to earthquakes.  Rodríguez-Esteves (2002) is one of the few border scholars 
who have written about the possible impact in the case of Mexicali, Baja California. 
Rodríguez-Esteves (2002:134-135) reports that in a 40 km radius from Mexicali, from 
1950 to 2000 there have been about 1,301 movements with an intensity greater than 3 
on the Richter Scale and 43 of these have exceeded the 4.5 mark. 
Various events not only in Mexico and the U.S. but across the globe have shown the 
devastation of an earthquake; the 1985 earthquake that devastated Mexico City is just 
one example that put contingency planning in the mind of public agencies. Because 
earthquakes are diffi cult, if not impossible, to forecast, the best approach is a preventive 
one and urban planning is perhaps the best preventive measure. Urban planning as a 
preventive measure relates to regulating the location of urban development away from 
high-risk areas; building codes and supervision complement the preventive measures. 
Mexican cities are more vulnerable than U. S. cities to natural hazards due to the 
lack of strong and effective institutions to regulate urban development and prevent 
substandard housing and the development of squatter settlements in high-risk areas. 
Azuela and Duhau (1993) and Duhau (1998) have analyzed the weakness of planning 
institutions in Mexico and shown how squatting has become an option for the poor to 
have access to land. Llera-Pacheco (2004) analyzed the differences in the planning 
regimes that Mexico and the U.S. have followed, concluding that the U.S. decisions 
follow more closely a rational model, whereas Mexico’s model is more discretional.  
Finally, wildfi re is another type of hazard that is latent along the border. A wildfi re 
could pollute the common airshed and induce loss of life and property. Fires in the 
southwestern U.S. and northern Mexico are a common summer seasonal occurrence 
and there is always the threat of a wildfi re on one side of the border moving across the 
border. In addition to wildfi res crossing the border, wildfi res in Mexico also have had 
effects reaching well into the United States. For instance, one of the most devastating 
fi res along the U.S.-Mexico border took place on October 25, 2003  near San Diego, 
California when, according to NASA, one wildfi re grew 10,000 acres in only six hours 
(see Figure 3), The fi nal estimates are that the wildfi re destroyed 500,000 acres and 
1100 homes. Communities living along the San Pedro River and areas around Forth 
Huachuca and Sierra Vista, Arizona are well aware of this natural hazard.  In 1999, 
the U.S. Department of the Interior and the environmental protection agency in 
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Mexico, SEMARNAT, reached an agreement to address this issue. The purpose of the 
agreement was to facilitate, coordinate, and share resources needed for fi refi ghting 
activities across the border. 
Authors such as Sanchez (1990) and Rubio (2003) have pointed out the institutional 
differences between the two countries in responding to and managing a contingency 
event, which makes the Mexican side of the border and its cities more vulnerable to 
exposure and to bearing the costs of possible accidents. This situation has already been 
recognized by the two countries, which are moving toward closing the institutional 
gap; that is, toward developing new institutions and protocols that would respond in a 
timely and effective way, as discussed in the next section.  
 
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CONTINGENCY PLANNING + THE BORDER
This section presents a discussion of the current institutional framework regarding 
contingency planning in the U.S. and Mexico as well as a discussion of international 
and binational treaties that frame contingency planning at the U.S.-Mexico border. 
FIGURE 3. Wildfi res in the  San Diego-Tijuana Border. Source: http://earthobservatory.
nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/natural_hazards (Figure 1).
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As previously stated, contingency planning at the U.S.-Mexico border best resembles 
an incremental approach because various institutions have been created to respond 
to new challenges; the institutional framework of crossborder planning is a layer of 
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multiple agencies and institutions with specifi c functions converging in the border 
space. 
Using level of analysis is perhaps the best way to understand the institutional 
framework of crossborder contingency planning. Such analysis means that we begin 
with the highest level of analysis, which is the global or transnational, then we move 
to specifi c binational agreements, and, fi nally, to national, state and local efforts to 
implement crossborder contingency planning (see Figure 4).
TRANSNATIONAL LAYER 
The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment adopted 
in Stockholm in 1972 is one of the most relevant multilateral treaties that directly relate 
to crossborder externalities. Principle 21 of the Declaration recognized the sovereign 
right that each nation has to exploit its resources according to its laws but also its 
responsibility to ensure that its activities will damage the environment of other states 
beyond its political jurisdiction. The Stockholm Declaration was used as the reference 
treaty for Annex III of the La Paz agreement, which is discussed below, signed by the 
U.S. and Mexico to deal with externalities at the border.   The export of hazardous 
waste material, typically from industrialized to developing countries, has been one of 
the main focuses of attention of the international community. This issue is extremely 
relevant for the context of the U.S.-Mexico border, considering the exponential growth 
of international trade and the maquiladora industry (see Figure 5) as shown by the 
number of tons returned to the U.S. from Mexico. It is important to recognize that the 
program in charge of monitoring the ﬂ ow of HAZMATS between Mexico and the U.S. 
known as haztracks, was cancelled by the administration of U.S. President George W. 
Bush in 2003.
The Basel Convention in 1989 is the main international treaty regarding the control of 
the movement of hazardous waste materials across borders. According to Sanchez 
(1990), the negotiation of the text resolution of the convention showed the divide 
that existed between industrialized and developing countries. On the one hand, 
PEN
A
HAZMATS RETURN TO THE U.S. FROM MEXICO 
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Year
H
A
Z
M
A
T
S
FIGURE 5. Hazmats Flow. Source: EPA, Haztracks ‘97 cited by Guhatkakurta et al. (2000:83).
29
PR
OJ
EC
TI
ON
S 
6 
M
IS
M
A
TC
H
ED
 B
O
U
N
D
A
RI
ES
the developed world was reluctant to accept any measure that would prevent the 
relocation of polluting industries and the export of hazardous waste to other countries. 
On the other hand, developing countries were reluctant to become dump sites of 
hazardous material from the developed world.   
There exist two competing paradigms regarding international relations, 
transnationalism and realism, which are also relevant to understanding crossborder 
planning.  Transnationalists have emphasized institution building and international 
cooperation as the premise of international relations. In essence, the nation-state 
surrenders partially its sovereignty to international institutions and organizations.  The 
transnationalist approach made substantive progress with the rise of globalization. 
Scholars such as Elkins (1995) began questioning the notion of nation-state and 
sovereignty with the emergence of non-territorial political organizations in the form of 
interest groups on a global scale (e.g., anti-globalization groups).  Another issue raised 
by transnationalists is the emergence of corporations and individuals as global players 
with power to bring down an entire nation-state.  Globalization, it has been argued, is 
making the nation-state obsolete, replacing it with transnational organizations. 
Realists consider the nation-state as the main unit of analysis in international politics. 
Realists start from the premise that nations are self-interested and selfi sh organizations 
whose main goal is to maximize the benefi ts that the national interest determines. This 
approach puts a strong emphasis on the concept of territorial sovereignty; therefore, 
the fundamental function of the nation-state is to guard the integrity and defense of 
its territory and the security of its citizens. Realists engage in cooperation as long as 
it furthers the national interests, international trade being one of those areas (Russett 
and Starr, 1992). Realists’ perception of borderlands is in tune with the idea of borders 
as demarcations where the sovereignty of a nation begins and ends. The realist 
approach limits local government activism in international relations due to the fact 
that international relations are performed by national governments. 
The internationalists’ approach to deal with environmental problems that affect border 
regions is at a crossroads. The resurgence of neorealism, headed by the administration 
of President George W. Bush, has tossed aside the commitment of the U.S. to 
international agreements related to environmental issues, such as the Kyoto Protocol, 
which would set limits on greenhouse gas emissions.  Neorealists prefer an ad hoc or 
case by case approach to international agreements. Thus, unilateral solutions and ad 
hoc binational agreements and accords between the U.S. and Mexico are more likely 
to play a far more important role than multilateral agreements in the post 9/11 era. 
BINATIONAL / CROSSBORDER LAYER
Already there exists a long history of international diplomacy and agreements between 
the U.S. and Mexico, and the creation of institutions where boundary and waters, 
narcotics, and telecommunications account for the largest number of agreements 
by far11.  The earliest binational agreements between the two countries concern 
boundary and water issues and these became institutionalized, fi rst with the creation 
of the International Boundary Commission (IBC), which was later reconstituted as the 
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) with expanded responsibilities 
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related to water.  However, it was not until the signing of the La Paz agreement that 
the two countries began to address environmental and contingency planning in a 
comprehensive way. The agreement, signed in La Paz, Baja California Sur in Mexico 
in August 1983, states that:  
the objectives…are to establish the basis for cooperation…for the 
protection, improvement and conservation of the environment and 
the problems which affected it, as well as to agree on necessary 
measures to prevent and control pollution in the border area, and to 
provide the framework for development of a system of notifi cation 
for emergency situations12.
The La Paz agreement in essence serves as an umbrella agreement that gives wide 
latitude to build upon to address crossborder environmental issues. Subsequent annexes 
to the La Paz agreement have been signed; of particular importance for contingency 
planning is annex II, which addresses the discharge of hazardous substances.  Article II 
of the same annex is the one that specifi cally concerns contingency planning in which 
the two countries agreed to establish the “United States-Mexico Joint Contingency 
Plan.”  The agreement also designated the environmental agencies of each country, 
EPA and SEMARNAT, to function as the coordinators.  
Annex III is also relevant because it specifi cally deals with transboundary shipments of 
hazardous waste and substances.  Article III in the same annex provides the framework 
to develop notifi cation and tracking systems for the importation of transboundary 
shipments of hazardous waste. This tracking or accounting system, known as 
Emergency Response Notifi cation System (ERNS), provides for the determination 
of the difference between what comes out (export) of the U.S. and what comes in 
(imports) as hazardous waste to Mexico. 
The La Paz agreement has become the main referent to develop plans to address 
transborder environmental issues.  Relevant to contingency planning is the Border 
2012: U.S.-Mexico Environmental Plan, announced in September 2002, which replaced 
Border XXI.  Border 2012 outlines six interrelated goals.  Goal fi ve, the most relevant 
to contingency planning, notes, “[to] reduce exposure to chemicals as a result of 
accidental chemical releases and/or acts of terrorism.”13  Goal fi ve concurs with 
Annex II of the La Paz agreement regarding the creation of a Joint Contingency Plan 
(JCP). The objective of goal fi ve is to complete by 2008 joint contingency plans for all 14 
pairs of sister cities14.  As of January 2003, only 10 sister cities have developed plans. 
El Paso-Ciudad Juarez is among those with plans still in development.  
NATIONAL LAYER
The above initiatives are in compliance with legislation at the national level. Two main 
legislative initiatives in each country address contingency planning. In the U.S., the 
relevant statute is the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act known as the 
Stafford Law15, which is in accordance with the police power that the U.S. Constitution 
grants to local governments under the 10th Amendment.  The Stafford Law provides the 
legal framework that defi nes emergency, preparedness, and mitigation assistance as 
well as the parameters under which federal funds should be allocated through FEMA. 
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As a complement to the Stafford Law, there exist other laws  relevant to contingency 
planning; for instance, the Clean Air Act, Chemical Safety Information Site Security 
and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act, and Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA), to mention a few. 
In Mexico, the 1985 earthquake in Mexico City and its devastating effects triggered 
legislation regarding contingency planning and management.  In 1986, a national 
system of civil protection was established by decree. In 1999, Article 73-XXIX-I of the 
Mexican constitution was reformed to give Congress the power to legislate in civil 
protection matters. Complementary to this law are the General Law of Ecological 
Equilibrium, General Law of Population, the Federal Public Administration Law, among 
others (see Figure 4)16. Several authors (Delgadillo-Macias, 1996; Macias, 1999) have 
agreed that contingency planning in Mexico is mostly reactive; as a matter of fact, one 
of the responses to natural disasters is the Plan DN III implemented by the Mexican 
army. The objective of this plan is primarily to respond to contingencies by evacuation, 
search and rescue, fi rst aid, food, and clean-up. Plan DN III was visible during the 
clean-up of hurricane Kathrine in the Gulf Coast in Mississippi and in the feeding of 
evacuees in the Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. 
STATE + LOCAL LAYERS
At the state and local level, contingency planning cannot be more contrasting 
between the two countries. In the U.S., state and local governments have not only 
the legal tools but also access to more resources to implement contingency planning 
compared to their Mexican counterparts. In Mexico, Protection Civil was created after 
the earthquake in 1985, responsible at the local level for coordinating the response to 
emergency situations. Throughout this article the role that urban planning plays has 
been emphasized as a proactive contingency planning tool that is mainly implemented 
at the local level. Even though an institutional framework to respond to disasters 
(natural or anthropogenic) exists in both countries, if local governments do not have 
the resources and capacity to plan effectively, contingency planning will be doomed 
to fail. In short, using the planning tools available (e.g., strong land use regulations, 
enforcement of building codes, regulation of time and routes to transport hazards) is 
a necessary condition, although not suffi cient, to successful contingency planning; 
that is, if joint contingency plans at the sister city level do not take into account this 
fact, their success will be doubtful. BECC’s charter allows it to become engaged in 
“institutional capacity building” in which not only contingency planning could fall but 
others areas as well. BECC is an agency that may be able to facilitate coordination 
efforts across local governments, focusing on making the border cities safer.
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown that there is an institutional framework in place to deal with 
contingency issues at the border.  Several issues are important to highlight regarding 
contingency planning that are unique to borders and that planners must be aware of 
during the planning stage: 
• The institutional framework is more complex than at non-border areas 
because borders add another layer of institutions (international), which 
makes the institutional design more diffi cult and lengthy, raising what 
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economists call transaction costs.  
• Federal agencies have a far more active role at the borders than otherwise. 
This causes their functions to overlap with those agencies at the state and 
local levels, making it confusing to determine what each agency is supposed 
to do and making coordination complex. 
• The goals and objectives of contingency planning may not be the same 
in both countries.  In the particular case of the U.S.-Mexican experience, 
this is a fact. The U.S. since 9/11 has seen contingency planning as part of 
preparedness and response to terrorism, making the border the fi rst line 
of defense. Contingency planning in Mexico has been more reactive than 
preventive. The result is that resources are allocated to different priorities, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of contingency planning. 
• Contingency planning is based on risk assessment and resources are 
allocated to manage risk. Risk management is more diffi cult when populations 
with different incomes, tastes, and preferences live side by side, as in the 
case of the U.S.-Mexico border. Therefore, defi ning and prioritizing risks and 
hazards around which plans can be developed is diffi cult and complex.  
This article is a fi rst attempt to identify the existing natural and anthropogenic hazards. 
The discussion of the legal framework has shown that the border poses a great 
challenge to the institutional design of contingency planning. Contingency planning 
has been a process of “muddling through” (Lindblom, 1996), of adapting and creating 
institutions in response to new challenges.  
An analysis and history of institutions provides a good sense and understanding of this 
process. Prior to the La Paz agreement (1983), most of the crossborder contingency 
planning experience dealt with natural hazards, such as ﬂ ooding in the Rio Grande, and 
the IBWC was instrumental to solving the problem by building dams and other water 
projects.  It was not until the signing of the La Paz Agreement (1983) that contingency 
planning received more attention and particularly focused on anthropogenic hazards 
related to the transport across borders of hazardous waste. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 put at the forefront a new type of risk and posed new 
challenges. The U.S. has set the tone and priorities with regard to contingency planning 
at the border, and Mexico has cooperated to a great extent; the Critical Infrastructure 
Group is an example of binational cooperation and crossborder contingency planning. 
The challenges ahead for contingency planning at the border are twofold: fi rst, 
designing new institutions or re-equipping existing ones to deal with the new risks in 
the post 9/11 era; second, fostering cooperation so that Mexico and the U.S. are on 
the same page.  
A future research agenda needs to focus not only on the institutional setting and design 
but also on incorporating crossborder impact models of natural and anthropogenic 
hazards such as ﬂ ooding, wildfi res, and earthquakes.  Dynamic systems models 
and geographic information systems could offer an important venue to incorporate 
institutional design into this type of analysis.  The border and its resources need to be 
seen as a binational public good in which both countries have a stake and, therefore, 
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cooperation is seen as a necessary although, not suffi cient, condition to successfully 
manage future natural and anthropogenic risks. 
ENDNOTES
i Crossborder refers to the ﬂ ows  (labor, goods, capital, services) that are local or regional in nature 
and that are dependent on a border location. For instance, the ﬂ ows of hazardous material that is 
moved across the U.S.-Mexico international border is particularly important from the perspective of 
crossborder planning. For more on crossborder processes see Alegria (1992).
1 1) Tijuana, Baja California-San Diego, California; 2) Mexicali, Baja California-Calexico, California; 
3) San Luis Rio Colorado, Sonora-Yuma, Arizona 4) Nogales,Sonora-Nogales, Arizona; 5) Agua 
Prieta, Sonora-Douglas, Arizona; 6) Naco, Sonora-Naco, Arizona; 7) Palomas, Chihuahua-Columbus, 
New Mexico; 8) Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua-El Paso, Texas; 9) Ojinaga, Chihuahua-Presidio, Texas; 
10) Ciudad Acuña, Coahuila-Del Rio, Texas 11) Piedras Negras, Coahuila-Eagle Pass, Texas;  12) 
Reynosa, Tamaulipas-McAllen, Texas; 13) Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas-Laredo, Texas; 14) Matamoros, 
Tamaulipas-Brownsville, Texas
2 Maquiladoras are foreign-owned assembly plants that import all the inputs and take advantage of 
low-cost location to assemble the inputs, which then are exported. The BIP restricted maquiladoras to 
within 30 km of the northern border, but in the 1980s the restriction was lifted and  maquiladoras could 
locate anywhere in Mexico. 
 
3 http://www.inegi.gob.mx/inegi/default.asp
 
4 U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program: Progress Report 1996-2000: Contingency Planning and Emergency 
Response. 
5 http://hazmat.dot.gov/regs/intl/nafta.htm
6 http://cocef.org/aproyectos/ExcomCdJuarez2001_07ing.htm
7 http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/
 
8 http://www.cocef.org/pcertifi ed.php 
 
9 http://www.cocef.org/tstatistics.php
10 http://www.ibwc.state.gov/wad/ﬂ owdata.htm.  Amistad has a maximum capacity of 6025 million of 
M3 and Falcon a top capacity of 3,897 millions of M3.
11 For a history and list of treaties see  http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/bbf/bftreaties.pdf
12 Bold added by the author.  A copy of the agreement can be obtained at  http://www.epa.gob/cgi-
bin/.
13 http://www.epa.gov/usmexicoborder/
14 The 14 pairs of sister cities are: San Diego-Tijuana, Calexico-Mexicali, Yuma-San Luis Río Colorado, 
Ambos Nogales, Ambos Nacos, Douglas-Agua Prieta, Columbus- Puerto Palomas, El Paso-Ciudad 
Juárez, Presidio-Ojinaga, Del Rio-Ciudad Acuña, Eagle Pass-Piedras Negras, Laredo-Nuevo Laredo, 
McAllen-Reynosa, and Brownsville-Matamoros.   Source: U.S.-Mexico Border XXI Program: Progress 
Report 1996-2000. 
15 U.S. Code, Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, Chapter 68 Disaster Relief. Amended Oct. 30, 
2000. 
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16 See Macias, 1999 for a more detailed explanation of the different laws. 
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ABSTRACT
The impact on planning of one major land title regularization program in Starr County 
colonias in the Texas-Mexico border is discussed.  This program, which ended in 2002, 
was undertaken by the Community Resources Group (CRG) and resulted in about 1,000 
titles being cleared and formally assigned to their proper owners.  To analyze this 
program we used a comprehensive approach involving new empirical data.  In this 
paper we present data gathered from a survey of 260 households and interviews as 
well as focus groups organized with affected residents in colonias.  The data revealed 
that the new legal owners expressed in many different ways the positive results in 
terms of their self-worth, sense of belonging, and feeling of being respected citizens 
as they pay property taxes.  We also found that colonia residents are choosing (either 
freely or determined by fragile markets) to stay and live in these communities, thereby 
exercising the use value of their property and not its exchange value.  We also observed 
that the implications of this intervention are limited.  New owners are not entering 
fi nancial markets due to their new ownership.  Residents worked hard to buy their 
lots and make improvements and they are not willing to risk losing them through the 
fi nancial system.  Besides, “titled” colonias do not differ dramatically from “untitled” 
colonias: they still lack basic infrastructure and are still isolated communities.  New 
owners are still low-skilled workers who have no access to fi nancial markets.  Proper 
ownership is a positive policy but it alone can  result only in limited impact in colonias. 
There is an urgent need for a comprehensive planning approach in the whole border 
region to allow colonias and their residents to continue improving their communities 
with more institutional and legal support.
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INTRODUCTION1
The border area between the United States and Mexico can be characterized as a 
distinct economic region because it shows unique characteristics that are clearly 
different from the rest of the country.  From Texas to California on the U.S. side and from 
Tamaulipas to Baja California on the Mexican side, this region has frequently been a 
focus of study.  During the last decade, this border region has grown dramatically in 
terms of economic activity, trade, and population compared to the rest of the United 
States and Mexico, in part due to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
As trade between the U.S. and Mexico has increased dramatically, the border areas 
have become extreme examples of the benefi ts and problems arising from such trade 
agreements.
It is important to note that the Texas border is not a homogeneous region (Boudeville, 
1966; Giusti, 1988).  Within it, there are both rich, dynamic areas and poor, stagnant 
areas.  Poor colonias are often the undesirable side effect of this increased dynamism. 
As border cities become more appealing to new investors and residents due to trade 
expansion, the cost of living increases and the low-income population tends to move 
away from the city in search of more affordable housing.  Few developers or state 
programs build housing for low-income residents; as a consequence, colonias are 
among their few options.  Texas border cities such as Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso 
that have grown considerably show signs of economic dynamism and offer more and 
better services, but at the same time, fi nd low-income settlements such as colonias 
visibly growing on their fringes.
Colonias represent all the elements that can go wrong in a community where there 
has not been a concerted planning effort.  They emerge and grow as the result of 
powerful forces regardless of the lack of regulation and or public intervention.  They 
can be seen as one of the results of a “free market in the making” (Larson, 1995). 
The informal, unplanned way in which these communities emerge has been changing 
and improving since the late 1990s, partly due to policies and programs enacted by 
the Texas legislature.  Land title has been a key element in this reform.  One of the 
immediate objectives of such legislation has been the conversion from an informal 
contract for deed (discussed in the next section) to a more formal legal instrument 
called warranty deed.  The objective is to assign legal ownership and responsibility for 
property taxes, to reduce insecurity, and to resolve tenure conﬂ icts.
This paper focuses on the effects of one major land title regularization program in 
some fi fteen colonias outside of Rio Grande City in Starr County in the Texas border 
region between the U.S. and Mexico.2  Here about one thousand titles were cleared 
and formally assigned to the proper owners.  Our focus is to analyze to what extent this 
policy, as it was implemented in Starr County, has cleared the path from informality 
to formality, enhanced property values, encouraged a more dynamic land market, 
promoted home investment and improvements, and activated credit and mortgage 
markets.  In dealing with these issues we aim at having a better understanding of their 
implications in terms of planning, in a border — isolated — low-income community 
like Rio Grande City.
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This paper will present, fi rst, an overview of colonias; second, a discussion of the 
relevant literature; third, our data sources, methodology, and research results; and 
fourth, conclusions and policy suggestions.
GENERAL CONDITIONS IN COLONIAS
Starr County is mainly composed of colonias, areas with substandard housing and 
inadequate plumbing and sewage disposal systems, where there is a high concentration 
of low-income residents.  Colonia is a Spanish term for neighborhood or community. 
In Texas, following the defi nition of the Offi ce of Attorney General (OAG, 1993, 2005), 
colonia refers to a residential area along the Texas–Mexico border that may lack basic 
water and sewer systems, electricity, paved roads, and safe and sanitary housing. 
Colonias can be found in other areas in the U.S. (Ward, 1999), mainly in New Mexico, 
Arizona, and California, but Texas has both the largest number of colonias and the 
largest colonia population.
According to the latest (2000) census, Texas contains 1,450 colonias, a 21.5 % increase 
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from 1,193 colonias recorded in 1992.  Currently, 350,000 residents (280,000 in 1992) 
live in colonias, an increase of 25% in eight years.  Clearly, the population of U.S. 
colonias is growing (US Bureau of the Census 2005).  The large majority of residents 
are Spanish-speakers of Mexican descent.  Contrary to common belief, many of them 
are legal residents or full citizens.
Texas colonias date back to at least the 1950s, but the 1980s and early 1990s show the 
largest growth.  From the supply point of view, developers created unincorporated 
subdivisions from agriculturally worthless land that lay in ﬂ oodplains or other rural 
properties.  They divided the land into small lots, put in little or no infrastructure, and 
then sold them to low-income individuals seeking affordable housing.  In the beginning, 
this marginal land was divided and sold with little control by local and state authorities. 
For a variety of reasons, regulations operating in most urban and rural developments 
in the U.S. were not mandatory, and colonias started with very little control over their 
legal status or the basic services provided to them (Ward, 1999; Doebele, 1994; Wilson 
& Menzies 1993).
From the demand point of view, a growing number of low-income, low-skilled workers 
with very limited budgets became incapable of paying city housing costs.  As the border 
economy expanded as a result of NAFTA, cities along the border grew and became 
less affordable to low-skilled workers, especially when confronted with demands from 
low-income residents with high expectations of owning property.  Many of those who 
became colonia residents came from Mexico with high economic expectations and 
the belief that one’s most important asset is a piece of land that gives security and a 
sense of belonging (Ward et al., 2003).  This is the bulk of the demand at the very low 
end of the income level.  Perhaps it is closer to what we call “need,” and there was a 
supply for this need.
The accessibility of “useless” land and its commercialization by local developers, 
coupled with the rising need for low-income housing, contributed to the formation and 
expansion of colonias.  As there was little regulation on the subdivision of lots, the 
legal transactions regarding them were also minimally regulated.  Colonia residents 
bought their lots through a contract for deed, a property-fi nancing method whereby 
developers typically offer a low down payment and low monthly payments but no title 
to the property until the fi nal payment is made (Larson, 1995; Ward, 1999).  Although 
this arrangement is very dubious, it has been an affordable alternative for thousands of 
families who could not afford formal fi nancing systems (Mettling, 1997).  Payment was 
often not a fi xed amount and a common practice was that residents paid “as money 
was available.”  It was also, most of the time, the only option available to them, given 
their inability to obtain loans from fi nancial institutions.  Their poor or non-existent 
credit history made them unqualifi ed for a loan from local banks.
Unfortunately, this contract for deed, the only alternative for many low-income 
residents along the border, was used fraudulently by some of the sellers (Larson, 1995). 
For instance, residents said, as it is documented in the Receivership legal case, that 
even though they continued making monthly payments while they were away doing 
migratory labor, developers sold their temporarily empty lots to other residents.  It 
is common practice that new lot owners do not immediately move to their property. 
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There is usually some time between the date of the fi rst down payment and the date 
that individuals are able to move onto these underserviced lots.  In some such cases, 
these lots were improperly oversold — that is, sold to more than one buyer.
Another factor of colonia life that appeals to low-income people is incremental 
construction:  they are able to build their houses in phases on their lots.  Residents 
gradually build their homes as they can afford materials and keep adding features as 
fi nances allow.  This self-construction (auto-construcción) is considered a problem 
in low-income communities in the U.S. because minimum construction standards are 
not usually met.  This is not the case in developing countries where, with very limited 
resources, housing programs not only tolerate these practices but in many cases they 
are  much promoted as the only option for the poor.
DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE
Property entitlement is one of the most cherished rights in the United States.  Land is a 
very distinctive type of property and is the basis for urban growth.  Access to land and 
its benefi ts is one of key ingredients in any development.  Planning is generally done on 
the basis of a legal system that protects and promotes legal rights to land.  Planning, 
however, becomes more complex and blurred in a context where land is not legally 
owned, as is the case of Rio Grande colonias.
Regularization of land tenure into formal property has been a major policy goal of the 
Texas legislature since the late 1990s.  While irregular — out of the legal framework 
— land markets are not the common model in the United States, they are very common 
in developing countries.  Informality in land markets is a well-discussed topic in the 
literature related to developing countries.  There we fi nd prolifi c fi eldwork for research 
because spontaneous appropriation of land has been a common way for low-income 
groups to obtain property, especially around big metropolitan areas (United Nations, 
1995).  Several studies have discussed the perception of these invaders and the 
process by which they have become part of the legal market system — or not (see 
Azuela, 1998; Hardoy & Sattherthwaite, 1989; Romero et al., 1994; Gilbert & Ward, 1985). 
A common theme in these cases is the illegality of land acquisition and the parallel 
market activity away from the formal fi nancial system.  Likewise, several studies have 
reported the process of bringing informal settlements into the framework of a legal 
system, and the policy recommendations that emerge from them (Buckley & Kalarickal 
2005; Calderon 1999).
In The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails in the Rest of 
the World (2000), De Soto discusses the consequences of informality and the positive 
outcome expected from giving full legal title to informal settlers.  De Soto argues that 
non-owners — people in developing countries who are occupying land without proper 
formal title — are not taking full advantage of the land on which they live.  They are 
incapable of using their property as the asset that it actually is.  This argument has 
strong policy implications because it expects that formality will not only result in a 
more dynamic land market but will also bring new owners into the fi nancial market 
and allow them to participate more actively as asset owners.  These arguments have 
been broadly criticized by Gilbert (2002), mainly on the basis of De Soto’s assumptions 
— for example, that title is a fi nancial asset and implies market participation and that 
lot owners are fi nancial participants.  Woodruff (2001) points out several cases in 
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which titling programs have not had the desired effects, as this is not the only variable 
needed for re-orienting the so-called informal or illegal settlements.  This argument is 
supported by several more studies on developing countries (Deininger & Binswanger 
1998, Payne 2002, Gilbert 2002, Cole & Grossman 2002, Varley 2002, Buckley & Kalarickal 
2004, 2005, Perlman 2002) that demonstrate that there are more elements than titling 
involved when designing land market policies.  Specifi cally, they mention access 
to well-paid jobs, access to institutions dealing with land and housing businesses, 
access to property, and family income, among other variables discussed below.
Nevertheless, there are policymakers who support De Soto’s arguments, and the 
debate is still open. In this line of argument Carter & Olinto (1998, 2000) and Paulson & 
Townsend (2000) show that there is empirical evidence showing a positive association 
between formal title and access to credit.  
Varley (2002) minimizes the relevance of a legal/illegal dichotomy and suggests that the 
polarity between formality and informality does not illuminate the issue but clouds the 
process.  The issue under discussion is not just the search for a formal legal system, 
but how the actual process of legality and formality is perceived by low-income 
groups.  In her study on Mexico, she argues that legalization was relevant when 
residents perceived public recognition of their achievements in housing their families 
and building a home.  In other words, legality did not imply a change in the way these 
families perceived themselves or how they acted in terms of home improvements.  The 
important role of legalization was the public recognition of such accomplishments.
Buckley and Kalarick (2004), in a review of land and housing policies in developing 
countries, argue that titling programs need to be applied in a more comprehensive way 
(see also Woodruff 2001).  They point out specifi c practical problems (p.22) as the high 
cost of titling and other social conditions as the access to legal instruments (as in the 
case of women in Kenya, who have no right to access to property [Lee-Smith 1997]) 
and the incapacity of using title as collateral.  This incapacity is due to the fact that to 
get a loan there are more requirements that just a property title; it is also necessary to 
show proof of income, which is not always easy in a context of informal settlers in an 
informal economy.
These arguments are very much in line with studies done by De Souza (1999, 2001) 
on land tenure security in low-income settlements in Brazil.  While the issue of land 
tenure is not underestimated in terms of the relevance of giving proper title to invasores 
(invaders), it is also accepted that among low-income groups the meaning of title is 
somewhat blurry.  They are already out of the market in many ways — for instance, 
they are not considered credit-worthy by most fi nancial institutions and in general 
and they are not part of the labor force.  Their status in terms of land tenure is just one 
more area in which they are not part of the formal system.  While this fact is widely 
accepted in developing countries, the issue in a developed country such as the United 
States remains uncertain.
Another element discussed related to title in the context of colonias is related to title 
and population mobility.  A concern discussed in the Texas legislature was that when 
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given proper title, new properties’ owners would promptly sell them and move out from 
these depressed areas.  As colonias were perceived to be transitory communities in 
a migratory process, this type of intervention was perceived as a waste of resources. 
However, there is research coming from studies done in developing countries 
suggesting that this is not the case.  For instance, Varley (2002) reports that in the 
case of low income settlements in Mexico, about 90% of people interviewed had no 
intention to move after receiving proper title on their properties.  That was not the 
crucial element in the decision to sell or move out.
A distinctive characteristic that differentiates the U.S. from developing countries is a 
well-established sophisticated fi nancial system.  In the U.S., markets (including land 
markets) are more developed and fi nancial institutions play a more active role than in 
developing countries.  Thus, when planners in the U.S. are confronted with an informal 
economy operating in a colonia, they are often not at ease.  It is true, though, that since 
the late 1980s the Texas legislature has intervened to provide these communities with 
the most essential basic services such as water, wastewater, electricity, and some 
paved roads3 as well as with more institutional and legal support.  However, the needs 
of colonias often exceed the investments and interventions made.  Nevertheless, there 
has been an observable improvement in the last fi fteen years due to intervention from 
the public sector.  While basic infrastructure has dramatically improved, there is still 
far to go in terms of several services available in colonias, such as health, education, 
and public transportation just to mention some.  The major discussion that has not 
been resolved yet, is which organization leads the effort in colonias.  As planning 
needs a holistic approach from a long-term perspective, it requires a great amount of 
coordinated effort among the several agencies currently involved in the region.
Another critical service lacking for residents of colonias is fi nancial services. 
Financial institutions, in the form of banks, credit unions, or cooperatives are just out 
of the reach of these populations, and there is little or no capacity to access their 
services.  Planners and policymakers need to frame issues of land markets within a 
more comprehensive approach, involving also access to basic services working with 
institutions that support these communities.
STARR COUNTY : A CASE STUDY
Starr County, one of the 29 border counties along the Texas-Mexico border and one 
of the poorest counties in the U.S., is where our research takes place.  Whereas the 
U.S. as a whole has less than 13% of its population living below poverty, almost 51  of 
Starr County’s population lives in this condition.  In our study, one typical colonia, Las 
Lomas, shows 70.7% of persons living below what is considered the poverty line in the 
U.S.4  In spite of this, we observed that many times and against all odds, through their 
labor and investment, these impoverished people created economic resources in the 
form of housing.
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, two corrupt developers, Blas Chapa (a local 
judge) and Elias López, sold over 2,500 underserviced lots to nearly 2,000 families. 
During these years, land around Rio Grande City was subdivided and sold to low-
income individuals, mainly under contract for deed.  The process of subdivision 
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and selling was rife with gross irregularities, resulting in lawsuits against the two 
developers.  The wrongdoings they were accused of included selling lots to more than 
one buyer, not identifying the lots correctly, selling lots on ﬂ ood-prone areas, and not 
paying local taxes on their land.  This last issue was a major factor in subsequent legal 
actions, especially because the school district is a benefi ciary of local taxes and thus 
was being denied income from these lots. 
Due to increasing complaints and rallies in Starr County as well as in Austin, the state 
capital, the Texas Attorney General’s offi ce initiated legal action against these two 
corrupt developers, and a state lawsuit began in September 1993 and concluded in 
January 1995, resulting in separating these individuals from the colonias they created. 
Following this decision, the state appointed the Community Resources Group (CRG), a 
non-profi t organization working with low-income groups in the U.S., as the “Receiver” 
for all colonia property still owned by those developers.  CRG was in charge of giving 
proper legal title to all claiming residents and it went through a complicated legal 
process that started by having bankruptcy declared on the lots just transferred.  (For 
a detailed explanation of the legal framework, see Ward et al., 2003.)  Problems to be 
solved by the Receivership went beyond proper title.  The issues they needed to resolve 
included lots that had been sold more than once, lots that were located in ﬂ ood-prone 
areas (it is not legal to sell property in such areas), lots with no plats available, and lots 
whose descriptions did not coincide with actual characteristics of the terrain.
Fieldwork for our study was done primarily in 2002-2003, when most lots had already 
been assigned.  However, fi ndings of the report were revised after supplemental 
interviews and focus groups were done in 2004.
Currently, 85% of colonia households in Texas and 79.5% of Starr County residents 
own and occupy their own home.  This makes these settlements a model context for 
piloting an economic development strategy based on asset accumulation and security 
among the poor.  These are, in fact, mostly “communities of owners” but, in some 
ways they do not portray the same image this type of community has in other parts of 
the country.
DATA SOURCES + METHODOLOGY
We gathered three major sources of data: fi rst, we identifi ed an extensive database of 
more than 1400 records of affected residents who were served by CRG in colonias in 
Starr County; second, we created and administered a survey (followed by interviews); 
and third, we conducted focus-group discussions in specifi c themes that emerged from 
our survey analysis.  Most of the information used, including the surveys, interviews, 
and focus groups, were in Spanish, as this is the main language spoken in colonias. 
The database we used was created by CRG and includes general information needed 
for the Receivership program in the fi fteen colonias were they intervened.  Specifi cally, 
it contains the owners’ basic information, dates of transaction and prices paid by lot 
and/or improvements, lot sizes and basic information on the property.
We developed and administered a purpose-designed household survey (a copy of 
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which can be requested directly from the fi rst author) to collect a variety of variables 
not available in the database.  We used the CRG database to create the list from which 
the sample was collected, and the households were randomly selected from that pool 
for our detailed household interviews.  The survey specifi cally collected new data on: 
1) the value owners input into their property to compare with the price recorded in 
the database; 2) whether receiving a title in the “regular” way (through a developer) 
was perceived as qualitatively different from when receiving it through CRG’s legal 
intervention; 3) whether there is a difference in the way individuals were using their 
new “formal” title compared with how they had been using their “informal” contract; 
4) fi nally we included specifi c questions related to residents’ perception of their 
communities, to compare their “formal” status with their previous one.
We administered the survey in the ten largest colonias that fairly represented the 
affected population.  There were 303 cases where households had their land title 
cleared with CRG’s assistance; these were designated the Study Group.  Given the 
relatively modest number, we decided to include them all rather than select a sub-
sample, recognizing that we were unlikely to succeed in interviewing everyone. 
In order to have a comparative group of those who had not been affected by CRG 
intervention, we drew up a sample of households from a list of 400 cases from the 
CRG database and randomly selected 133 cases (one-third of the total); these we 
designated the Control Group.
In total, 266 individuals (of a total of 436) or 61% of the total sample were interviewed in 
the study.  Among those, 195 individuals (or 64% of the total of 303 pre-selected cases) 
in the Study Group were interviewed, while in the Control Group, 71 of a total of 133 
individuals (or 53%) were interviewed.  Having both a Study Group and a Control Group 
in our survey was important to our objective of analyzing the extent to which attaining 
title in the “normal” way was perceived as qualitatively different from obtaining it 
through the CRG receivership program.
Some elements need to be addressed to validate our sample selection and sample 
size.  First, we purposely gathered our random sample from the same constituency 
— namely the CRG database — to minimize bias in our sample.  This dual approach 
resulted in two main advantages: fi rst, it allowed us to triangulate the larger CRG 
database;  second, we were able to undertake a more in-depth analysis of variables 
not included in the database.  Because the CRG database and survey respondents 
came from the same pool with similar socio-economic and cultural characteristics, 
we fi nd no reason to speculate the presence of a serious bias in our sample.  Second, 
we were concerned about the possible problems introduced when working with 
small samples.  We compared some of the socio-economic variables from the CRG 
database and from our survey with those of the 2000 census whenever these colonias 
coincided with census defi ned “places” (CDPs)5.  Our comparison was encouraging 
as our fi ndings coincided with census information, thereby providing greater veracity 
to our sample survey results.  Third, we needed to address the issue of non-responses. 
While open refusal rates were very low, in spite of multiple attempts-backs, it proved 
impossible to interview everyone in the originally assembled sample.  However, based 
on the characteristics of the CRG database and the random sample selection criteria 
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used, we have no reason to suspect that our fi ndings were affected by this reduced 
sample.
The 10 focus groups of about 100 residents generated more in-depth information about 
the process of getting title and the perception of legal owners about their new status. 
The general themes discussed in the focus groups resulted from an initial analysis of 
the surveys.  However, the researchers also allowed for other topics to emerge when 
participants raised new ones. None of the participants in the focus groups had fi lled 
out the survey, so the sample of the focus groups represented new sources of data. 
We purposefully created targeted groups consisting of randomly chosen individuals 
fi lling pre-determined characteristics.  In 2002 we conducted two women-only groups 
of 8 each; three couples groups, totaling 60 individuals; and two individuals groups, 
totaling 13 individuals.  In 2003 we came back and conducted three more focus groups 
including one that included re-located individuals totaling 14 participants.  Altogether 
we gathered 103 individuals in all focus groups.  Different settings in these focus 
groups contributed to more detailed and expansive conversations.  For example, 
women were more eager to participate in a women-only setting; they also seemed to 
be more at ease because the focus groups were conducted in Spanish and led by a 
woman (Giusti).
All this information was analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques.  First we 
performed a transcription and detailed coding for each and every focus group.  After 
extensive discussion among the researchers involved, we carefully, and in stages, re-
defi ned our original major themes.  Next we proceeded to re-evaluate our transcripts, 
re-defi ning areas of analysis.  After re-coding the transcripts we fi nally arrived at the 
main themes that emerged more clearly from these discussions.  We present in the 
next section some of the themes that more visibly exemplify our main fi ndings.
Finally we need to be aware of a limitation in our analysis.  Our survey originally 
considered a margin error of 5%, a confi dence level of 95% with a response distribution 
of 50% (see Utts 2004); however, we ended up reaching a smaller sample than originally 
designed.  While the research sample is still within the margins of acceptable size 
(Bartlet et al, 2001) some generalizations cannot be made.  The sample on each 
variable was limited, as some questions did not get enough answers to be statistically 
suffi cient, and this resulted in an additional complication in our study.  We decided not 
to present here a complex statistical analysis but rather to suggest the major themes 
and trends observed from our initial analysis of this limited sample.
Nevertheless, we are confi dent that this combination of tools and techniques 
defi nitively provides a reasonable source of new data to be able to set major trends, 
as well as to make a broad characterization of the existing conditions and constraints 
from the point of view of residents in the colonias under study.  We do not expect that 
our results can be generalized to every low-income community in the U.S., as colonias 
represent many particular circumstances.  We expect our fi ndings to be limited to 
areas with similar characteristics as defi ned by isolated low-income communities that 
characterize large areas along the U.S.-Mexico border region.
DATA FINDINGS
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Bringing homeowners into the framework of the legal system has resulted in some 
expected and other unexpected results.  Next we  present the major four areas we 
believe are relevant in terms of the effi cacy and relevance  of planning:
1 Population Stability
The fi rst fi nding that has direct implications in the planning fi eld is that residents who 
got their proper title neither moved out of the colonia nor had immediate plans to move 
out.  Although the general perception was that new owners in colonias would be ready 
to “sell and leave” these communities as soon as their legal status was cleared, we did 
not observe this behavior.  In our survey, we specifi cally asked whether they planned 
on staying in the colonia after getting the title.  The response was overwhelming: 
93.13% said that they were  likely to stay where they were.  This response was valid for 
both the Study and the Control Groups.  This fi nding was also confi rmed in our focus 
group:
Q:… you are all owners…. Can you sell it for more?
A:  Before we did not have title, or before we had a 
possibility of getting title, that land was bad, we were 
cheated, no one wanted to return to see us, we could 
not even rent!  If I wanted to sell, there was no one to 
buy because people said it was not valid.  If I did not 
have title, then the person I sold it to would not have 
title. Now that we have title, we could sell.  But now we 
do not want to sell.  That is exactly it.
To justify this opinion most respondents expressed that their property was  their main 
— and in most cases their only — asset, and after working so hard to obtain it, they 
were not willing to sell and leave.  
2 Comprehensive Meaning of Title
We found that the meaning of property goes beyond just having a legal title to the 
property.  This was observed as residents of colonias were making improvements in 
their lots even without being fully owners.  While this is unlikely in a wealthier, formal 
settlement, this was the only option available for colonia residents.
Most residents of colonias believed themselves to be “owners” of their lots even 
before receiving a deed.  Within the study group 68% felt themselves to be owners of 
their property since the moment they began paying for the land.  This response came 
from those who had contract for deed (49%) and those who only held receipts as the 
proof of purchase (40%).  As long as they were making payments they had this “sense 
of ownership.”  This explains why residents in these colonias were making home 
improvements even without a deed on their properties.  This perception, however, 
was not validated by the “legal” system.  This “misguided” appreciation is also found 
in developing countries where the sense of ownership has no direct correlation with 
legal systems, to which low-income individuals do not feel they belong.
However, the CRG intervention prompted owners to rely on a legal system to protect 
their rights.  Before, when colonia residents held contract for deed or only payment 
stubs, they could not take advantage of the privileges that title warrants.  Moreover, 
when colonia residents became legal owners, they did not fear eviction from their lots. 
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Indeed, one resident in a women-only focus group expressed the difference between 
“before” and “after” ownership in this way: 
For example, the property title is like a marriage 
certifi cate.  If you are not married with that person [with 
whom you cohabit], well, it does not exist.  Even though 
you are living together, keeping the union together, you 
are nobody.  You have no rights over that person.  If 
you are married, you have more rights in all aspects.  
The same with property.  We have rights in everything.  
Simply now that [inaudible] either you are the wife or 
you live together.  I am the husband. ... I am his owner.  
My property.  My marriage is my property of him.  I have 
all the rights with him.  It’s the same with the house.   
The title is my right to it.  It’s yours.” 
Besides expressing a very particular understanding of marriage, the resident is clear 
about how important this piece of paper is.  Title is the “property of him (lot).”  The 
issue of right is essential in this view. 
Having your title, being secure, you can say, it is my 
house and it is my solar [lot].  I can do whatever I want 
with it in case of an emergency or anything else.  ….  If 
you have a little piece of paper, as we say, the paper 
speaks for you.  (laughter)  Yes, the paper talks.  It says 
that it is yours.  Well, it is mine.
Another consequence of legality is the fact that most new legal owners are very 
willing to pay taxes.  They expect that, by doing so, their claim on their lot is even 
more secure because it ultimately proves they are the rightful owners of the property. 
Moreover, paying taxes also has important implications in their self-perception and 
in their perception of colonias.  As taxpayers, residents are starting to change their 
perception of their right to request basic infrastructure from county offi cials and to 
improve the provision of services such as water, sewage, and paved roads.
We also observed that having legal title has had an empowering effect on current 
owners and has changed their self-perception dramatically, as individuals and as 
members of their communities.  In terms of self-perception, having legal ownership 
of their lots was expressed as a turning point for most people interviewed.  Their 
worthiness as individuals and as family members improved dramatically.  As one of 
the residents expressed, “It was hard.  But we owned the land.  I could say, ‘Esto es 
mio.’”  This pride does not come from the fact that they own the land (as we observed 
that they acted as “de-facto” owners) but from the recognition of that fact by others. 
This outside validation resulted in a considerable redefi nition of who they are in their 
communities.
3 Use Value VS Exchange Value of Title
This theme is closely related to our previous fi nding.  As new owners actually live in 
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their properties, make improvements, and stay in their communities, they are actually 
taking advantage of the “use-value” of title as they feel the security and peace-of-
mind title brings along.  Paying taxes to assure their rights contributes to this fact.  This 
fi nding is now addressed in our theoretical discussion on the capacity of new owners 
to use the exchange value of their property.
In terms of real market value, our research shows that the price was fi fty cents 
per square foot, about the same from the beginning of the 1980s until 2003.  Getting 
proper title did not change market conditions or colonias’ lack of basic services and 
isolation from main cities (see Ward et al., 2004 for a detailed analysis of land market 
performance in the colonias under study).  Lots with proper title and lots without it did 
not show statistically relevant differences in terms of price.  Title as a variable did not 
seem to be correlated with land price.  From our survey, we found that the market was 
not operating well in these colonias, and that resale of lots were diffi cult.  Almost four-
fi fths of survey respondents stated that it would not be easy to sell their properties, 
even if they wanted to.  The impediment to such transactions does not seem to be 
possession of title but the fact that demand is low.  Demand is not the same thing as 
need, as demand implies need and fi nancial capability to pay to satisfy it.
Another aspect was also explored: to what extent new owners were willing to use this 
new asset to enter the fi nancial system, and to use title as collateral to back loans. 
Without title, there are no legal rights over the land that colonia residents occupy, 
so they cannot use this asset in the fi nancial market (De Soto, 2000).  Following this 
argument, residents who became new owners were expected to start using their lots 
as collateral for loans.  However, this is not what we observed.
One third of the 162 respondents in the Study Group claimed that in the past they 
had applied for a loan (for any purpose, not just home improvements), but only 5% 
indicated that they used property as collateral.  The majority in both groups (87%, N 
= 228) expressed fearfulness about losing their homes if they failed to repay the debt. 
The Control Group showed similar results.  This group has held a warranty deed for 
a longer period of time than the Study Group and therefore was more aware about 
the ability to use title as collateral for a loan (53% compared to 42%).  However, our 
fi ndings show that they, too (82%), feared losing their land and homes should they 
default on their loans.
Very few residents expressed their intention to use their lots as collateral.  This could 
be explained from two different standpoints.  From the demand point of view, in most 
cases new owners are very reluctant to jeopardize their only asset and do not want to 
risk losing it.  Most colonia residents do not qualify for traditional loans; they had poor 
credit history, unstable jobs, and low incomes before and after getting title to their 
property.  From the supply point of view, fi nancial institutions are not actively pursuing 
these clients because the fi nancial status of the residents does not change radically 
just because they have become “proper owners.”  They are still characterized as low-
skilled workers who do not have stable or well-paid jobs.  And because the market 
value of these lots is not growing signifi cantly, it is not profi table for the banks to give 
loans to individuals who, in their perception, are still high-risk clients.  Finally, as the 
value of the property has not increased dramatically, banks do not see this as an 
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attractive investment, as the re-sale value of those properties is not signifi cant.
Use-value of title is what matters, according to our observations.  This conclusion came 
from our survey and from our focus groups.  Homeowners are actually living in their 
property and making the most out of the fragile and many times unsafe environment in 
which they live.  Accepting this fact is a “must” for planners who need to approach the 
needs of these communities from a holistic view.
4 Title and Informality
When this study was conducted title had been given across colonias and therefore 
we expected that almost all our respondents were going to claim to have a deed on 
their properties. The Warranty Deed is the evidence of title that the CRG granted to 
all residents in the Study Group, and those in the Control Group already had received 
deeds from the developers when they completed their payments.
However, our survey showed a slightly different picture: 82% of respondents (218 of 
265, combining both groups) said they currently held a Warranty Deed; most of the 
remainder (10% or 27) stated they held a written Contract for Deed; and the rest 
claimed to have only a letter or receipts to prove ownership, had no title at all, were 
unsure, or declared some other form of title.  No major differences appeared in this 
respect between the Control and Study Groups.
While it is always possible that these may be non-results reﬂ ecting “noise” within the 
survey questionnaire and/or misreporting and misunderstandings, we have reasons to 
believe that this data may genuinely portray what is happening in colonias.
This was one fi nding coming from the survey that needed to be addressed in the focus 
groups and with our key informants in the area.  One fact is that holders of a warranty 
deed may sell property in subsequent exchanges since titling, whether it was granted 
by the developers or by the CRG, using the written contract for deed or payment 
schedule when they sell (traspaso in Spanish).  Thus, people may be reverting to the 
older mechanisms of lot sale and title transfer rather than working through the formal 
exchange of Warranty Deeds.
This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the purchaser only receives a warranty 
deed if the full purchase price is paid outright at the time of sale, whether it is fi nanced 
by a loan or from savings.  As most colonia residents do not qualify for outright 
purchase of the lot, the contract for deed or an unwritten payment schedule is their 
most practical option.  The contract for deed or payment schedule, in fact, replaces a 
formal selling process and dramatically reduces transaction costs such as attorneys, 
mortgage set-up, and title searches.
Indeed the conditions that created informality in colonias have not changed 
dramatically, so we observe a tendency to return to a situation very similar to the 
one that the intervention intended to rectify.  Before the receivership program was 
applied in these colonias, these were the conditions that moved them into informality: 
lack of access to legal instruments explained both by their lack of information and 
of fi nancial resources; lack of a legal framework for colonias who happened to fall 
into the inconsistencies of Texas legislation related to their status.  While the CRG 
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intervention has addressed the last factor, the other ones are still present and it is very 
likely that the future will see a re-appearance of similar problems. This is an issue that 
needs further consideration.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that land titling in colonias has resulted in a positive effect on 
feelings of effi cacy and belonging and a neutral effect on access to fi nancing through 
the use of title as collateral to secure loans.
Colonias are characterized by substandard housing units in a land market with very 
little regulation.  Initially, the Texas legislature disregarded their existence, assuming 
that these border communities were just transitory.  Most policymakers failed to see 
or accept that this was not the case.  In the case of Starr County, legal intervention 
happened only after a spectacular fraud case involving a corrupt county judge — and 
only after media coverage of resident unrest and several protests in the state capital 
of Austin.
This study shows much more stability in the population in colonias than was expected 
by Texas offi cials.  The majority of residents expressed their willingness to stay in 
these communities even when having the possibility to legally sell their properties.  It is 
not totally clear whether this is just the result of the lack of demand in a mostly lagging 
land market, but whatever the cause may be, the fact is that residents are there for the 
long-run and that we need to start planning accordingly.
Several regulations have been enacted to stop the colonia-growing process and make 
developers comply with state minimum standards.  However, colonias still exist and 
new colonia-type developments are emerging along the border and in the rest of the 
country.  Indeed, the conditions that resulted in the initial emergence of colonias still 
persist.  Low-income, skill-less individuals cannot afford increasing housing prices, 
and if land — one way or another — is available and regulations are not clearly 
defi ned or not always enforced, the problems presented here will persist.
We have presented the many positive results of the titling program, but we also 
observed that the implications of this intervention are limited.  In terms of making 
communities more livable, which is essence of why we do planning, titling has been 
very positive.  New legal owners have expressed in many different ways the positive 
results in terms of their self-worth, sense of belonging, and feeling of being respected 
citizens as they pay property taxes.  Ultimately, planners aim to improve people’s 
lives, and it is observed in this research that formal ownership is one way to do that, 
especially when the alternative is not renting but total insecurity.
Title has not had an immediate impact on land markets.  We observed that, as theory 
suggests, ownership is a necessary but not a suffi cient condition.  What is needed for 
a healthy market is supply and demand.  And demand is not equivalent to need.  Need, 
together with fi nancial capability, results in demand.  We found a pressing need in 
colonias but household incomes are too low to generate a strong demand out of that 
need.  While having proper title is positive, other elements are required for robust and 
dynamic land markets.
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Some authors have suggested that new owners have the new capacity to use their 
title to back loans, but we did not observe this.  We did observe that residents worked 
so hard to buy their lots and make improvements to them that they were not willing to 
risk losing them through the fi nancial system.  In our view, this reﬂ ects how rational 
the residents are.  The cost of not being able to pay a debt and then losing their most 
valuable asset is too high.
Colonia residents are taking advantage of the use value of their property rights and 
are not, by now, realizing its exchange value.  After all, they are choosing (or freely 
or determined by fragile markets) to stay and live in these communities.  Planners 
need to recognize this fact in order to recommend policies that will improve these 
communities in the long-term.
It is important to note the limitation of this study and the need of further research.  We 
have studied some of the poorer regions in the country under very adverse economic 
and legal circumstances.  It is still a work in progress as more empirical research is 
needed in a very active border region.
The establishment of informal un-regulated settlements is not accepted by the legal 
system in the U.S.  However, as observed in this study, they are happening and planners 
need to understand that just by giving title to property owners, the complex array of 
problems they confront are not solved.  We observe that this is a move in the correct 
direction, but much more is needed in a long-term to creating livable, sustainable 
communities in the border region.
Planners and policy makers need to approach these communities from a holistic view. 
It is clear from our study that giving title is a positive policy but alone can only result 
in limited impact in colonias.  There is a cry for a comprehensive planning approach in 
the whole border region that will allow colonias and their residents, who are already 
working hard to attain the American Dream, to continue working with more institutional 
and legal support.
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ENDNOTES
1 This paper greatly benefi ted from the comments and suggestions of two anonymous reviewers.
2 This paper derives from a fi nal report these researchers presented to the Community Resources 
Group in 2002-2003 related to an evaluation of their role in the Receivership Program in Starr County, 
Texas. However CRG is not responsible for the opinions cited in this paper. 
3 Perhaps the most important agency investing in infrastructure in colonias is the Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB) that has been in charge of major water and wastewater projects.
4 The U.S. Census Bureau uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and 
composition to determine who is poor.  If a family’s total income is less than that family’s threshold, 
then that family and every individual in it is considered poor.  The poverty thresholds do not vary 
geographically, but they are updated annually for inﬂ ation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U).  
For the year 1999, one person with an annual income below $8,501 is considered poor.
5 In the 2000 Census this is the way in which colonias information was collected.
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ACROSS THE RIVER : DAJABÓN 
+ OUANAMINTHE : A CASE 
OF URBAN BORDERLAND 
DEVELOPMENT IN HAITI + THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
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ABSTRACT
Border cities have to cope with divergent interests more than other cities, because 
in the same place protection of national sovereignty clashes with local practices and 
international cross-border movements. The question of how economic, political, and 
societal transformations linked to the globalisation process shape the urban space of 
border towns should thus be answered through a multifaceted analysis. This article 
introduces the analytical framework of border intermediation, dealing with the internal 
characteristics of the city, its function in national and transnational networks, its 
relation to the direct rural environment and the ways in which the border conditions 
these dimensions. 
The two towns studied, Ouanaminthe and Dajabón, are located on the Haitian-
Dominican border, which is strongly marked by its complex history since the times 
of French and Spanish colonization. This case study is based on qualitative methods 
— such as mapping use of urban space and interviewing local stakeholders and 
residents. Cartography and other primary and secondary sources complement these 
observations. 
Following the economic opening of the border, the remarkable demographic and 
spatial growth of both towns has dramatically changed ground property values. 
Urban development remained principally in the hands of landowners. Cross-border 
exchanges and the establishment of a “maquiladora” industry have had a different 
impact on the relations between both towns. At the local level, recognition of common 
problems has built some basic cross-border solidarity, supported by civil society and 
local governments. But this apprehension is not shared by the central governments 
and transnational economic actors, and it is undermined by strong prejudices of people 
on both sides. Both towns develop, following their own inherent characteristics, and 
despite the fact that they play common roles in cross-border networks, no bi-national 
urban space exists. The links between both towns are mainly functional and not strong 
enough for creating the sentiment of belonging together.
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INTRODUCTION1
Few borders exist that separate two countries as dramatically disparate as the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Both share the territory of the island of Hispaniola2, 
but a profound process of differentiation rooted in the colonial division of the island 
between France and Spain, and ideologically maintained by both modern nations, 
has led to what Théodat (1998, 2003) calls “twofold insularity,” where each country 
behaves as if it were located on a separate island. 
In spite of all prejudices and ethnic, historical, linguistic, social, economic, or religious 
differences (see Table 1 below), people living in the border regions have established 
cross-border relations, which, even if largely based on economic interests, are much 
more frequent and important to both nations than offi cially acknowledged (Cerdano 
and Dilla, 2005; Sillé & Segura & Cabral, 2002). 
TABLE 1 Basic data of Haiti and Dominican Republic 
Haiti Dominican Republic 
Population 8.4 million 8.7 million 
Surface area 27,750 km2 48,442 km2
Density of inhabitants 299 habitants/km2 176 habitants/ km2
GNI per capita 
(Atlas method) 450 USD 2,470 USD 
Life expectancy at birth 52 years 67 years
Sources: Worldbank 2005, IHS 2003, ONE 2002
The local dynamic created by this exchange becomes palpable when one observes 
the busy bi-national market in the border towns of Ouanaminthe (Haiti) and Dajabón 
(Dominican Republic) that are, as showed by Figure 1, located  in the north of the island. 
Twice a week, people from almost the entire northern region of both countries travel 
to these towns, located on either side of the Masacre River, to buy and sell goods or 
offer services in the market of Dajabón. The other days of the week, tons of cargo are 
transported to Haiti, to the extent that the once small borderland settlements have 
become an important junction in the economic subsystem of the northern part of the 
island. Moreover, the 2002 construction of a free zone in Ouanaminthe — to produce 
textiles for the U.S. market — has connected the borderland towns to the international 
economy. The uneven relation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic shows how 
the socio-economic differences between the countries have become fertile ground 
for cross-border trade and transnational production systems. On a much smaller 
scale, the Haitian-Dominican relationship is thus comparable to the existing economic 
exchange and the “maquiladora” industry in urban centers at the Mexican-United 
States border.
How has this recent growth of cross-border economy affected the urban development 
of the two border towns Ouanaminthe and Dajabón?
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The fi rst section of this article introduces the analytical framework of “border 
intermediation” that guides the empirical part of this study. The second section, mainly 
sourced on statistical and historical data, will provide a profi le of the relations between 
both countries. The next two sections deal with the spatial and social transformation 
of Ouanaminthe and Dajabón: their demographic and spatial growth, their function 
as economic interfaces and the cross-border relations of the local population. This 
part is largely based on data  collected during four periods of fi eldwork from 2002 to 
2004;(4 months overall) using principally qualitative methods: observation and mapping 
of occupation and use of urban space (photography, sketches, notes), cartography of 
new urban extensions using GPS and qualitative interviews with 1) local stakeholders 
(30  politicians, representatives of civil society, entrepreneurs, landowners and 
educators on both sides of the border) and 2) residents of marginal neighborhoods (15 
residents of Ouanaminthe and 15 residents of Dajabón). 
The article concludes with a discussion of the bi-national perspective of the urban 
space as a result of the role that both towns have in the cross-border interactions.
URBAN BORDER INTERMEDIATION
The development of two opposite border cities must be seen in the context of the 
economic, socio-demographic, and legal discrepancies that separate the two 
adjacent countries. Their development is also the result of their geographic insertion 
in infrastructure networks that makes the place attractive for settlements. This means 
that we have to understand the status of the border that conditions their relations, but 
also their history, their genesis, and the relations that borderland cities maintain with 
the border and within the national and international network of cities (Bennaﬂ a, 2002; 
Buursink, 2001; Ehlers, 2001; Reitel et al., 2002; Vaneph, Revel et Mouzoz, 1994). 
More so than other cities, borderland cities are situated at the crossroads of “territorial 
space,” based on the protection of national integrity and “reticular space,” which 
FIGURE 1. The transit point Ouanaminthe and Dajabón within the network of urban 
agglomerations of the island.
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implies cross-border movement of goods and people. This spatial particularity makes 
the analysis of interactions especially complex and blurs the perception of different 
territorial scales, for instance, when national interests of territorial defense mingle 
with local cross-border interactions. 
I addressed this issue of the intervention of different geographical scales in a local 
context through the analytical framework of urban intermediation (Ajuntamenta de 
Lleida, UNESCO UIA-CIMES, 1999, Bolay and Rabinovich, 2004).  Intermediate cities 
either have central functions in relation to their immediate environment (local or 
regional administrations and places offering services and goods, centers of social, 
cultural and economic interaction) or play a central role within the infrastructure 
networks on the regional, national, or international level. In my approach, I focused 
on the practices and politics of endogenous and exogenous stakeholders in politics, 
economics and civil society. In this way, the framework becomes principally a 
guideline for the analyses of complex processes that link the transformations of a local 
environment to the national and international context. In borderlands, this also means 
that the motivations behind economic strategies, policies, and social practices should 
be analyzed according to the relations they have with and across the borderline. 
Consequently, the characteristics of the border play a central role in these relations 
that are also described in Figure 2 : 
• Political implications such as the existence of bi-national or international 
treaties, but also unoffi cial cooperation of political stakeholders at the local 
level. 
• Economic interest of the border to create economic activities (legal and 
illegal) due to the disparities between the two countries (economic, socio-
demographic and regulatory).
• Identity formation through the border by the defi nition and delimitation of the 
national identity, but also as federator of a regional “borderland identity.” 
• Social permeability of the border to social contacts between borderland 
societies. 
• Territorial defense role of the border as physical barrier and military 
presence at the borderline. 
• Geographic integration of the border in the regional and national context 
and its connection through infrastructures.
THE BORDER : A PARADOX OF PERMEABILITY + OBSTRUCTION
BRIEF INCURSION IN THE HISTORY OF HISPANIOLA : THE TWO-FOLD IDENTITY OF THE ISLAND
The history that shaped the island of Hispaniola is complex, and in order to understand 
the  issues that currently characterize this country’s division, it is necessary to go back 
to the 17th century, when the former colonial powers, France and Spain, negotiated its 
division. The Spanish arrived fi rst when in 1492 Christopher Columbus dropped anchor 
near the island and set up the fi rst settlements on the eastern part of the island. The 
arrival of foreign troops contributed to the decline of the indigenous population. 
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French settlers arrived around 1625 on the western part of the island and proclaimed it 
a French colony in 1665, a status that was offi cially confi rmed thirty-two years later by 
the Rijkswik Treaty. The fi nal determination of the demarcation line between colonial 
powers took place in 1777 through the Aranjuez Treaty. With the exception of a few 
later modifi cations, this delimitation matches the current border between the two 
now independent nation states. Before and even after this treaty, frequent territorial 
disputes in the borderlands resulted in military excursions organized by the central 
governments. 
Spain and France organized the exploitation of their colonies from completely different 
perspectives.  The French set up a system of intensive plantations that exported 
production directly to the metropolis, while the Spanish occupied their territory 
through extensive agriculture based on livestock. The French extensively employed 
African slave laborers, while slavery was less present in the Spanish colony.3  In spite 
of the territorial disputes between the colonies, trade was more or less tolerated. It 
consisted mainly of the export of livestock from the Spanish side to the French side, 
and the transit of goods imported from Europe in the opposite direction (oil, textiles, 
instruments, and luxury articles). Throughout this period, the border region was both 
the object of military interventions and a place of contact and exchange, vital to the 
population that lived through trade. This paradoxical situation is also reﬂ ected in the 
foundation of the two cities of Ouanaminthe and Dajabón. Ouanaminthe, located on 
the French side of the Masacre River, became an independent parish in 1758 after 
a struggle for recognition. It was described by Moreau de Saint-Méry (1796) as 
pleasant small town. The relative prosperity of the town also continued after the 
independence of Haiti, and a fair picture of it can be perceived nowadays by looking at 
the few remaining historical buildings, although they are in a state of advanced decay. 
Dajabón, the Spanish counterpart, was founded sometime between 1771 and 1776 
FIGURE 2. Framework for border intermediation.
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as a military outpost. In comparison to Ouanaminthe, it was described by the same 
author as a rather modest, uninteresting town. Even if the Spanish colony’s military 
objectives were the prevailing function of Dajabón, its inhabitants were heavily 
involved in the then-illegal cross-border trade. By the end of the 18th century, the 
parish of Ouanaminthe consisted of 7,500 inhabitants and the parish of Dajabón 4,000 
(Moreau de Saint-Méry, 1796), a rather signifi cant number of inhabitants that indicates 
the importance of the trade for both colonies. 
The independence of Haiti in 1804, the episode of Haitian occupation of the entire 
island (1822-1844), and fi nally Dominican independence in 1844 did not dramatically 
alter cross-border relations, as the production in each part of the island did not 
change signifi cantly and cross-border trade continued. During this period, both cities 
maintained their place in the cross-border networks.  
Later, during the American occupation of the island (1915-1924 in the Dominican 
Republic and 1916-1935 in Haiti), the strict control of cross-border trade by the occupying 
administration drove the elites that dominated this commerce to resist and reinforce 
bi-national contraband networks. This resistance to the occupying force fostered a 
bi-national solidarity movement and a borderland identity, which resulted in relative 
independence from the occupiers, especially in the northern part of the island (Baud, 
1993). The Americans altered the established balance between the two agricultural 
production systems by starting the intensive exploitation of sugar cane plantations 
on the Dominican side. As there were not suffi cient numbers of Dominican workers, 
the plantations hired mainly Haitian laborers, which started the Haitian immigration 
to the Dominican side that continues to this day (Muñez, 2003). This period was also 
marked by the departure of Dominican settlers from the border to other parts of the 
island and their replacement by Haitians. The arrival of large numbers of Haitians in 
the Dominican Republic revived anti-Haitian and racist resentment, which had been 
latent since the occupation of the island by the Haitians a hundred years previously. 
Some years later, this anti-Haitian ideology culminated with the establishment of the 
superiority of Dominican people under the regime of Rafael Trujillo (1930-1961) that 
highlighted its supposed white skin color (70% of the DR population is of mixed race) 
and the religious practice of Catholicism, in contrast to the black color of the Haitians 
(95% are of African origin) and the non-Christian practices of Voodoo. The Dominican 
population was taught this ideology through school manuals, and today the older 
population still retains the prejudices transmitted by these representations. 
Trujillo set in place a policy of Dominicanization of the borderlands in a very systematic 
manner. One of his fi rst moves was the 1937 massacre of Haitians living in Dominican 
territory (estimations vary between 15,000 and 30,000). The region around Dajabón 
was strongly affected by this massacre.  This cruel and unforeseeable action created 
a strong resentment in the Haitian population, thereby establishing the Haitian 
counterpart to anti-Haitianism — anti-Dominicanism. During the following period, the 
Trujillo regime militarily strengthened the border and reinforced border settlements 
through new infrastructure (schools, administrative buildings, churches, military 
posts, roads, monuments).  The border region was repopulated with mainly European 
settlers. The Dominicanization process of the borderland resulted in a “Dominican” 
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border landscape that physically distinguishes itself from the appearance of the 
settlements on the Haitian border (Augelli, 1980). 
After the period of dictatorship on the island (Trujillo 1930-1961 in the Dominican 
Republic; François and Jean-Claude Duvalier 1957-1986 in Haiti) the status of the 
border changed, progressively opening to economic exchange. Between 1992 and 
1994 the embargo on Haiti conferred a particular status to the border, as contraband 
was one of the only ways to supply the Haitian market. 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Today the border maintains its role as an interface between two economic systems. 
Both economies are based on services.  In Haiti, agriculture still represents a large 
part of the national production (27% of GNI), while in the Dominican Republic, a similar 
share is occupied by industry (24% of GNI). Both rely on imports and remittances sent 
by migrant workers (Haiti imports three times more than its exports and has weak 
barriers restricting imports, whereas the Dominican Republic covers up to three-
fourths of its imports with exports). 
The bi-national trade has become an important source of income for the Dominican 
Republic.  By absorbing goods of minor quality produced in the Dominican Republic 
unsuitable for export to other countries, Haiti is its second destination for exports after 
the United States. According to offi cial sources, between 1996 and 2005 the value of 
these goods (for a large part construction materials and processed foods) grew from 
USD 24 million to USD 96 million. In the opposite direction, exports grew from close to 
0 to USD 9 million (CEDOPEX, 2006). Nevertheless, for Haiti, the Dominican Republic 
is not an important export destination of goods, but is very important for the export 
of labor.  Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic is estimated at 500,000 people 
working in agriculture and construction (OIM/FLACSO 2004). 
Ouanaminthe and Dajabón are actively taking part in these bi-national movements, as 
more than 30 percent of the offi cially registered trade transits through its customs, and 
the bi-national market that takes place in Dajabón is the most important in the island 
(during one market day about USD 1 million of goods are exchanged). The market 
represents an important source of income for the inhabitants of both cities. These 
economic exchanges offer opportunities for businesses to start organizing export of 
goods from the Dominican Republic to Haiti by setting up warehouses on both sides of 
the border. The same businesses also introduce a transnational dimension to trading 
as they re-export merchandise imported from third countries (for example, rice). 
Even if the population of both towns takes advantage of the growing trade, the majority 
of profi ts are reaped by the exporting and importing companies located in the larger 
urban centers, Cap Haitien in Haiti and Santiago de Caballeros in the Dominican 
Republic. 
Haitian migrant workers are regularly expelled to Ouanaminthe, where some then 
settle. The occasional revelations of illegal networks organizing cross-border transit 
of migrants in Ouanaminthe or Dajabón also show that these cities play a particular 
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role in the system that supplies the Dominican Republic with labor. In this context, the 
installation of a free zone in Ouanaminthe by a Dominican entrepreneur (supported 
by both central governments), using cheap Haitian labor to sew textiles for the 
international market, is a logical development of the unequal relationship between 
both countries. 
DISCONNECTION BETWEEN CENTRAL STATES + LOCAL SOCIETY
Confronted with the reality of such an unequal relationship, reactions of both 
governments are feeble. In public, the presidents of each county affi rm the importance 
of collaboration, but to date hardly any mutual agreements exist at central government 
level, and those that do exist are not operational. The main concern for the Dominican 
government regarding the border seems to be migration, which creates conﬂ ict 
between the governments and populations of the neighboring countries. 
Symptomatic of the relations between the governments is the enduring strong Dominican 
military presence, regulating and administrating the border in absence of the Haitian 
counterpart. (Haiti has had no military force since 1995.). The absence of support by 
the central state leaves local governments confronted with a complex situation where 
policy orientation, fi nancial resources, administrative and organizational setups, 
language, and culture differ on each side of the border. On the local level, the growing 
trade has contributed to a revival of cross-border relations that are mainly the result 
of individual practices and civilian society. The latter is gradually organizing cross-
border networks aimed at reacting to arbitrary administration of transit at customs, 
human rights infractions, and environmental issues. These organizations also have 
relationships with international solidarity networks. In Dajabón and Ouanaminthe, they 
play an important role in local governance, as they are currently the only organizations 
that have relative credibility regarding cross-border relations. International 
development agencies present in the borderland have initiated projects of bi-national 
interest, but they are disconnected from local institutions and are strongly inﬂ uenced 
by their direct relationship with the central governments. For example, the free 
trade zone in Ouanaminthe that has been set up by a Dominican entrepreneur with 
the approval of both governments received fi nancial support from the International 
Monetary Fund and the European Community fi nanced the construction of a covered 
market in Dajabón, without involving the local governments. 
Disconnection from the central government is common in the borderlands, where 
governance models frequently outside governmental action are invented to regulate 
and supply services in bi-national regions. They are often precursors of more formalized 
treaties (Sparrow 2001). For instance, in the present case, the mayor of Dajabón decided 
of his own accord in 2003 to help Ouanaminthe with waste elimination and continues to 
do so. As in other border cities, the relations that link Ouanaminthe and Dajabón to their 
national context are shaped by the contradictory objectives of top-down dynamics of 
the central state, which focuses on territorial integrity, and the bottom-up dynamics 
initiated by local populations and governments, whose existence and development 
depends largely on the opportunities offered by cross border-relations. 
This conjunction of different types of spatial logic results in a constant adjustment 
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between different demands, for example when application of rules is altered by the 
pressure from economic stakeholders who act on an international level, but also 
from the local milieu, as was the case in Ouanaminthe and Dajabón when women 
involved in the bi-national market succeeded in their demand to continue exporting 
used clothing. There is also the case of cross-border practices that constantly test 
the imposed territorial limit by taking advantage of the existence of the border and 
the junction of two national territories, such as the contraband of gasoline or rice. 
An important capability of the local population is their expertise in getting around the 
offi cial rules and adapting them to their needs in daily cross-border relations.
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
DEMOGRAPHIC GROWTH
The urban population of Ouanaminthe increased from 7,200 to 39,700 between 1982 
and 2003, while Dajabón grew from 8,500 to 16,300 inhabitants between 1981 and 2002 
(IHSI 1987, 2003, CONAUR - CEUR 1999, ONE 2002). This growth was partially due to the 
general tendency of urbanization in both countries; however, the borderland situation 
brought about an additional inﬂ ux of mainly rural migrants, particularly in Ouanaminthe. 
The map in Figure 3 shows that both towns have grown in different ways. The major 
growth of Dajabón took place before 1990, whereas Ouanaminthe’s area more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2004 (from circa 90 hectares to 230 hectares). This period 
coincides with the embargo on Haiti, when hardship in the country drove migrants to 
the cities and borderlands, as contraband was one of the ways to assure survival. It 
also reﬂ ects the different economic systems of the counties, as during the 1990s, the 
Dominican Republic extensively developed free zones close to large agglomerations, 
making the emerging economy in the border region less attractive. 
FIGURE 3. Growth of Ouanaminthe and Dajabón from 1777 to 2004
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Both towns lack urban planning and adequate application of building regulations 
that should be enforced by the municipalities under the supervision of the central 
administration. Thus, spatial growth is entirely governed by landowner structure and 
land occupation practices. Land around Dajabón belongs mainly to two landowners, 
whose current strategy to enhance land value by developing well-equipped middle 
class neighborhoods has restricted urban sprawl. Ouanaminthe land mostly belongs 
to small farmers. The selling and illegal occupation of quite small plots has led to 
sprawling urban growth along rural footpaths, with entire areas inaccessible to 
motor vehicles. Population growth is also absorbed by high densifi cation of existing 
neighborhoods. Land has become a point of conﬂ ict. In Dajabón, land prices have risen 
from a symbolic value up to USD 40 per m2 in better locations over the last twenty years. 
The town center, where the market takes place, is progressively being transformed 
into a commercial area, with warehouses in former dwellings and improvised food-
stands that are only open for the two market days. In both towns, a process of internal 
segregation has begun, as more and more businesses occupy the town center and the 
emerging middle class gathers in specifi c neighborhoods. 
Comparative data for both cities makes the unequal situation clear. The cities have 
common traits, such as a relatively young and female population. However, while both 
lack infrastructure, Dajabón is at least able to provide a minimum standard, whereas 
Ouanaminthe lacks nearly all necessary services and infrastructure. A brief study of 
the budgets of both cities explains the situation: in Ouanaminthe the yearly budget is 
about USD 30,000, while Dajabón municipality receives a yearly sum from the central 
government equivalent to USD 360,000 and collects taxes from the bi-national market 
equal to about a third of this amount. The additional surcharge due to population 
growth and transit of traffi c has had little or no impact on the budgets. 
Table 2 shows that Ouanaminthe has a fi ve times higher population density as Dajabón, 
cumulated with very precarious health care, sanitation and education. 
SERVICES FOR A TRANSIT ECONOMY
The boom of the border economy has had a contradictory inﬂ uence on the 
development of services. While public infrastructure lags far behind the need, each 
city has four banks that are branch offi ces of the most important national fi nancial 
institutions (before 2000 there was one branch offi ce in each town). The major national 
and international telecommunications companies are present in Dajabón, and the 
population of Ouanaminthe frequently uses the Dominican mobile phone network, 
also available in the Haitian border region. Despite the absence of tourist attractions 
(although the market regularly attracts a few foreigners), the number of hotels in 
both towns is rising. This private development, initated by economic players on the 
national level or by local investors, clearly shows that both cities are consolidating 
their insertion as a transit point of goods and people in the national city networks. 
The location of the two towns, Dajabón and Ouanaminthe, is strategic for the conquest 
of the Haitian market. This statement by “Magazine Commercial,” one of the most 
important export fi rms that trades in both towns, confi rms this point: “We started 
with a small warehouse in Ouanaminthe and today we have one big warehouse in the 
town centre and a small deposit in front of the market. We also own 50, 000 m2 land 
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located on the main road for further business development. We have as well bought 
warehouses in Dajabón. (…) Our commercial relation is not only a relation between 
Ouanaminthe and Dajabón, but concerns the trade between the Dominican Republic, 
Haiti and other countries that can satisfy the Haitian market. We possess 500,000 m2 
of land in Dajabón where we plan to develop the project of a “Zona Multimodal y 
Fronteriza de Hispanola” including 25 locations for enterprises, a hotel, a free port 
for the re-exportation of goods to Haiti.” (Interview with the Director of “Magazine 
Commercial,” Dajabón, August 2004.) This venture concerns also the development of 
the now declining seaport of Manzanillo, located at about 30 km to the north.
BORDERING SPACE
UNEQUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
The conversion of rural migrants to the service economy and cross-border trade makes 
crossing over to Dajabón indispensable for a growing number of Haitians seeking 
income, but also healthcare and education, despite latent racism and mistreatment. 
With strong feelings of exploitation, Haitians often criticize the capitalist and even 
colonialist relationship imposed by their neighbors.  They criticize not only the fact 
that the bi-national market takes place in Dajabón, but also that Dominican businesses 
have developed subsidiaries in Ouanaminthe, taking advantage of cheap labor and 
the absence of local production: “The Dominicans need us for the market, that’s all. 
There is no possibility to live together on an equal base. But also we [Haitians] have to 
develop our infrastructure; in the present situation we cannot share with them – fi rst 
we have to grow to be stronger and then we can start sharing.” (Interview with a 
resident of Ouanaminthe, November 2003.)
TABLE 2 Summarized profi le of Ouanaminthe and Dajabón
Ouanaminthe Dajabón 
Population commune / province 77,319 62,046
Urban population 39,665 16,328
Density of habitants/km2 in the whole 
commune /province 347 hab./km
2 61 hab./km2
Population less than 18 years 50.4% 46%
Number of household members in urban 
environment 5.5 persons 4 persons
Illiteracy 49.5% 22%
Health centers 1
General hospital  1
Manual water pumps 
Fountains
63
8  (= one water supply for 550 habitants)
Households without access to 
drinkable water n.a. 18%
Households without sanitation n.a. 27%
Sources: IHSI, 2003; ONE, 2002; CONAUR/CEUR, 1999; MPCE/PNUD/FENU, 2001.
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For the Haitian population, the border represents a formidable barrier, even if it is 
open for free passage during the two days of the bi-national market in Dajabón. The 
gate in the middle of the bridge that crosses the Masacre River separating the two 
countries is thus a signifi cant symbol. It is closed at night and closely guarded by 
the Dominican military and customs during the days with no market, and only those 
who have valid papers or offer some money to the military personnel can go through. 
The unoffi cial passage over the river (the water is barely knee-high most of the time) 
is also controlled by the Dominican army. Once in Dajabón, it is diffi cult to get out of 
town, as public transport is under military control and the major routes have several 
checkpoints. 
Consequently, the bi-national market seems to be the only space where Haitian and 
Dominicans mingle (about 10,000 people actively take part). However, this mingling 
of vendors and buyers is  equal only in appearance. Haitian participation depends on 
the arbitrary attitude of customs and the military and the underlying discriminatory 
regulations that make permanent installation diffi cult, such as the regulation that 
merchandise imported from Haiti (mainly used clothing) may remain in Dajabón only 
for 3 consecutive markets. It is no wonder that Haitians have less attractive displays 
and lower prices than Dominican vendors. Haitian products are also considered lower 
quality. A Haitian merchant describes her situation as follows: “I used to go to the 
market in Dajabón every week, but for the moment I stopped going there as I don’t 
fi nd any profi t there. There are assassins, and some people steal merchandises – no 
use to make a declaration to the police.” (Interview with a resident of Ouanaminthe, 
August 2004.)
Dajabón residents interviewed, on the other hand, do not need to cross the river to make 
a living. Half of them have never been to Ouanaminthe, but consider it insalubrious, 
dangerous, and out of control : “I am scared over there, I have been one or two times 
to Ouanaminthe, I know the park and the church in the centre of the city¸ I stayed one 
hour, not more.” (Interview with a resident of Dajabón, August 2004.)
The simple fact of crossing the river is considered dangerous, as the general 
perception is that only people involved in illegal activities or with low morals (e.g., 
seeing prostitutes, participating in voodoo rituals) go to Ouanaminthe.  
For these various reasons, space is not appropriated by the population of the other 
town in either Dajabón or Ouanaminthe. The unequal and complex relationship of 
both populations and the particularity of the border, that is simultaneously permeable 
and diffi cult to cross, have brought about the paradox of their spatial proximity 
accentuating segregation in both towns. The citizens of both countries can remain 
in their own environment and commute, if necessary, even daily. In Dajabón, there is 
no Haitian neighborhood, as is the case in other towns of the same size, even those 
located at the Dominican border. 
In itself the border represents a specifi c space where Dominican domination is at least 
partially confronted. As already mentioned, the river that is an important element in 
the existence of both towns is controlled by the Dominican military, but its space is 
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occupied by the population of Ouanaminthe that uses it for its daily needs and for 
leisure. Dominicans are barely seen there and avoid going there. 
THE FREE ZONE : A COMMON PROBLEM...BUT ONLY TO A CERTAIN EXTENT
The free zone is located on Haitian territory, but on the Dominican side of the Masacre. 
Thus, control of this space is easy for the Dominican military, which frequently violates 
the Haitian border, notably to intervene in protests of Haitian workers for better 
working conditions. On one hand, its presence creates new tensions between both 
populations as the workforce is exclusively Haitian but the supervisors and technical 
personnel Dominican. On the other hand, the fact that this zone has been imposed by 
the central governments without consulting the local population and governments has 
resulted in a common struggle against its presence that has mobilized players of the 
civil society of both towns. After losing the fi ght, this mobilization has continued with 
a certain degree of success in the battle for the workers’ rights. The commitment of 
a civil society that also rallied international networks and labor organizations in this 
cause is thus a poignant example of the struggle for adjustment between local and 
transnational players in a globalized world that takes place even when power relations 
remain unequal. “The story of the free zone is somehow confusing and surrounded by 
secrets. (…) The consultation of the local population has been done in an arbitrary 
way. Thus, when the government decided its construction in 2002, everyone hurried 
to denunciate this on local, national and international level. (…) But the government 
pursued its enterprise, destroying cultivated area without compensating the farmers. 
And now that the factory is running, the wages are much too low: 432 gourds (about 
11 USD) weekly, in diffi cult working conditions.” (Interview with the coordinator of the 
“Comité de défense Pitobé,” Ouanaminthe, October 2003.)
In spite of the common solidarity movement, the perception of the free zone is 
nevertheless different on each side of the border. In Dajabón, economic players 
and part of the population see it as an opportunity to develop business and attract 
residents with higher income, but in Ouanaminthe it is clearly perceived as a problem, 
overburdening the existing infrastructure with additional migration of a mainly 
unskilled labor force. “They say that the free zone will create employment, but on our 
side [Haiti] the government has taken no initiative to help us to cope with this situation. 
People come from all over the country, Port au Prince, Jacmel, Gonaives, and they do 
not necessarily fi nd work here.” (Interview with the Mayor of Ouanaminthe, October 
2003.)
OUANAMINTHE + DAJABÓN : A BI-NATIONAL URBAN SPACE?
Ouanaminthe and Dajabón are functionally interlinked and their transformation has 
been undeniably governed by the gradual permeability of the border, but the economic 
opening of the border has created a contradictory relationship between the towns. 
The interest in developing greater permeability of the border, not only in regard to the 
economic relations but also social and political exchanges, must clearly be located on 
the local level. For the central governments – especially on the Dominican side - the 
border remains a source of conﬂ ict, principally due to illegal immigration. Furthermore, 
the lack of transparency in customs administration profi ts a small part of the inﬂ uential 
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entrepreneurs in alliance with central administrations and governments. The small 
local traders do not benefi t from this kind of favouritism. 
Even if the ambiguous feelings regarding the neighboring population persist, local 
governments and local populations are confronted with problems that go beyond 
borderlines, such as human rights, population growth, and environmental deterioration. 
The aims of the active local civil society involved with cross-border relations reﬂ ect 
these concerns. Present in both towns is the awareness that the increasing trade can 
only contribute to their positive development if the disequilibrium in the established 
relations is not strengthened, even if there are divergences as to how to bring it about 
and who must take action. 
The major common problem for the local stakeholders is that the concerns of the 
central governments, and the transnational companies, are not a development of the 
internal characteristics of these urban settlements, but national or entrepreneurial 
interests that deal with cross-border relations in a manner detached from daily reality, 
but nevertheless interested. For these stakeholders, a partial permeability, restricted 
to economic exchange, remains the most advantageous option. Furthermore, the rules 
that defi ne the border are not clearly established and vary according to the “client,” 
which also means that a change in political direction has an unpredictable impact 
on the living condition of the local population. Important issues, such as customs 
regulations, military intervention, installation of transnational companies, and, last but 
not least, the major part of illegal cross-border activities, are not under the control of 
the border population. The malaise they feel about the border is also expressed by 
the aspiration of players in both towns to develop activities independent of the border 
by revitalizing their links with the rural environment and taking their role as regional 
centers more seriously. 
Dajabón’s dominant position can be attributed to a more stable national environment 
and superior infrastructure, giving the Dominican town the leading role in the border 
intermediation relations from the start. Opening the border has enhanced this unequal 
relationship, as infrastructures play a primary role in the economy. 
The situation can be summed up by saying that Ouanaminthe is becoming the poorest 
area of Dajabón. However, this statement does not correspond to reality, as both towns 
are developing according to their internal characteristics and national environments, 
and functionally maintain an important role as urban centers for their rural environment. 
Moreover, for the reasons mentioned above, their role as complementary interfaces 
does not create a common urban space characterized by a common social and spatial 
organization that would give to the local population the sense of belonging together. 
Ouanaminthe and Dajabón can therefore still be characterized as two opposite border 
towns that will barely converge more than is necessary to effi ciently tackle common 
problems when their social relations remain mainly confi ned to the organizations of 
civil society and the border continues under the arbitrary administration of the central 
states. 
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ENDNOTES
1 This article is based on my PhD research. The research was sponsored by the Swiss National 
Foundation for Research through the National Center of Competence in Research “North-South”, in 
the framework of the Laboratory of Urban Sociology (LaSUR) at the EPFL.  Poschet, L. (2006) Villes à 
la Frontière et transformation de l’espace, le cas de Haïti et la République Dominicaine. Thèse 3655 
(2006). Lausanne : Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne.
2 On the island there is a desire to rename it “Quisqueya,” one of its ancient Indian names. Nevertheless, 
I will use the term “Hispaniola”, as this denomination of colonial origin is widely recognized.
3 The population present on the island by the end of the 18th century reﬂ ects these differences: almost 
four times more people lived in the French part on one-third of the territory of the island. The majority 
were of African origin and used as slave labor on the plantations (500,000 inhabitants, of whom only 
30,000 were whites or Creoles). On the Spanish side, the population was very sparsely spread through 
the territory and there was little slave labor (125,000 inhabitants, of whom only 15,000 were classifi ed 
as slaves) (Moreau de Saint-Méry, 1796).
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ABSTRACT
With the continuous transformation of the architectures, landscapes, and urban 
spaces of Europe’s internal national boundaries, the nature and signifi cance of cross-
border territories requires close investigation. Cross-border territories challenging the 
right of existence of the nation-state now play a crucial role in the European socio-
economic landscape. Regional collaborations as well as new and faster international 
transportation and communication infrastructures constitute a transnational fi eld 
of operations within the European territory. Recent studies of urbanization trends in 
Europe have too easily discarded internal national borders as no longer relevant in 
a hyper-networked transnational world. Urban dispersal has become the privileged 
model to describe the non-hierarchical spatial organization of European urban space, 
replacing the national centralized metropolis. Yet crossborder regions and networks 
are not without hierarchy. Instead of strengthening the large fi eld of sameness, they 
rearticulate and differentiate Europe’s spatial structure. All the more intriguing, 
transnational space has developed in the form of international zones and districts, 
most signifi cantly at specifi c borders, where the spatialities of topography, nation, and 
culture were never entirely congruent. 
This study will take a closer look at the spatial mechanisms of European transnational 
space and theories of transnational urbanisms that developed during 1960s and 1970s. 
The fi rst chapter is a phenomenological landscape study of transnational space at a 
very specifi c scene both in time and space: the landscapes of battle in Flanders Fields 
at the start of the Great War. The second chapter extrapolates these violently uprooted 
spatial mechanisms to larger considerations of transnational space and critically 
investigates architects’ theories of a border-less European urbanism developed during 
the 1960s and 1970s. In this period of post-war optimism were formed the foundations 
of more recent theories of transnational urbanisms and architectures. Therefore, it 
is worthwhile to critically examine the post-war architectural discourse of a united 
urbanized Europe within the framework of the transnational spatial mechanisms.  
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Décidés à assurer par une action commune le progress économique 
et social de leur pays en éliminant les barriers qui divisent l’Europe.1 
(Treaty of Rome, 1957)
Have we eliminated the barriers dividing Europe? No doubt the architectures, 
landscapes, and urban spaces of Europe’s internal national boundaries have changed 
since the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and are still transforming. Cross-border territories 
challenging the right of existence of the nation-state now play a crucial role in the 
European socio-economic landscape. Regional collaborations as well as new and 
faster international transportation and communication infrastructures constitute 
a transnational fi eld of operations within the European territory2. Recent studies of 
urbanization trends in Europe have too easily discarded internal national borders as 
no longer relevant in a hypernetworked transnational world3. Urban dispersal has 
become the privileged model to describe the non-hierarchical spatial organization of 
European urban space, replacing the national centralized metropolis. Yet cross-border 
regions and networks are not without hierarchy. Instead of strengthening the large 
fi eld of sameness, they rearticulate and differentiate Europe’s spatial structure.4 All 
the more intriguing, transnational space has developed in the form of international 
zones and districts, most signifi cantly at specifi c borders, where topography, nation 
and culture spaces were never entirely congruent (see Figure 1). 
This study will take a closer look at the spatial mechanisms of European transnational 
space and theories of transnational urbanisms that developed during the 1960s and 
1970s. The fi rst chapter is a phenomenological landscape study of transnational space 
at a very specifi c scene both in time and space: the landscapes of battle in Flanders 
FIGURE 1. Left: Battlefi elds of the last two centuries.  (Foucher, Michel (Ed.) (1993). 
Fragments d’Europe. Atlas De L’Europe Médiane Et Orientale, Maxéville: Fayard, p. 34). 
Right: Bleeding Borders. Interregional collaboration territories.  (INTERREG IIIA (2004), 
INTERREG IIIA regions, AeroGeographics Association for the administrative Boundaries).
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Fields at the start of the Great War. The movements of the armies in the territory 
and the transformations of the landscape during these fi rst months of what would 
become a global war brought to the surface the very deeply rooted characteristics of 
transnational space. The second chapter extrapolates these violently uprooted spatial 
mechanisms to larger considerations of transnational space and  critically investigates 
architects’ theories of a border-less European urbanism developed during the1960s 
and 1970s. These theories investigated the possible application of new brutalist, 
metabolist, and megastructural building methods as the new tools for universal 
architectures; in this case to further the cause of a united Europe. In this period of post-
war optimism were formed the foundations  of more recent theories of transnational 
urbanisms and architectures. Therefore, it is worthwhile to critically examine the 
post-war architectural discourse of a united urbanized Europe within the framework 
of the transnational spatial mechanisms.  The more abstract challenge of the border 
in urbanisms that transcend national boundaries posed by postwar architects such 
as Yona Friedman5,  Constantinos Doxiadis, Archigram, Reyner Benham, the editors 
of Forum [ital] magazine and others can be traced back to the ways borders have 
been most violently challenged, relocated or erased (see Figures 2, 3). Their diagrams 
and schemes prescribed the transformation of borders into transnational space and 
implicitly reiterated their intrinsic spatial characteristics. 
CHAPTER 1_Flanders Fields, August 1914
If transnational space is the interest of this study, let us brieﬂ y investigate its 
predecessor: national space. Since the birth of the state in the  seventeenth century, 
FIGURE 2. Mapping of Europe by Yona Friedman, 1963.  (“Friedman’s Europe,” Architectural 
Review, May, 1963, p.307).
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the city has become its spatial and organizational model6. According to Michel 
Foucault, a well-regulated state was one that adopted a structural system similar to 
that of the polis (Foucault, 1984). Following Aristotle’s model of the polis as a place 
where human nature culminates, the new ‘polis-state’ was a limited territory beyond 
which the state’s regulation would be suspended (Reeve, 1998). However, while the 
hinterland of the classical polis knew no life but that of beasts and gods, the outskirts of 
the state did not consist of lawless life, but of another, equivalent system of regulation. 
The dominant Western urban model with its Greek roots that rendered culture versus 
nature was thus no longer able to fully describe incongruent border conditions. Thus, 
as soon as the state became an instrument for controlling a vast territory, its borders 
turned to a reciprocal condition of ‘otherness.’ This state of reversibility between one 
side and the other, especially in incongruent borders, formed a considerable threat to 
the legitimacy of the state.
In many ways, the Great War was an outburst of the crisis of the state. Although 
the turn of the century had witnessed a new intensity in international relations, the 
FIGURE 3. Forum magazine: Predicting Europe in the Year 2000. (“2000. A Sketch,” Forum 
magazine, N1, 1964).
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condition of exchange and cooperation was accompanied by the rising power of 
nationalism. Minorities pressured for their own states; existing states were looking 
to expand. This nationalist impetus emphasized and expanded the easily combustible 
incongruities — existing or pursued. The incongruities between the space of control 
and their spaces of resistance — using Foucauldian terminologies — have been 
explained by the inﬂ uential political theorist Ernst Gellner as the difference between 
bottom-up nations and top-down states (Gellner, 1983)7.  In these theories, a national 
entity was seen as formed by the shared characteristics and common will of its 
members, a principle of political legitimacy rooted in eighteenth century theories of 
natural law. However, recent theorists of nationalism such as Benedict Anderson, 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger have emphasized the artifi ciality of the idea of 
a nation, formed by invented traditions (Baycroft, 2004). Taking into account the more 
recent skepticism, incongruities might still exist between socio-cultural constructs 
such as nations and states, rather than between so-called natural conditions such 
as tribes and mountains. However, the more a nation is not intrinsically embedded in 
human nature, the more it can be related to larger spatial conditions. Thus one can 
conclude that transnational space has its roots in the establishment of national space 
and its intrinsic incongruities. 
Flanders Fields — a territory stretching across both sides of the border between 
France and Belgium — is such an incongruent border zone, comprising the territories 
of South-West Flanders in Belgium and North-East France. Under this name, it fi rst 
appeared in a poem written in 1915 by the Canadian military doctor John McCrae, 
featured as a land of conﬂ ict, memories, and death. Only in a condition of crisis did 
the territory’s identity surface as a locatable place. Yet also before and after the First 
World War, these fi elds of Flanders operated as a territorial entity stretching across 
multiple cultural, political, and topographical boundaries.
To designate this border region, I therefore borrow McCrae’s term in a search for the 
historical roots of a territory of increasing importance in the transnational European 
landscape, with Europe’s central high-speed train hub located in its metropolitan 
heart. “Before being geometric or even geographic, space presents itself fi rst and 
foremost as scene or landscape.” (Foucault, 1988, Vol 1, p.101.)
If, according to Foucault, space is a priori landscape (Foucault, 1988), the panoptical 
dominance of space over bodies can be reversed to a space constituted by the body 
(Lefebvre, 1991). Indeed, landscape is the incorporation of the territory by human 
presence.  Instead of being the geometric structure of simultaneity, space is then 
situational8.  In the landscape of Flanders Fields, human actions such as military 
activities, inhabitation, migration, and smuggling molded and inscribed a cross-border 
territory9.  Custom control stations, smuggling hideouts, taverns for commuter workers, 
and other border spaces together created a widened strip of land on both sides of the 
actual border line. At fi rst more or less ignored in the eighteenth century and fi rst half 
of the nineteenth century, the separation between two nations gained strength until 
the mid-twentieth century, now again losing its strength as a boundary, yet not rid of 
its spatial ambiguities. 
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It is hence the situation, inhabited by a social body, that brought about the transformation 
of a line between one state and the other into a wider margin10.
This study highlights a range of instances where the landscape of Flanders Fields 
played an important military role in the fi rst months of the First World War. However, 
these military tactics appear not isolated or invented, but symptomatic of underlying 
and continuous spatial processes.  The study of a spatio-temporal instance — Flanders 
Fields at the start of WWI — will be used to establish a phenomenological model of 
border space, with an impact far beyond the specifi city of the instance. In what follows 
I will elaborate three mechanisms of space-making specifi c to incongruent border 
zones. Here, different types of boundaries coexist: between land and sea, between 
languages, between nations, between enemies. The mechanisms that produce, modify, 
or erase these boundaries will be investigated by pairing the momentary “ontogenic” 
timeframe of battle with an evolutionary, “phylogenic” timeframe looking at forms of 
inhabitation, social practices, and migration. In this way, Foucault’s understanding 
of battle as a model for society can gain new meaning. War time is a window to 
longer lasting spatial practices, from inhabitation over centuries, social oppositions 
confi rming the border’s existence, to economic exchanges reconnecting one side to 
the other. 
1 FLUID SPACE
After a series of battles along the Western Front from August to September 1914, the 
Allied Forces and the German Army started a northward race to the sea with several 
mutual and unsuccessful attempts to outstrip the enemy. Meanwhile, in order to protect 
the last piece of defensible Belgium, King Albert I responded by opening the ﬂ ood 
gates at the mouth of the river Ijzer, submerging the polders and keeping the Germans 
on the east side of the river (see Figure 4). The Belgian army took position behind 
the embankment of the railway connecting the towns of Nieuwpoort and Diksmuide, 
canceling the last possibility for the German army to cross the French-Belgian border. 
It was, however, no coincidence that precisely this piece of land would prevent the 
movement of both armies by returning to its former underwater state. Once ‘wrested’ 
from the North Sea, these polder lands were surrendered back to ‘nature.’
Over centuries of struggle against and symbiosis with the sea, the Flemish coast 
inhabitants and conquerors had adapted tactics of inhabitation in a constantly 
changing landscape. During the Roman period, the Flemish coastal plains were 
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FIGURE 4. Left: British Military Map of ﬂ ooded Ijzer plains with German trenches in black. 
(“Zwartegat Inundation” Map at 1/10000, 17.12.17, Documentatiecentrum In Flanders 
Fields). Right: Soldiers in the ﬂ ooded plains of the Ijzer river. (Documentatiecentrum In 
Flanders Fields).
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frequently ﬂ ooded due to large scale sea transgressions. In the  eighth century the sea 
withdrew once again, creating areas of salty soil used for sheep and cow breeding, 
called saltings. Occupation of these saltings caused their dehydration, compaction, 
and a level decrease of the local topography, which then again created new ﬂ ooded 
depressions. This topographic inversion overturned the settlement patterns, forcing 
inhabitants to move elsewhere. Villages relocated for want of better soils to former 
creeks, now fi lled with sand. The battle for inhabiting these violent territories shaped a 
ﬂ uctuating and instable relationship between inhabitable land and uninhabitable water. 
Between 1014 and 1042 A.D., a new sea transgression took place, causing frequent 
ﬂ oods at two weak spots along the coast line: Kadzand and the plains of the river 
Ijzer. In response, the inhabitants built a series of long embankments to avoid future 
ﬂ ooding and invaded the plains of the Ijzer river to create new plots of land, called 
polders (Verhulst, 1964). The fi rst records using the word ‘polder’ in these areas date 
from the second quarter of the twelfth  century, to indicate land conquering over water 
by building embankments. The inhabitants thereby moved from defensive strategies 
against ﬂ ooding to offensive strategies of conquering land over sea for economic 
expansion. The polder lands acquired the status of being an act of aggression against 
nature, endowing the land with a value of illegitimacy. In the Ijzer Plains the fi rst polder 
was built by the Dunes Abbey of Koksijde in order to expand its territory (see Figure 5). 
The abbey’s records describe how, with hard labor, the monks ‘wrested the earth from 
the heart of the sea’ (Verhulst, 1964, P.21).
In order to create profi t, the polders were developed as fenlands for the extraction 
of peat for salt and fuel. Because of a new concern with the decrease of woods as 
a source of fuel due to a growing urban population, the local count encouraged peat 
digging in the second half of the twelfth century. Systematic peat digging took place 
in the area of the French-Belgian Moeren, an area of lees fi elds on both sides of the 
border at Adinkerke. After a process of peat exploitation, the Moeren naturally turned 
into a sweet water lake surrounded by a marshy strip. Under archdukes Albrecht and 
Isabella, court engineer Wenceslas Cobergher undertook a large scale project to 
dry the lake to create new land for agriculture. This fi ve-year process, completed in 
1627, was again reversed in the 1640’s when the Moeren were intentionally ﬂ ooded 
by the Spanish ruler to create a protective strip of water around the by then important 
military seaport city of Duinkerke. In 1760, the Count of Hérouville obtained  permission 
to dry the Moeren, which he accomplished six years later. Only four years later the 
dikes gave way and the Moeren ﬂ ooded once again.  The count’s creditor Vandermey 
FIGURE 5. Left: Ijzer Polders. (Verhulst, Adriaan (1964). Het landschap in vlaanderen in 
historisch perspectief. Antwerpen: De Nederlandse Boekhandel, p. 49).  Middle: Ijzer Flood 
1914. (http://www.westhoek.be/wo1/index.html). Right: Ijzer Front Line. (Keegan, John 
(1998). The First World War, London: Hutchinson, p. 134-135).
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continued the efforts to regain the land and by the end of the 1780’s the terrains of the 
Moeren were brought back to the surface. Subsequent ﬂ ood problems due to dike 
failures were more easily met by more advanced pumping methods and by the First 
World War the Moeren, fulfi lling their strategic value, turned into a military airbase by 
King Albert I (see Figure 6). 
This continuous cycle of land returning to water and vice versa prevents a permanent 
defi nition of these territories as one or the other. While the conquering of land was a 
slow process, ﬂ oods happened quickly and frequently. Land was the exception to the 
rule and settlement patterns ﬂ uctuated following the caprice of the sea. Even more 
permanent housing typologies were frequently abandoned and rebuilt. An inhabitation 
logic of trial and error formed in close dialogue with the movement of the landscape 
itself, the formation of a ﬂ uid space.
FIGURE 6. Left: Moeren 18th century.  (Verhulst, Adriaan (1964). Het landschap in vlaanderen 
in historisch perspectief. Antwerpen: De Nederlandse Boekhandel, p. 86-87).  Right: Moeren 
1644. (Verhulst, Adriaan (1964). Het landschap in vlaanderen in historisch perspectief. 
Antwerpen: De Nederlandse Boekhandel, p. 84-85).
FIGURE 7. Left: Fluid Space Mapping.  Right: Fluid Space diagram (drawings by author).
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When King Albert I submerged the Ijzer Plains, three boundaries intersected: the edge 
between land and sea, the frontline between enemies and the border between nations, 
a triple intersection which multiplied territories into four different zones, each with a 
unique combination of topographic, national and political characteristics (see Figure 
7). Not only in war, but also in calmer periods, did different boundaries intersect, such 
as the incongruence of language, topographic and national boundaries. The territory’s 
ﬂ uidity replaced singular boundaries between self and other by more complex and 
intersecting boundaries, whereby nature was simultaneously self and other, hence no 
longer opposite civilization.
2 SOLID SPACE
Throughout the nineteenth century, the exercise of power moved from the static 
defense to the mobile offensive, cancelling the need for frontier fortifi cations and trench 
wars. The new trust in mobile wars led to the emergence of abstract military plans 
prepared in advance and kept strictly secret. The German invasion in Belgium was the 
implementation of such a military plan conceived years earlier by German Chief of Staff 
Count Alfred von Schlieffen. Based on a strong trust in road and railroad transportation 
networks, the Schlieffen plan would provide a way to outﬂ ank the French by ignoring 
Belgium’s and Luxembourg’s neutral statuses, obtained from Britain, France and Prussia 
in 1839. Encouraged by the extensive industrial network of railroads laid out in this 
region throughout the nineteenth century, the plan predominantly focused on mobility, 
speed, and timing. Unexpectedly, as early as the fi rst months of the Great War, the 
strategic plans of mobility and large scale military strategies inspired by modernity and 
technological advancement were abandoned and replaced by an ad hoc battle with 
and against the landscape. Modern strategies of mobility stagnated in the double line 
of trenches and the mud of Flanders Fields (see Figure 8). The intertwining of modernity 
such as advanced war technology and transportation infrastructure with seemingly11 
anti-modern phenomena such as stagnated army movements was nevertheless a 
direct consequence of the evolution of battle strategies over the past two centuries. 
Martin Warnke demonstrates how the military landscape evolved from a level ground 
in which only cowards took advantage of the characteristics of the landscape to a 
fi eld for military operations in which the terrain became identifi ed with the enemy 
(Warnke, 1995). With the introduction of fi rearms, the distance between soldiers 
increased and suits no longer offered enough protection. The land thus became the 
FIGURE 8. Left: Trench Drawing. (Documentatiecentrum In Flanders Fields), Right: British 
Military Map of enemy trenches.  (“Kemmel” Map at 1/20000, 1.4.17).
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new shield whereby trees, ditches, woods, or walls became extensions of the military 
uniform. With the development of great strategic plans, the landscape moved from the 
actual battle fi eld to a chessboard, a tableau on the wall, allowing the commanders 
to withdraw from the scene of action. The combatant, however, as opposed to the 
strategist, was forced to merge his body with the earth by digging himself into the 
ground and using camouﬂ age to blur the distinction with the landscape (see Figure 
9). For instance, during the Great War the German army wore fi eld-grey uniforms 
specially designed for the landscape of Northwestern Europe. As Warnke has argued, 
the modernist paradigm did not get rid of the connection between bodies and land, 
but created a disconnection between strategy and physical battle, which in the case 
of Flanders Fields proved to be disastrous. A space of movement was confronted with 
its own viscosity in which stagnation became the unavoidable last rescue, blurring 
the distinction between bodies and land.  At the scale of the region, this stagnation 
of movement led to a double line of trenches distorting the former national border 
FIGURE 9. Left: Bodies in Trenches.  (http://www.klm-mra.be/engels/collecties/dodengang.
html).  Right: The antagonistic landscape. (Fragment from Gravenstafel Panorama, D9(c), 
N.58, 8.3 Sheet 28, 17.4.15, Documentatiecentrum In Flanders Fields).
FIGURE 10. Left: Solid Space Mapping.  Right: Solid Space diagram (drawings by author).
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into a new actual boundary between two opposing army forces. Not the border itself 
materialized into trenches but the edge on either side. As opposed to edge conditions 
in former urban models such as city gates, metropolitan peripheries, and suburban 
fabric, this edge was double-sided (see Figure 10). One side fulfi lled the role of mirror 
image of the other.
3 OSMOTIC SPACE
The rains and ﬂ oods of December 1914 quickly fi lled the double line of trenches — 
which ran from the English Channel to the Swiss frontier — with mud. That month, 
the armies suffered more casualties from frost bite, rheumatism, and trench foot than 
from war injuries (Keegan, 1998). In Rites of Spring, Modris Ekstein suggests that these 
dreadful conditions encouraged the feelings of commonality between different sides, 
reinforced by a general disappointment with the war strategies of those in command. 
On the evening of December 24, 1914, colder temperatures hardened the mud. Soldiers 
came out of their trenches and in the no-man’s land between two enemy lines, parties 
were held with exchanges of alcohol, tobacco, food, and songs.  Weather and land had 
become common enemies for both armies and the zone of land between the trenches 
became the only possible space for the enemies to temporarily be in peace.
Gradually fi ring ceased almost everywhere along the line that 
Christmas Eve. Men got up and sat on their parapets and shouted 
greetings across to the “enemy.” Conversations began. Opposite 
the Queen’s Westminster Riﬂ es a Saxon challenged the British to 
come across and fetch a bottle of wine. (…) When dawn came 
the next morning, the ground was frozen solid. In some areas a 
sprinkling of fresh snow lay on the ground. In Flanders the sudden 
freeze had produced a thick fog, which began to light only gradually 
under the glare of a strong sun. The sudden change in the weather 
brought astonishment and cheer. In comparison with the monsoon 
conditions of the preceding month, the day was glorious.(…) 
Soldiers moved into no man’s land, or in some cases even into each 
other’s trenches, and celebrated. Some were shy. Others were 
more open. They talked, sang, and exchanged stories and gifts. 
(Ekstein, 1989, P.110-111)
The exchange of specialty products such as tobacco and alcohol was not a new 
activity in these territories. The more the state border in Flanders Fields materialized, 
the more a range of new social behaviors of resistance emerged, destabilizing the 
clear separation between two sides. Specialty products such as tobacco, alcohol, 
spices, butter, sugar, and embroidery crossed the border in both directions depending 
on ﬂ uctuations of the market price (Figure 11). Comparable to the principle of osmosis, 
a biological term whereby a difference in substance composition causes a ﬂ uctuation 
across the membrane between both sides, these exchanges created a relationship 
of reciprocity. One side of the border promised to complete the other. So were the 
Belgian Flemish able to compensate the sugar shortage at the beginning of the 
twentieth century by crossing over. Smuggling and labor migration created a zone of 
solidarity, reaching its peak in the period between the two world wars. State power 
eroded before it reached the border line. 
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As soon as a solidifi cation of both sides of the border took place, new cross-
border movements were facilitated by the landscape itself. Both sides of the border 
interpenetrated, thereby inhabiting the space between two sides, a land that does 
not belong to one or the other, yet is accessible and needed for economic and social 
exchanges to take place (see Figure 12). The mirror-space between one side and the 
other became inhabitable as a third space, not self or other, but unclaimed and able 
to provide a platform for latent interactions between friend and foe, between humans 
and nature, to materialize. 
This no-man’s land that exists beyond the times of war is a result of the overlaps 
between ﬂ uid space, solid space, and osmotic space and yet waiting for new layers to 
be added. The three mechanisms of space-making I have  depicted here have guided 
FIGURE 11. Left: Two tobacco smugglers caught. (Tabaksmuseum, Wervik). Middle: 
Smoking tobacco  in Trenches. (Tabaksmuseum, Wervik). Right: The announcement of a 
Christmas Truce, December 1914.  (Documentatiecentrum In Flanders Fields).
FIGURE 12. Left: Osmotic Space Mapping. Right: Osmotic Space diagram (drawings by 
author).
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the evolution of transnational space throughout history in war and peace, into a complex 
landscape now evolving toward a borderless land, in which opposite sides no longer 
exist. In addition, they reveal the importance of the close encounter between humans 
and the land in the context of the development of transnational space at national 
borders. As shown, the landscape plays an active role in the production of space and 
the urbanization of transnational territory, which becomes literally and metaphorically 
informed by geographic terms such as ﬂ uctuation, stagnation, and erosion. 
CHAPTER 2_Visions for a United Europe_1960s-1970s
In the decades following the Second World War, a series of architecture publications 
attempted to envision the new Europe, with 2000 as its year of completion. The 
architectural discipline took upon itself the daunting challenge of ‘shaping’ Europe as 
a united space, a task formerly performed by statesmen and monks12.  In a time when 
the modernist vow entered a stage of revisions and adjustments, these visions for 
a united Europe explored new urban models based on mobility and sprawl. Thereby 
they implicitly applied notions of transnational space as developed in the fi rst chapter, 
yet without questioning the complexity of transforming national into transnational 
urbanisms. As borders are already transnational in nature, they played a double role 
in these schemes. On the one hand, they were obstacles to be erased, but on the 
other, they formed the base for transcending the nation. In a search for these implicit 
assumptions of transnationalism embedded in the mappings of a new European 
territory, I will study a cross-section of articles published in architecture magazines of 
the 1960s and 1970s.
1 MOBILE EUROPE
In November 1962, Architectural Design Magazine published a thesis project by 
four students of the Architectural Association School of Architecture (Bridges et al, 
1962). The scheme they proposed had been strongly inﬂ uenced by British planning 
tradition. They especially and explicitly referred to the MARS Group’s 1942 plan for 
London, which they had now modifi ed to accommodate the connection across the 
Channel with the European continent. The MARS (Modern Architectural Research) 
Group, formed during the interbellum, envisioned the future growth of London to follow 
thirteen tentacles reaching out to the countryside (Gold, 1995)13.  The linear organization 
of these new urban units would allow easy access to the surrounding countryside. 
Based on the MARS ideas, the AA students’ map of Europe showed a territory in which 
most national borders had vanished. The map laid out a transportation network across 
Britain and the European continent, constructed out of straight lines of varying widths 
(see Figure 13). Especially on the continent, the network lines were drawn in disregard 
of local topographies. A black skeleton, foreign to the territory, emerged as a new layer 
on the map, as a notational device, rather than geographically located. Expressing the 
need for a stronger physical connection between the British Islands and the mainland, 
the students drew three concentric circles centered on the Channel crossing. The 
drawings that accompanied this map showed how the new network, titled ‘Euroway’ 
would be implemented (see Figure 14). Their audacious design required a tabula rasa 
of existing conditions, replaced by a new mobile city, its shape derived from the black 
skeleton. The assumption that transnational space would only prevail by erasing not 
only existing boundaries but also existing organizational systems such as cities came 
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FIGURE 13. Diagram for a transnational city by AA students, 1962.  (Bridges et al, “Euroway,” 
Architectural Design, N11, Nov, 1962, p. 536).
FIGURE 14. Diagram for a transnational city by AA students, 1962.  (Bridges et al, “Euroway,” 
Architectural Design, N11, Nov, 1962, p. 536).
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from a discontent with obstacles such as clogged metropolitan cities and topographic 
boundaries.  Instead, transnational movement was channeled into a highly controlled 
mechanism creating its own artifi cial topographies and boundaries, ignoring already 
existing territorial articulations such as urban and natural transitions from one place to 
another. Although this and similar proposals14 used the principle of ﬂ uid space as their 
principal goal, they also contradicted the ﬂ uidity of transnational space by confi ning 
its directionality, by literally turning an abstract diagram into a building (see Figure 
15). Cross-border movement therefore does not happen according to the principle of 
FIGURE 15. Linear Cities in a United Europe published by Architectural Review, 1963. 
(“United Cities,” Architectural Review, N133, May, 1963, p. 367).
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unstable and ﬂ exible territories but rather by creating hard, impenetrable, and non-
ambiguous boundaries between the new linear urbanism and its hinterland. Reyner 
Banham’s three-dimensional map of Europe upside down was a less bold imagination, 
yet it emphasized as well the importance of mobility in the Europe of tomorrow (Banham, 
1963). The special May 1963 issue of Architectural Review  titled AR EUROMART, edited 
and compiled by Banham featured an image of Europe seen from the U.K. (see Figure 
16) This image was an oblique photograph of a printed map, with additional three-
dimensional components such as ﬂ ags of international organizations, folded ribbons 
representing arrows, and wrinkled paper mimicking signifi cant topographies. The 
angle, as Banham points out, shows Europe upside down, whereby England no longer 
seems closely linked with the continent, but rather isolated and disconnected, with only 
a few ferry linkages to the mainland. At the same time, the image proposed an idea of a 
mobile Europe, united by the movement of goods and people. Banham’s map presented 
the natural border between England and the continent, the Channel, as a membrane 
that allowed multiple crossings, depending on the amount of international attractors 
on either side (represented by the ﬂ ags). Banham’s argument for a transnational 
European urbanism was thus based on the principle of osmosis and the creation of 
spaces for economic exchange within existing territorial divisions and topographies. 
Although at a rather preliminary level, Banham’s intuitions promoted a more complex 
understanding of mobility not as a cleanly channeled traffi c but as a more dispersed 
condition of possible interfaces and crossings between nations. However, the view of 
an urbanization of Europe based on highway and rail infrastructure crossing borders 
has played and continues to play an important role in the formation of a transnational 
Europe.  New boundaries emerged between spaces of movement and their hinterland, 
whereby highly connected places  alongside underdeveloped and peripheral areas.15 
FIGURE 16. Reyner Banham’s three dimensional map of Europe, 1963. (Banham, Reyner, 
(ed.) “Euromart,” Architectural Review, N133, May, 1963, p. 312).
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Thus the more complex and democratic alternatives for mobile transnational space, 
such as Banham’s three-dimensional map, remain worth investigating. 
2 EUROPEAN MEGALOPOLIS
Other schemes found their model in the American city, superimposing urbanities of the 
new world onto those of the old16 . The March 1969 issue of the visionary magazine 2000 
published Constantinos Doxiadis ‘ecumenopolis,’ a system of regional conurbations that 
would together form a world-wide city (Doxiadis, 1969). In a historical graph Doxiadis 
described the birth of Gottman’s Megalopolis, soon to turn into his own Ecumenopolis, 
FIGURE 17. Constantinos Doxiadis: the evolution from city to ecumenopolis, 1969. (Doxiadis, 
Constantinos, “L’Ecuménopolis,” 2000; Revue de l’Aménagement du Territoire, March, 
1969, p. 23-31).
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a universal city accessible to all (see Figure 17). Doxiadis’ map of the world at the end 
of the twentieth century showed uninterrupted linear zones of high density, a universal 
city structured no longer by national divisions, but by different degrees of density, 
independent of their specifi c location (see Figure 18). Doxiadis thus extrapolated the 
urban model of the American East Coast, identifi ed as Megalopolis by Jean Gottman in 
1961, to cover the globe. In a series of evolutionary diagrams, Doxiadis explained how 
the existing condition of transportation axes and inherent population densities would 
constitute the base for a series of ‘forces’ that would form the fi nal amoebic-looking but 
only seemingly irrational Ecumenopolis (see Figure 19). Therefore,  Doxiadis’ scheme 
also put forward mobility — in the form of transportation — as a primary condition for 
the development of transnational urbanity. Yet simultaneously, he redirected  attention 
to densities and density attractors as the materials that would constitute a transnational 
city. In the case of Europe, these ecumenopolitan densities were based on the existing 
FIGURE 18. Constantinos Doxiadis: the ecumenopolis as universal city, 1969. (Doxiadis, 
Constantinos, “L’Ecuménopolis,” 2000; Revue de l’Aménagement du Territoire, March, 
1969, p. 23-31).
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distribution of zones of urbanization. Therefore, it remained unclear how Doxiadis’ 
universal city would be any different from the existing urban conditions of Europe, 
as had been the case with Gottman’s megalopolis. Like Megalopolis, Ecumenolopolis 
only seemed to identify an existing condition without a larger consideration of the 
difference between existing space, which was based on national divisions, and the 
universal or transnational space he proposed. However, the drawings suggested an 
amoebic urbanism that could sustain itself by redistributing densities within itself 
and with its surroundings. Also the Dutch magazine Forum published a study in 1965 
comparing the Northwestern part of Europe with the Northeastern part of the United 
States (Wijers, 1965). These images were supported by the assumption that the high 
population density in this area of Europe indicated a potential to grow into a regional 
city (see Figure 20). The two accompanying comparative drawings showed American 
borders between federal states and European borders between nations using exactly 
the same line type. Not only did these drawings promote a radical idea for the spatial 
organization of Europe, but at the political level they seemed to suggest that Europe 
– like the United States – would become a federal state. The schemes based on the 
American model were confronted with the question of the physical and political 
meaning of national borders. If they were to disappear, nations would have to be 
abolished. In order to superimpose American models, borders would have to become 
mere administrative boundaries. However, as opposed to the American model, in 
which borders between states did not grow out of long term territorial relationships 
embedded in the landscape as demonstrated by their geometric forms, the European 
city did not lend itself easily to the extrapolation of the American megalopolis. Hence 
the mappings they produced represented Europe as a highly abstract territory, erased 
from its specifi cities. However, the returning importance of density and sprawl as 
components of cross-border urbanities suggested a belief in the potential of osmosis 
and ﬂ uidity as a prerequisite for transnational space.
FIGURE 19. Constantinos Doxiadis: process diagrams to achieve ecumenopolis, 1969. 
(Doxiadis, Constantinos, “L’Ecuménopolis,” 2000; Revue de l’Aménagement du Territoire, 
March, 1969, p. 23-31).
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Certain ideas presented by the maps above have proliferated into the built world, with 
highly developed transnational transportation networks, cross-border regional cities, 
and the establishment of  free trade zones. Nevertheless, borders did not disappear 
and instead became part of the transnational city. Therefore, the implicit notions of 
ﬂ uid, solid, and osmotic space remain important as critical tools for understanding 
transnational space not only as a space of movement and ﬂ uidity but also as a solid 
space in which transitions are tangible yet not impenetrable. 
FIGURE 20. Juxtaposition in Forum of the urbanization in Europe and the US, 1965.  (Wijers, 
“2000, A Sketch, Additional Data,” Forum voor Architectuur en daarmee Verbonden 
Kunsten, 1965, p.1).
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ENDNOTES
1 Fragment from the preamble of the Treaty creating the European Economic Community in 1957, as 
cited in De Rougemont, D. (1961). Vingt-huit siècles d’Europe. La conscience Européenne à travers les 
textes d’Hésiode à nos jours. Paris: Payot.
2 See INTERREG IIIC, http://www.interreg3c.net,  EU program promoting cross-border, transnational. 
and interregional corporation, see also EUREGIO, http://www.euregio.nl collaboration between 
Netherlands and Germany, EURALILLE, http://www.saem-euralille.fr, intermodal transportation node 
in the North of France. 
3 See studies such as After-sprawl (Xaveer de Geyter), Uncertain States of Europe (Stefano Boeri), 
Citta Diffusa (Francesco Indovina), New Territories (Paola Vigano).
4 See studies such as After Sprawl, Uncertain States of Europe.
5 The May 1963 issue of Architectural Review reported the attention Yona Friedman had attracted in 
France with his scheme for a triangulated spatial city grid for Paris, to be extended all over Europe 
(Architectural Review, May, 1963). The magazine reported the growing fame of Friedman’s work, which 
had been broadcast on television and which had been considered as a valid plan for Paris by the local 
government. As a tool to deal with increasing traffi c jams, this new scheme expanded all over Europe 
as an easily accessible network of compact space-frame cities. 
6 See Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge and Power,” The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, 
1984.
7 See Ernest Gellner, 1983. Gellner writes that nationalism can lead to war when the political boundary 
of a state fails to include all members of a nation or when the rulers of a political unit are not part of the 
nation’s majority, as in large empires.
8 Therefore, to call Foucault’s contribution to historiography the spatialization of history does not fully 
grasp the complexity of his approach. More precisely, it is Foucault’s addition of the spatiotemporal 
unit — the event, the situation or the battle — that allows a more accurate description of mechanisms 
of space-making. 
9 Michel Foucault replaced a structuralist approach with the model of battle, which profoundly 
affected the importance of the relationship between bodies and land in the historical research of 
social space (Foucault, 1984). From a system of sign and signifi ed in which nothing exists outside of 
language,  he moved to a realm of body practices in which a discourse can exist before and beyond the 
author or the subject, and thus, where spatial confi gurations can function as statements. As example, 
Foucault points out that the most important aspect of disciplinary practice in the rational age was the 
arrangement of tactics, which he links directly to the birth in the eighteenth century of great military 
strategies and at the same time the rise of meticulous army tactics that disciplined the soldier’s body 
(Foucault, 1977). See also Foucault’s theory of discursive formations as described by Paul Hirst in 
“Foucault and architecture.” AA fi les (Autumn 1993): 52-60.
10 This follows the Lefebvrian understanding of space as lived, as an entity constituted by the movement 
of bodies (Henri Lefebvre, 1991 and more recent feminist theory).
11 See Didier Gille’s Maceration and Purifi cation.
12 As extensively described by Denis de Rougemont in: De Rougemont, D. (1961). Vingt-huit siècles 
d’Europe. La conscience Européenne à travers les textes d’Hésiode à nos jours. Paris: Payot.
13 Formed as the British section of CIAM after a request from Sigfried Giedion to create a body 
that could represent Britain at future CIAM meetings, it was the fi rst successful attempt to create 
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a platform for those British architects, engineers, and theorists who sympathized with the European 
modern movement and felt isolated by what they saw as the English conservatism of the 1930s. In 1938, 
the group organized an exhibition titled “New Architecture” at the New Burlington Galleries, which 
Le Corbusier characterized as a “charming display of youth” in a review of the show published in 
Architectural Review, February 1938.
14 In special issue of May 1963 of Architectural Review called AR EUROMART, an article titled ‘United 
Cities’ included two maps drawn by a Dutch urbanist. While the fi rst map showed the major highway 
connections in Europe, a second one showed how this could transform into a linear city following the 
most important highways (Banham, 1963). Again, mobility became Europe’s glue, and therefore the 
future of Europe’s urban condition would be characterized by a linear urbanity. 
15 See for example the development of the high-speed train station Euralille in Lille at the French-
Belgian border, surrounded by rural and poorly developed areas on both sides of the border.
16 Many articles of the period published articles about the American condition as a model, or 
sometimes an unavoidable, future, for Europe. Especially the Independent Group and Team 10 were 
interested in exploring American culture as a possibility for renewing the architectural and urban 
condition of the old world. For example, Architectural Design Magazine published frequent articles 
on the American city in that period. This confrontation between a problematic English reality versus 
American advancement was part of a discourse in the pages of the magazine.
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ABSTRACT
This essay looks at a specifi c, fundamental element of post-war reconstruction, the 
disconnect between the nature and intention of destruction, and the nature and outcome 
of reconstruction.  In failing to understand and conduct reconstruction in a way that 
appreciates the intricacies of architectural destruction, often called “warchitecture” 
or “urbicide,” the international community fails to address the complexities of 
multi-ethnic existence and conﬂ ict.  While the destruction of architecture was a 
premeditated weapon against multi-ethnicity during the war in Bosnia, reconstruction 
efforts have not, in general, taken a strong stance on reversing the destruction of 
symbolically signifi cant buildings, and, in turn, have not fostered the reconstruction 
of multi-ethnic life in Bosnia.  In Mostar, this failure by the international community 
has directly led to a spatial and social entrenchment of the ethnic divisions which, 
in theory, were the original target of conﬂ ict resolution and reconstruction.  While 
post-war Bosnia is used as a case study to outline the failures of the international 
community to understand the effects of housing-centric reconstruction, this essay 
raises further questions about the prevalence of this kind of non-contextual post-war 
reconstruction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout world.  The essay concludes that 
post-war reconstruction practices and policies, especially in relation to multi-ethnic 
societies, need to be shifted to address the isolation and inequalities created by 
war.  Furthermore, current reconstruction projects artifi cially separate architectural 
and infrastructure reconstruction from social and cultural reconstruction, further 
neglecting the opportunities afforded by a more holistic approach to rebuilding post-
war countries.
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‘’Why do we feel more pain looking at the image of the destroyed 
bridge (in Mostar) than the image of the massacred people? 
Perhaps because we see our own mortality in the collapse of the 
bridge... We expect people to die; we count on our own lives to end. 
The destruction of a monument to civilization is something else. The 
bridge, in all it’s beauty and grace was built to outlive us. It was an 
attempt to grasp eternity. It transcended our individual destiny.’’  
– Slavenka Drakulic (Balic, 2004, p. 5)
The brutal war in Bosnia in the 1990s not only shocked the world but gave us a new 
vocabulary of violence (see for example Coward: 2002). The ethnic nature of the conﬂ ict 
not only led to mass population displacement but also the destruction of “symbolically 
signifi cant” buildings and urban environments. The brutality of the war generated an 
international effort to end the conﬂ ict; in turn, the international community contributed 
to the reconstruction of Bosnia after the war.  This pattern of individual states or 
supra-national organizations helping to rebuild war-torn countries is common when 
they are involved in resolving a local conﬂ ict.  Some theorists place grave importance 
on the initial “conﬂ ict resolution” role of the international community and miscalculate 
the importance of rebuilding efforts.  In Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and many other 
countries, well-intentioned foreign states and organizations have attempted to rebuild 
cities and societies torn apart by war. The process of conﬂ ict resolution is well 
documented, but the process of reconstruction and the economic, civic, and social 
implications of rebuilding have been less completely explored, and are therefore 
less understood. This essay looks at a specifi c, fundamental element of post-war 
reconstruction: the disconnect between the nature and intention of destruction, and 
the nature and outcome of reconstruction. While the situation in Bosnia serves to 
highlight the intricacies of the issue, this essay is meant to raise questions about the 
practice of post-war reconstruction all over the world.
After a brief historical overview of the conﬂ ict in Bosnia, I will explain existing theories 
of architectural destruction and use the broad understanding of “warchitecture” to 
highlight the multiple expressions of destruction. This broader defi nition allows us to 
understand the over-simplicity of the international community’s reconstruction efforts. 
Although Mostar was in part rebuilt by different actors than in the rest of Bosnia, it 
is nevertheless a striking example of the disconnect between destruction and 
reconstruction. Reconstruction by the international community in Bosnia has failed 
to account for the multiple types of destruction employed by warring armies. In failing 
to understand and conduct reconstruction in a way that appreciates the intricacies of 
architectural destruction, the international community fails to address the complexities 
of multi-ethnic existence and conﬂ ict. In Mostar, this failure has directly led to a spatial 
and social entrenchment of the ethnic divisions the international community intended 
to address through resolution and reconstruction.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a multi-ethnic unit of Yugoslavia with a complex and 
complicated reality of religion, identity, politics, history, and patterns of settlement. 
Yugoslavia and its republics, particularly Bosnia, were generally seen as successful 
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examples of heterogeneous polities capable of overcoming difference. Some authors 
overemphasize the extent of ethnic integration and intermarriage in pre-war Bosnia, 
and ignore the divisions that did exist, especially in rural areas. However, in larger 
cities like Mostar, there was virtually no residential, social, or institutional segregation. 
Indeed, a large percentage of residents had mixed backgrounds or marriages (Bose, 
2002). Perhaps more importantly, Mostar served as a symbol of multiculturalism not 
only through its diversity, but also through its cultural life and architecture. These 
symbols had developed over hundreds of years, through Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian occupation, war, migration, and Titoist socialism. Over time, Kaiser writes, 
“a sense of integration had developed though a common attachment to places and 
shared space” (Kaiser, 2000, 7). 
In the early 1990s, Bosnia rapidly descended into war following the secession of 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia from Yugoslavia.  After Yugoslavia disintegrated, there 
was a panic throughout the region over the future of ethnic minorities in the newly 
independent states (Bose, 2000; Hayden, 1999). Some Bosnians wanted an independent 
state, while minority groups, like Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, wanted to be part 
of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia, respectively. Serbia and Croatia supported the 
dissident groups within Bosnia both materially and morally. Within each ethnic group, 
however, there was a range of positions and opinions, and some armies, particularly 
the “Bosnian” Army, which defended the new state, were ethnically mixed. Despite 
some exceptions, complications, and compromises, the Serb and Croat intentions 
were to create ethnically homogenous territories that were to be annexed by their 
respective “homelands.”   
These ambitions led directly to the most distressing characteristic of the war, “ethnic 
cleansing.”  Ethnic cleansing is generally understood as the violent removal of a 
people from their homes and towns via forced migration or killing.  This type of warfare 
creates massive numbers of “internally displaced persons” (IDPs), in nearby towns 
or across the line of conﬂ ict, and refugees to other countries.  By the end of the war, 
there were approximately one million IDPs and one million refugees from the pre-
war population of 4.4 million (Yarwood, 1999, p. 4). The intention of ethnic cleansing, 
according to Coward (2002) is to destroy heterogeneity and establish homogeneity. 
The expulsion of minorities from Bosnian towns (allegedly perpetrated by all sides of 
the conﬂ ict) was accompanied by a less understood but important phenomenon: the 
intentional destruction of architecture.  This phenomenon was not separate from ethnic 
cleansing; rather, it was a related and premeditated weapon against the presence of 
multi-ethnicity in contested spaces.   
THEORIES OF DESTRUCTION
It is as if the protagonists, unable to strangle the last living representatives of what 
they see as an alien culture, seem to think that with the destruction of place, an 
architectural cleansing, as it were, they can eradicate the people who inhabit that 
place.... Mosques, churches, synagogues, markets, museums, libraries, cafes, in 
short, the places where people gather to live out their collective life, have been the 
focus of bitter attacks. 
(Adams, 1993, ¶ 3)
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Warring armies throughout Bosnia, particularly Bosnian Serb and Croat forces, 
destroyed whole towns and targeted culturally signifi cant buildings for destruction. 
The massive number of destroyed cultural buildings has been well documented and, 
according to Bevan, includes “over 1,100 mosques and other Muslim buildings, 309 
Catholic churches and monasteries and 36 Serbian Orthodox churches” (Bevan, 2001, 
p. 2). The destruction of the built environment, or “urbicide,” has been hotly debated by 
architects and historians.  Coward outlines the three prevailing theories used to explain 
the destruction of buildings and cities. These theories are “(a) collateral damage, (b) 
the destruction of cultural heritage, and (c) a metaphor for certain concepts or values” 
(Coward, 2002, p. 13). Collateral damage refers to accidental damage to buildings 
as a result of military action. The cultural heritage theory (see for example Adams, 
1993; Kaiser, 2000; Riedlmayer, 1995), Coward notes, satisfactorily highlights the 
importance of the built environment in cultural identity but ignores the destruction of 
non-heritage buildings, like schools, hospitals, or houses. Finally, some theorists argue 
that the destruction of buildings acts merely as a metaphor for the ideas behind the 
war, namely, the desire for homogenous ethnic states (Coward, 2002, p. 28).  Coward, 
however, argues that none of these theories gives a complete understanding of the 
destruction of Bosnia’s urban fabric.  He believes the destruction of the urban fabric 
to be an intentional destruction not only of heterogeneity, but also the conditions that 
allow for heterogeneity (Coward, 2002, p. 35).
By  focusing on the “urban fabric,”  Coward deemphasizes actual spaces of 
heterogeneity (e.g., city centers or markets) or buildings with cultural importance 
(e.g., libraries or religious buildings) in favor of potential spaces of heterogeneity 
(anything “urban”), thereby devaluing the symbolic signifi cance of individual pieces 
of architecture. Coward updates the discussion of urban destruction by illustrating 
that the destruction of physical spaces of heterogeneity is also the destruction of 
any theoretical or future spaces available for heterogeneity.  However, this defi nition 
of urbicide neglects the importance of symbolism in the destruction of “culturally 
signifi cant” buildings. This term generally refers to libraries, museums, theatres, 
places of worship, and historic buildings (Council of Europe, 1995). However, this 
term generally excludes less obviously “cultural” buildings, such as houses or 
infrastructure.  
These unexceptional pieces of the urban fabric are nonetheless symbolically 
signifi cant. Ordinary buildings, as much as cultural institutions, bear the weight of 
everyday “heterogeneity,” especially in rural areas where there are generally fewer 
grand architectural gestures of diversity, culture or religion.  It is useful to look at Torsti 
to understand this broadening of the term “culturally signifi cant” to mean symbolically 
signifi cant. Torsti uses the term “history culture” to mean “that part of public culture 
where people are confronted with claims about the past in their daily lives” (2004, p. 
142). This approximates the sense of “symbolically signifi cant” I wish to convey; that 
is, any part of the built environment that demonstrates, refers to, evokes, or symbolizes 
a particular culture or multiculturalism.  This would include the churches, monuments, 
houses, bridges, schools, etc., that are neglected by Coward’s spatial heterogeneity 
theory and often excluded in the theories he dismisses.      
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In this essay I will therefore approach the destruction of symbolically signifi cant 
buildings and monuments as “warchitecture,” the “deliberate destruction of 
architecture” (Herscher, 1998, p. 1). I use this broad defi nition because it does not 
distinguish between urban/rural and ordinary/heritage.  Although these are important 
distinctions, this essay posits that destruction in Bosnia was not limited to “cultural 
heritage” or to a vague destruction of the conditions of urbanity. Rather, “warchitecture” 
had multiple expressions in different contexts. Mostar provides a good example of the 
different expressions of warchitecture and the failure of reconstruction to deal with 
these distinctions. 
DESTRUCTION OF MOSTAR
According to Yarwood, the European Union Administration in Mostar (EUAM) Director 
of Reconstruction, pre-war Mostar was highly mixed, institutionally integrated, 
residentially integrated, with good schools, well known universities, and a healthy 
tourist industry. The 1991 Mostar census reported a population that was “29 per cent 
Croats, 34 per cent Muslims, 19 per cent Serbs, 15 per cent Yugoslavs and three per 
cent other groups” (Yarwood, 1999, p. 2). Mostar was a vibrant city, known to all “as a 
paradigm of a harmonious multi-ethnic society, modern, sophisticated and agreeable” 
(p. 3). 
In 1992, war came to Mostar when Bosnian Serbs launched an attack, which Croats 
and Muslims fought off, side by side (Yarwood, 1999, p. 4). While Croats and Muslims 
worked together to defend the city, the Serb population ﬂ ed.  While the Bosnian Serb 
army withdrew after a three-month siege, the Croats soon “turned on the Moslems, 
assembling them in detention camps, putting them on buses to leave the area, or 
subsequently expelling them to the ghetto on the east side, which they then bombarded 
from previously prepared artillery positions” (Yarwood, 1999, p. 4). When the Muslim 
population was forced to move to east Mostar or out of the city altogether, their empty 
houses were often occupied by Croats, some who ﬂ ed from east Mostar.  This area, 
which had before been a typically integrated neighborhood, became the Muslim part 
of city, the ghetto. 
With the remaining Muslims living in the eastern part of the city, the Croats focused 
on destroying it.  Thus the majority of destruction in Mostar occurred in the east, 
which received over 80% of the heavy damage (Yarwood, 1999, p. 6).   Throughout 
the city, Yarwood writes, “the view is widespread that historic monuments, cultural 
property and religious buildings were deliberately targeted” (p. 6).   He lists the 
following buildings as damaged or ruined: Austrian baths, Ottoman baths, the bazaar, 
the Symphony Orchestra building, the Museum of Herzegovina, the Church of St Peter 
and St Paul, the Bishop’s Palace (and its library), the Catholic Cathedral, as well as 
other churches and “almost all of the mosques.”  In one instance, Yarwood notes, 
the Orthodox Cathedral was dynamited in direct “retaliation” for the destruction of 
the Koski Mehmet Pa,ša mosque’s famous minaret. Just outside the city, entire towns 
were blown up after the locals had been forced out (p. 6).  
The bridges of Mostar, which connected east to west, were systematically destroyed 
during the conﬂ ict. Initially, Stari Most, a famous bridge built by the Ottomans, was 
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spared, although no one really knows why.  However, in November, 1993, this iconic 
and beautiful structure was heavily shelled by the Croats. Armaly, Blasi and Hannah 
write that the bridge was “deliberately destroyed for its symbolic signifi cance 
rather than its military value.”  This fi nal blow left Mostar with no bridges, a sad and 
paradoxical situation in the town whose name means “bridgekeeper” (Armaly, Blasi 
& Hannah, 2004, p. 9). 
Thus the destruction of urban Mostar was characterized by the deliberate targeting 
of shared historic and cultural buildings as well as ethnic or religious architecture. 
In addition, as Coward notes, the urban fabric itself was attacked through wholesale 
targeting of residential areas and bridges.  In the rural villages around Mostar, 
warchitecture was characterized by a systematic destruction of the homes of expelled 
residents as well as the destruction of shared or ethnic architecture.  All of these 
buildings were symbolically signifi cant, but the reasons for their destruction varied 
widely. The multiple rationales of destruction included military maneuvering, expelling 
residents, creating a homogenous city, humiliation, destruction of public or cultural 
buildings, preventing expelled residents from returning, instilling fear, and attempting 
to destroy a specifi c or shared culture. Early reconstruction policy in Mostar, however, 
focused largely on one aspect, rebuilding the houses people were living in at the end 
of the war, a precarious foundation for the reconstruction of Bosnian’s multicultural 
society.
RECONSTRUCTION POLICY
It is an immense challenge to reconstruct cities, and indeed societies that have been 
systematically destroyed in this way. In their reconstruction policies, the international 
community, specifi cally the European Union, Technisches Hilfswerk and the United 
Nations, has not adequately addressed the nature of Bosnia’s war-time destruction 
in their reconstruction policies. They have mistakenly focused on housing repair as 
the primary and most potent solution to conﬂ ict settlement and reintegration. This is 
a regrettably limited outreach to Bosnians, because they witnessed a much greater 
destruction of their city far beyond the destruction of their housing stock.  The 
international community does not seem to understand the impact of these policies, 
in particular the choice of housing reconstruction as their fi rst goal as well as their 
policies on where and how to rebuild housing. What international actors do and what 
they choose to rebuild act as symbols and examples for further reconstruction, as well 
as serving to begin or prevent the healing of a torn country. 
The reconstruction efforts of the international community in Bosnia have a number of 
important characteristics. First, returns of refugee and internally displaced persons 
(IDP) have been politically, morally, and fi nancially linked to reconstruction. The Dayton 
Peace Agreement offi cially ended the conﬂ ict in Bosnia.  The document outlines the 
legal role of returns in Annex 7: Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
stating, “the early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective 
of the settlement of the conﬂ ict in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1995, chap. 1, Article 1). 
Sokolovic adequately sums up the psychological and political importance of refugee 
returns in the context of reconstruction.  He writes,
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Although repaired buildings and cities never fully replace those 
that were destroyed, at least the visible evidence of renewal send a 
message to everyone- other victims, bystanders, and perpetrators- 
that those who were expelled have not been defeated.  For these 
reasons, as well as for the very practical reasons of providing 
shelter and stability, return and rebuilding programs are at the 
center of efforts to strengthen Bosnian society and democracy.  
(2001, p. 181)
The majority of reconstruction funding was tied to refugee and IDP returns, to the extent 
that “housing represented the largest single category of international expenditure... 
ranking above expenditures on peace implementation activities, landmine clearance, 
government institution building, and social support” (Black, 2001, p. 183). He stresses 
that refugee returns could minimize the nationalist character of the political system, 
by reintroduction of minorities, thereby encouraging political progress (p. 183). One 
example of the importance of returns in reconstruction was the 1,000 Roofs for Bosnia 
program, where  more than 30% of the program recipients were returnees. Black notes 
that as reconstruction continues, it is increasingly common for projects to require 100 
per cent of “returnee” recipients. While it is true that minority returns could positively 
impact political progress, using the general term “returnee” allows these programs to 
overlook who they are returning, and to where.  For example, under this defi nition, a 
“returnee” could be a Muslim from west Mostar who ﬂ ed during the war and is now 
being “returned” to the homogenous, Muslim east Mostar.  These policies could thus 
serve to entrench ethnic homogeneity in neighborhoods that used to be integrated.
The second important characteristic of reconstruction is its inherently political nature. 
Multiple sources of funding and implementation, political elites with nationalist 
agendas, grieved populations and continued low-level conﬂ ict after the Dayton Peace 
Accords all contributed to the diffi culty of adequately and responsively conducting 
reconstruction projects. The goals of the international community are to ensure returns, 
provide shelter, and rebuild the economy, while the local elite’s endeavored to solidify 
their territories, gain political currency through returns (but not minority returns), 
and rebuild their districts (Yarwood, 1999, p. 7 and 11). Local residents, and those 
wishing to return, may want to regain a pre-war standard of living, including shelter, 
heating, electricity, plumbing, schools, hospitals and, for some, ethnic reintegration or 
getting their property back. As Kaiser notes, the competing moral, physical, political, 
psychological and economic demands on reconstruction efforts are extremely intense. 
He writes, “in this context, the restoration and rebuilding of cultural heritage can take 
on political and downright divisive dimensions: it is no longer a question of rebuilding 
what was held in common, but only ‘what was ours’ “ (2000, p 8). Thus nationalist goals 
of local residents can compete or even overpower the desires of residents and the 
international community.  However, the lack of foreign commitment to minority returns 
and reintegration made it easier for nationalist objectives to be met.
The third dimension of reconstruction policy is the scarce funds and willpower for 
cultural reconstruction. Based on international and internal accounts of reconstruction, 
there is a disparity between the nature of destruction (destroying symbolically 
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signifi cant buildings to eliminate heterogeneity) and the reconstruction efforts, which 
are largely nationalist in intention or outcome (and reinforce the imposed homogeneity 
of the war.) The international “outrage” over images of the destruction of libraries 
and museums in Bosnia did not result in a coordinated funding effort to rebuild those 
cultural institutions or their collections (Donia, 2004, p. 22). While the Dayton Peace 
Agreement recognizes the importance of cultural heritage in Annex 8: Agreement 
On Commission To Preserve National Monuments by establishing a multi-ethnic 
Commission to Preserve National Monuments, this body is essentially non-functioning 
and has no real role in reconstruction in Bosnia (1995, Article 1).
RECONSTRUCTING MOSTAR
Reconstruction in Mostar began in 1994, about a year and a half before hostilities 
ceased in the rest of Bosnia. In May 1994, the Washington Agreement (essentially a 
ceasefi re agreement) established the European Union’s role in the reconstruction of 
Mostar through the European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM).  Thus the initial 
reconstruction of Mostar was not under the mandate of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 
but under its own mandate, which lasted until 1997 (Yarwood, 1999, p. 8). Some of 
primary goals of the EUAM were freedom of movement, public security, refugee 
returns, returning homes to their original owners, and infrastructure reconstruction 
(p. 7). Because the EUAM offi cials were appointed by the EU and not elected, the 
Administration was not accountable to anyone in Bosnia, least of all local residents 
(p. 22). Despite this, the EUAM worked with local elites and politicians in an attempt 
to be relevant and transparent.  However, these attempts at addressing local desires 
often diminished the impact of projects because of the nationalist objectives of some 
local leaders. This is especially apparent in the failure of the EU to meet their goal of 
returning IDPs to their original homes.
Other key international actors in the reconstruction in Mostar have been Technisches 
Hilfswerk (THW) and the World Bank. Although the bulk of reconstruction was 
conducted and funded by international (and non-aligned) organizations, a handful of 
signifi cant projects were conducted by aligned or internal actors, which inﬂ uenced 
the reconstruction of Mostar. In particular, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the 
World Monuments Fund have been signifi cant actors in Mostar’s reconstruction since 
1998. Their approach will be discussed later.  
The majority of the EUAM reconstruction work established shelter, infrastructure, 
and basic facilities, what Yarwood calls “humanitarian” development (1999, p. 26). 
Yarwood notes that housing repair constituted a majority of EU reconstruction efforts 
in (p. 46). In some respects, this was a successful project, as the EUAM repaired over 
6,000 houses.  However, most repairs were external and did not include electricity, 
heating, water, or plumbing (p. 48). The EU housing repair project had two goals: to 
improve living conditions and to facilitate refugee returns (p. 48). According to Bose, 
however, Mostar has a “poor record of returns by refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes” (2002, p. 113).  
Although the bulk of reconstruction focused on housing, the fi rst “major” project 
EUAM carried out was replacing a bridge across the Neretva. Rather than rebuild 
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a permanent bridge, the EUAM replaced the Musala bridge with a Bailey Bridge, a 
temporary military structure. Yarwood recognized the symbolism of rebuilding the 
bridges, and noted, “Bridge-building was a fashionable metaphor at the time” (1999, 
p. 13). Rather than connect the isolated ethnic neighborhoods created by the war, the 
new bridge connected two Muslim enclaves, angering the Croats. Thus EUAM’s fi rst 
big project was stripped of its capacity to act as either unifi er or symbol.  During their 
mandate, EUAM replaced fi ve of the ten destroyed bridges across the Neretva, mostly 
with Bailey Bridges (1999, p. 7).  Yarwood notes how he came to understand the impact 
of rebuilding, rather than replacing, one specifi c bridge.  He highlights 
the psychological and political dimension. I had criticized the 
Administrator for his decision to rebuild Carinski Bridge to its 
original Austro-Hungarian design at a cost of DM5 million [3.2 
million US dollars]. I said a Bailey Bridge would suffi ce. He listened 
politely, but stuck to his view.  At the opening ceremony, I saw I was 
wrong. The bridge became a symbol of both hope and continuity.  
It was visually stunning and a tremendous affi rmation of the faith 
of Europe. (p. 50)
The EUAM’s budget included urban Mostar but did not include historic monuments or 
anything outside the city (Yarwood, 1999, p. 7). Thus EUAM excluded from reconstruction 
(with a few discretionary exceptions) the villages that had been systematically cleared 
of minorities and were burned down or dynamited, as well as intentionally targeted 
cultural and historical buildings. Although EUAM made signifi cant advances in 
restoring the city’s functional capabilities, these projects were conducted in a parallel 
manner and did not extend across the river. Bose writes, “utilities such as water, 
electricity, gas and telephones were restored fairly quickly, although with separate 
systems for the two zones. Schools and hospitals also reopened in due course, once 
again on a segregated basis” (2002, p. 107). The reconstruction of Mostar, rather 
than foster integration through shared facilities and spaces, entrenched the ethnic 
divide and actually created a new possibility of complete ethnic isolation, through the 
construction separate facilities.  The siege of Mostar, Bevan writes, “left a legacy of 
bitterness and division that is being made physical by the reconstruction” (2001, ¶ 11). 
The European Union Administration did restore some symbolically signifi cant facilities, 
albeit for their use, rather than their symbolism (Herscher, 1998, ¶ 3). These buildings 
included the theatre hall, post offi ce, fi re station, court house, airport, railway station, 
bus station, and three libraries. The scale of restoration was rather limited, however, 
as cultural buildings received only approximately 1% of the EUAM’s budget (Yarwood, 
1999, Appendix 1). This budget included the stabilization of three mosques to prevent 
further deterioration, but did not fund restoration (Wenzel, 1994). Yarwood and his 
colleagues understood how important symbols were in the reunifi cation of Mostar. 
However, their policies and process of reconstruction directly contributed to the 
consolidation of ethnic groups into isolated, segregated areas of post-war Mostar. 
By reconstructing utilities and public buildings as two separate systems, the EUAM 
practically ensured ethnic consolidation. Of particular concern are the twenty-eight 
schools restored by the EUAM, which serve only their respective, segregated parts of 
the city, without any integration of students from other ethnicities. These schools have 
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no common curriculum, allowing nationalist ideas to be taught unchecked, further 
securing a segregated future for Mostar. The reconstruction of Mostar, fi nanced and 
guided by the European Union, lacked a deep understanding of how reconstruction 
can and should reverse the tangible, symbolic, and physical inequalities created by 
ethnic conﬂ ict.  A colleague of Yarwood wrote to him that “in Mostar it is the buildings 
that are being reconstructed, not the life in the city” (Yarwood, 1999, p. 90). 
Another organization, the German-funded Technisches Hilfswerk (THW), also 
conducted humanitarian-driven reconstruction in Mostar during this time (Yarwood, 
1999). THW conducted a self-help program, providing materials for housing repair but 
not funding any labor for repairs. As with the EUAM, the initial repairs were largely 
cosmetic. THW operated almost exclusively in east Mostar, because, Yarwood writes, 
“political leaders did everything they could to resist free movement and positive political 
development in the city” (p. 54). Rather than fi ght for integrated reconstruction, or even 
conduct parallel efforts, THW concentrated its efforts on the more badly damaged east 
side.  Since the east side was artifi cially homogenous, and THW did not encourage or 
insist on a program of minority returns, repairing homes only in east Mostar encouraged 
the geographic entrenchment of ethnicity in the city.  THW did have one interesting 
project that challenged the simplistic nature of reconstruction.  The Ad Hoc Programme 
provided rapid assistance in reaction to exceptional incidents.  In one instance, “just 
an hour after a grenade had exploded in the city, the damage had been surveyed, and 
the day after the material [for repairs] was delivered” (p. 57). This small program was 
important because it reﬂ ected ongoing problems in the city, rather than approaching 
reconstruction from the static position of housing repair. If this program had been more
widely implemented or replicated, it could have been used to reconcile the reality of 
segregation in the city.
The most visible and renowned international project was the reconstruction of Stari 
Most.  The project was initiated in 1998 by the World Bank, UNESCO, and Aga Khan 
Trust for Culture, together establishing a Pilot Cultural Heritage Project (PCHP, 2000). 
What PCHP called the “new Old Bridge” was intended to be a symbol to the world 
of the international community’s efforts in, and hope for, Mostar.  The bridge was 
rebuilt with original techniques and materials after an intensive study of the original 
construction techniques.  Reconstruction began in 2001 and was completed in 2004 
with a large opening ceremony attended by the UN’s High Representative and Prince 
Charles, as well as local offi cials (Armaly, Blasi & Hannah, 2004, p. 7). 
The international focus of this project was intentional and fundamental.  Wimmen 
writes that the “popular image” of the bridge as unifi er,
…probably reveals more about the Western need to reduce 
complex and multi-layered structures of ethnic interaction to clear-
cut oppositions (which then can be, as it were, “bridged”), and 
also provides a symbol for easy media consumption, rather than 
reﬂ ecting actual local realities. (2004, p. 4)
Kron also writes about these assumptions of symbolism by the international 
community. The intention of the bridge, he notes, is to “reinforce a general Mostar 
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ESidentity by refocusing the attention of residents on a physical place, the river and the 
bridge. These projects are quite literal in their approach” (n.d., p. 32). This project, he 
theorizes, misses the reality of Mostar’s identity. He highlights this misunderstanding 
in reference to a proposal of a new community center near Stari Most. He writes that 
the international community assumes 
A space designated for public gathering coupled with proximity to the 
symbol of Mostar will buttress the unique Mostar identity. However, 
the community center itself, even as a conceptual design, is in a 
global, if not purely Western or even American style of architecture. 
Mostar’s civic identity was, in the past, defi ned by a much more 
complex set of relationships, such as the bazaar, the mosque, the 
hamam, and the spaces generated between them.  (p. 32)
The reconstruction of the bridge with original Turkish construction techniques was a 
positive move away from the poor EUAM model of rebuilding. However, if there were 
an inherent symbolism or healing power in rebuilding Stari Most, it is likely that these 
powers would have decreased over time. Based on the accounts available of those 
involved in reconstruction, as well as those observing or experiencing reconstruction, 
it seems that the most important reconstruction works are the initial ones.  The fi rst 
reconstruction projects not only set an example for consequent work, they immediately 
serve as a visible symbol of the objectives of those who rebuild, whether it is the EUAM, 
UN, an inter-governmental or non-governmental organization.   
In contrast to EUAM and THW’s cosmetic “humanitarian” projects, some international 
FIGURE 1. The “new Old Bridge” (Stari Most), Mostar, Bosnia. S
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organizations are helping Mostar rebuild in a more holistic way.  The Aga Khan Trust 
for Culture (AKTC) and the World Monuments Fund (WMF), working together, “realised 
that the reconstruction of the bridge without an in-depth rehabilitation of the historic 
neighbourhoods ﬂ anking it on the picturesque Neretva riverbanks – its matrix as it 
were – would be devoid of context and meaning” (AKTC, 2004).  This contextual, holistic 
approach by AKTC and WMF is characterized by their city-wide conservation plan and 
their designation of twenty-one “priority” sites.  These sites are essentially marketed 
for rehabilitation by highlighting them as important “focal points” and “anchors” to 
secure further investment for rebuilding.  Unfortunately, this partnership did not start 
working in Mostar until 1998, however.  Had their involvement begun earlier, it could 
have signifi cantly altered the post-war landscape of Mostar.  Nonetheless, their work 
FIGURE 2. The rehabilitated area around Stari Most.
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is an important progress away from the problematic EUAM approach and is a positive 
example for reconstruction projects in other post-war cities. 
Other actors in Mostar’s reconstruction are local (though sometimes internationally 
funded) organizations who conduct religious rehabilitation projects. These projects 
have been generally undertaken by one ethnic/religious community to restore, 
expand, or establish new religious buildings. The most important of these, symbolically 
speaking, is the construction by Bosnian Croats, in 2000, of a huge cross that overlooks 
all of Mostar, but is directly perched above the Muslim east (Bose, 2002, p. 141). This 
religious/nationalist claim of space and territory characterizes much of the local 
reconstruction efforts. Bose writes, “the most striking aspect of Mostar’s partition 
consists of visual symbols used to mark zones and boundaries of territorial control,” 
including mosques in the new Muslim territory and an “enormous Catholic cathedral” 
(p. 141). While this may be justifi ed in light of the international community’s general 
neglect of communal and religious buildings, Torsti emphasizes, “just as destroying 
a mosque greatly injures and inﬂ uences Bosniac historical consciousness, so the 
reconstruction of that mosque at twice its original size has signifi cant meaning for the 
construction of Serb historical consciousness” (Torsti, 2004, p. 153).
These nationalist claims on space through reconstruction eliminate both the possibility 
and the reality of heterogeneous, shared space, which Bose stresses was the “key to 
coexistence in Bosnia for centuries” (2002, p. 141). The actions of the international 
community, furthermore, have encouraged an entrenchment of ethnic division and 
neglected symbolically signifi cant buildings, both historic and functional. Parallel or 
FIGURE 3. View of mosque and riverside cafes, from the top of Stari Most.
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exclusionary reconstruction efforts, in tandem with a lack of sensitivity regarding 
shared space and complex pre-war multiculturalism, have done little to remedy the 
deep damage done by warchitecture in Mostar.  On the other hand, a thoughtful 
combination of the holistic “matrix” approach, the housing-centric approach, a solid 
policy of minority returns, and a consideration of both everyday and sacred symbolism, 
could rebuild a divided city in way that not only addresses wartime inequalities but 
also can approximate the pre-war city.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction by the international community in Mostar has predominantly focused 
on rebuilding, foremost, housing and infrastructure, and, almost as an afterthought, 
religious and civic sites. Houses and churches are, respectively, private and public 
spaces for the expression of individual or group identity. This kind of reconstruction 
fails to recognize the importance of reconstructing shared space, such as multinational 
or supranational institutions (e.g. museums, libraries, concert halls) and spaces (e.g., 
markets, cafes, sports fi elds). 
Pre-war Mostar was well known for its diversity, social life, cosmopolitanism and 
joie de vivre. The destruction of Mostar intended to both symbolize and actualize the 
removal of certain ethnic groups or, at the very least, the division of ethnic groups 
into homogenous areas. The pragmatic (if political) reconstruction of houses by the 
international community restores shelter, raises morale, encourages returns, and 
allows the city to be re-inhabited. However, without a program to return minorities and 
previous residents, this approach allows for ghettoization and ethnic entrenchment. 
It sends a signal to residents, and those wishing to return, that the international 
community is primarily concerned with their basic needs and not social reconstruction, 
reintegration, or reconciliation. Although many people have returned to Mostar, minority 
returns, where Croats return to east Mostar, Muslims to west Mostar or Serbs to the 
city in general, are rare, reinforcing the unnatural homogeneity of the wartime ethnic 
zones. In addition, the parallel reconstruction of facilities and housing in east and west 
Mostar further strengthens the residential, institutional, and ethnic divisions.  
The reconstruction of symbolic, singular monuments by other actors additionally 
reinforces the wartime divide of the city, rather than its pre-war patterns.  Adams 
questions “whether the new masters of Bosnia-Herzegovina will have any interest 
in rebuilding the monuments they have so recently torn down?” Adams, 1993, p. 7). 
According to Donia, the answer is no, as demonstrated across Bosnia by the lack of 
will to rebuild non-nationalist buildings (2004, p. 12).
The disparity between destruction and reconstruction is not unique to Mostar. Some 
of the most potent symbols of cultural destruction in Bosnia, the Parliament and 
National Library in Sarajevo, are still burned-out shells ten years after the end of the 
war. Mosques and churches in Sarajevo are gleaming and bustling but important 
symbols of Sarajevo’s historically multi-ethnic identity lie ignored. Higueras writes that 
“Sarajevo has received most of the funds in Bosnia for the restoration of its old town 
and monuments. Rightly so, it continues to be a thriving multi-ethnic city where the 
coexistence of the three ethnic groups maintains pre-war patterns” (2002, p. 15). The 
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idea that Sarajevo deserves more funding for cultural reconstruction has two basic 
ﬂ aws. First, if the community and residences are as integrated as before the war, it 
follows that the most grievously damaged cities, the most divided, should receive more 
funding for cultural and multi-ethnic projects, to help them rebuild the integration that 
was lost during the war. Second, although funding for Sarajevo has made great strides, 
particularly in the rehabilitation of the old Ottoman section of town (also the center 
of Sarajevo’s cultural offerings and nightlife), it has neglected important symbolic 
buildings like the Library and Parliament. Letting important symbols lie in ruin is foolish 
because their reconstruction can serve as powerful reminders of shared history as 
well as re-establishing space for shared culture and politics (Riedlmayer, 2002, p. 2)
These cultural symbols, targets of warchitecture, need to 
be addressed in a way that reﬂ ects the nature of their 
destruction.  Wenzel writes, Few people seem to have 
considered the disastrous social effects which will result 
from international indifference towards Bosnia’s cultural 
monuments. In a war where symbols of cultural identity 
have played such an important part, the psychological 
benefi ts which would follow from the restoration of these 
damaged symbols would be huge. Bosnians themselves 
understand this. Unfortunately, the decisions about 
priorities in the reconstruction budget are being made 
not by Bosnians, but by outsiders. (1994, p. 7)
The consequences of the international community’s inattention to cultural heritage 
have recently become evident. In just one of many instances, the National Museum 
in Sarajevo has  been funded only intermittently for the last ten years; employees 
and utility bills are only paid occasionally. According to Plazonic, collections are 
beginning to deteriorate and the international community is thinking of passing 
a law to protect them (2004, p.14). Plazonic places blame largely on the Bosnian 
government for not funding the museum. However, the international community led 
the way in reconstructing Bosnia, and the government, still guided with a heavy hand 
by the international community, is simply following their apathetic and irresponsible 
example.
By focusing on cosmetic housing repair, allowing for parallel construction and failing 
to address minority returns, the international community has sent a strong message to 
Bosnians about the Bosnia they believe in and are willing to rebuild.  Deemphasizing 
cultural, historical, and social reconstruction entrenches this problem, despite 
the efforts of secondary actors to intervene. The continued neglect of multi-ethnic 
buildings, culture, society, and spaces imperils Bosnia’s ability to heal the ethnic 
divisions entrenched by warfare and reconstruction. Riedlmayer writes, “a generation 
of Bosnians is coming of age while we speak, and if we want them to play a part in 
rebuilding their society, they will need educational and cultural resources” (2004, p. 
6). Those resources, weakened by war, are disintegrating with each passing year of 
neglect. The international community, represented by the EUAM in Mostar and the UN 
institutions which replaced it, seriously misjudged the opportunities, symbolism and 
importance of reconstruction. Perhaps as a consequence, Friedman writes, 
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The cream of  Bosnia’s youth, those with a multiethnic 
point of view, are voting with their feet. Large numbers of 
them are leaving Bosnia for the US or Europe, unwilling to 
sacrifi ce their lives while Bosnia tries to become a viable 
state.  A 2000 survey found that 62 percent of Bosnia’s 
youth would leave if they had a chance. (2004, p. 124) 
The ﬂ ight of youth, educated people, and skilled workers from Bosnia cannot be 
attributed solely to mismanaged reconstruction efforts.  However, the symbolism of 
the international community’s insensitive reconstruction efforts in Bosnia is not lost on 
young people in Bosnia.  One young woman from Sarajevo, whose family moved to the 
U.S. during the war but returns to Sarajevo every summer to visit, wrote to me:
It really bothers me to see fi ve hundred cafes and clubs 
opening in Sarajevo while our museums and libraries are 
not getting fi xed. It sends the wrong message to the world 
and our whole community. It shows what we value and 
fi nd important. Our society can go down hill if we put no 
importance into education and preservation of history. (J. 
Arsic, personal communication, June 21, 2005) 
While ethnic cleansing was perhaps the most visible characteristic of the war in Bosnia, 
it brought with it the widespread destruction of symbolically signifi cant buildings and 
spaces. Despite well intended and well funded international efforts to rebuild Bosnia, 
most reconstruction projects did not address the complexity of destruction and thereby 
contributed to ethnic entrenchment, particularly in Mostar. Independent, local actors 
with nationalist agendas in Mostar have exacerbated the failings of the international 
community.  Organizations like Aga Khan and World Monuments fund understand the 
severity of the problem and are beginning to have greater involvement in Mostar’s 
reconstruction. Unfortunately for Mostar, ten years have passed with no real physical, 
social, or cultural reintegration. In a city with such a long history of diversity and multi-
ethnic interaction, it seems that the international community has grievously erred if 
they could not encourage the reestablishment of shared space.
LESSONS FOR POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION
Pre-war Bosnia was not a paradigm of harmonious multi-ethnicity. However, Mostar, 
Sarajevo, and other Bosnian cities had a high level of social and cultural integration 
that was admired around the world.  The nature of the conﬂ ict in Bosnia intended to 
destroy integration and thereby multi-ethnicity. Some scholars might argue that it is 
not the job of the international community to reverse the social upheaval caused by 
the war.  Reconstruction will either support or suppress social rebuilding, however, 
so it follows that the international community must be responsible for whichever path 
reconstruction takes.  Therefore, how can the international community not take steps 
to include social reconstruction in their post-war rebuilding efforts?
During the recent U.S. involvement in Iraq, museums were looted and cultural 
buildings were ruined.  U.S. reconstruction policy is focusing on infrastructure and 
security, important elements of post-war stabilization. But what of the valuable and 
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unique museum collections that have been lost?  What of the mosques that are being 
blown up every week?  These buildings and collections need to be attended to, as an 
important element of post-war stabilization.  Without a focus on rebuilding cultural 
monuments, museums and other symbols like shelled-out buildings, it is exceptionally 
diffi cult for a society to rebuild itself. As a multi-ethnic but troubled country, Iraq is 
like many other nation-building and post-war reconstruction situations. After the fall 
of a unifying government, however repressive (as in Bosnia [Yugoslavia] and Iraq,) 
local ethnic differences become more apparent and more important.  The U.S. is 
quickly losing the chance to foster multi-ethnic interaction in Iraq, and this could 
be contributing to the massive post-war increase in ethnic violence. While it cannot 
be expected that Iraq, or Bosnia, or any other multi-ethnic country will rejoice in its 
multi-ethnicity after a bitter war or period of repression, it is important to understand 
that post-war reconstruction will contribute or hinder social and cultural integration. 
One tiny project funded by the National Endowment for the Arts, intended to help 
secure or return pieces of Iraq’s cultural heritage, is a small step forward in the mass 
of infrastructure, oil. and security expenditures in Iraq (Johnson, 2005). The U.S. and 
other organizations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other post-war societies would do well 
to reconsider their reconstruction priorities. At the very least, they should understand 
the relationship between physical and social reconstruction, rather than funding the 
reconstruction of civil society separately from “rebuilding.”   
While it may be disheartening that the EU failed to foster reintegration in Mostar, a 
city famous for its diversity, it must not be used as an example of the futility of trying 
to restore pre-war society.  Instead, we must use Bosnia to show that international 
reconstruction efforts lack a contextual understanding of how reconstruction must 
reﬂ ect and overcome the conditions created by war. To foster social and physical 
reintegration, post-war reconstruction must go beyond “humanitarian” projects and 
take a fi rm stand on minority returns and integrated facilities.  In addition, buildings 
and spaces that serve as symbols of multi-ethnicity: marketplaces, neighborhoods, 
athletic fi elds, government offi ces. or museums- regardless of their “cultural” 
importance- must be completely restored. These visible and prominent investments in 
multi-ethnicity must be made, at the expense of nationalist or homogenous projects. 
The restoration of symbolically signifi cant buildings and spaces should not supercede 
the basic needs approach to rebuilding.  Nevertheless, if post-war reconstruction is 
to have the maximum possible positive effect, it must be a fundamental element of 
any reconstruction policy. When billions of dollars are being spent to “reconstruct” 
a country, it is the duty of the architects to make maximum use of the opportunities 
afforded by the process.  As we have seen, these opportunities were lost in Bosnia 
and are being lost in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the basic underpinning of 
reconstruction is a belief in the future of the country, and it is my hope that future 
reconstruction efforts can have a more contextual, and ultimately benefi cial, approach 
to rebuilding.  
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ABSTRACT
The article aims to explore and present management alternatives for the juxtaposition 
of three different types of hard constraints on metropolitan integration in Buenos Aires, 
namely, the social, territorial, and political boundaries. The social boundary denotes 
the gap between southern underdeveloped indexes and high quality of life standards in 
the north. The territorial or jurisdictional boundary elicits the contrast between Buenos 
Aires as a single megalopolis and Buenos Aires as the sum of 20 different jurisdictions 
often with  defi nite physical  limits, as is the case of  General Paz Avenue and the 
Riachuelo River. Finally, the political boundary refers to the non-completion of the 
political competence transfer from the federal government to Buenos Aires City, given 
the fact that it holds the double status of being an autonomous city and Argentina’s 
capital city. The paper introduces the question of how political authorities should 
coordinate and govern through this fragmentation in an effective manner. It uses a socio-
historical approach that examines different metropolitan governance experiences in 
recent history, grouping them into two conceptual models: the Metropolitan Focalized 
Public Intervention Approach and the Metropolitan Comprehensive Public Intervention 
Approach. While the fi rst model champions the idea of designing specifi c policies and 
special administrative procedures for each metropolitan issue, the second aims to 
conduct work through supra-municipal structures, seeking common solutions for all 
municipalities. Although the second approach is always more comprehensive, it has 
proved unsuccessful due to political economy problems. This leads us to present a 
third alternative, one that emphasizes the relevance of coordinated and participative 
strategic planning in all jurisdictions. This long-term strategic planning relies more on 
the idea of mutual cooperation and horizontality, which involves higher coordination 
costs at the beginning but guarantees a longer sustained action over time.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
While nourished by a limited array of options, every decision-making process is, at the 
same time, strongly biased by the overall conditions in which it evolves (Giddens, 1995). 
Although knowing as many options as possible is of critical importance in order to 
evaluate the different alternatives for any given policy, being aware of the restrictions 
allows decision makers to sharpen the resulting analyses.
Designing policies for Buenos Aires City requires taking into consideration the plurality 
of boundaries that impose restrictions on its core capabilities, and its manifold 
interrelations. This requirement suggests that we adopt a holistic perspective, from 
which one can visualize Buenos Aires City as part of a broader metropolitan unit 
and design mid- and long-term policies through a series of methodological devices 
provided by strategic planning.
By exploring these boundaries we will  enter a wide and intricate dimension, which 
gives rise to the diverse socioeconomic aspects intrinsic to the city’s development and 
its interaction with various external factors, such as the metropolitanism phenomenon; 
the functional superposition between its constitutional autonomous status and its 
national capital status; the strongly enrooted social fragmentation between the 
northern and the southern zones of the City; the progressive aggravation of the social 
gap after the last decades’ market-oriented reforms — which included privatizations 
and an adverse distribution of public investment — or the long-lasting political tensions 
between Buenos Aires and other Argentine provinces.
Which boundaries are shaping the metropolitan area in Buenos Aires? We believe they 
can be conceptualized as three analytically different categories: social boundaries, 
territorial boundaries, and political boundaries.
The social boundary refers to the historical “symbolic wall” that runs in an east-west 
direction, separating high poverty levels on the southern side of Rivadavia Avenue1, 
from developed-world levels on the northern. The territorial boundary (which can be 
also understood as an administrative or jurisdictional boundary) elicits the contrast 
between Buenos Aires as a megalopolis and Buenos Aires as an exclusive urban center 
with defi nite limits set by the General Paz Avenue and the Riachuelo River2. Although 
the city’s territorial boundaries were clearly reasserted by the 1996 Constitution, 
Buenos Aires is the center of a greater metropolitan area that comprises 24 other 
municipalities belonging to the Buenos Aires Province. This area hosts 13 million people 
on a daily basis — more than 30% of Argentina’s total population — who face common 
problems and diffi culties. Finally, the political boundary denotes the non-completion 
of the transfer of jurisdictional competences from the federal government to Buenos 
Aires City, given the fact that it holds a double status, one of being an autonomous city 
(as if it were one more province) and the other of being Argentina’s capital city. The 
city’s autonomy was acquired during the 1994 national constitutional reform, which 
granted it the prerogative of electing its own executive head of government (called 
Jefe de Gobierno), who was formerly appointed by the President. Additionally, its 
legislative branch abandoned its subordination to the National Congress, and became 
functionally independent. Soon after its autonomization, in 1996, the legislature brought 
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forth the Buenos Aires City’s Constitution, which sealed its novel political status. The 
city left behind its legal condition of being a federal territory, even if it continued to 
serve as the seat of government for both local and national authorities. 
Although we have mentioned three specifi c boundaries, these categories are 
complex, since all of them involve an inherent relation with multidisciplinary factors. 
For instance, the stark contrast between north and south can also be witnessed in 
salient infrastructure inequalities (as an example, note that most of Buenos Aires’ 
shanty towns or villas are located in the south). Furthermore, the territorial boundary 
that divides the city from the province can be traced back to the city’s federalization 
in 1880, and to a great extent it is explained by political confrontations as well3. Finally, 
the autonomy issue has its origins in the old cleavage between the urban Buenos Aires 
bourgeoisie and Argentina’s rural periphery, which explains why the city’s social and 
economical origins cannot be overlooked.
2.0 HOW TO DEFINE THE METROPOLITAN ANSWER
When dealing with the metropolitan area, one of the main problems is its very defi nition. 
Different parameters can be taken into account when assessing the key elements that 
demarcate the metropolitan scope. 
One defi nition could be based on the urban sprawl that spans several political units, 
and is determined by the continual linkage of material elements with a homogeneous 
physical morphology (Pírez, 1994, p. 58). Another option would be to consider not just 
the urban sprawl, but the sum of all the jurisdictions that totally or partially enclose that 
urban sprawl (Sabsay et al., 2002, p.17).
Finally, it is also possible to defi ne the metropolitan area as a greater unit that is 
determined by functional criteria: it would cover the central urban built-up area and 
the adjacent urban centers, according to their present or potential interrelations, 
including, thus, agricultural units and empty spaces (Sabsay et al., 2002, p.17). In this 
last defi nition, the Metropolitan Area would be conceptualized as a territorial unit 
determined by functional criteria and not merely territorial ones.
On the basis of this analytical framework, the INDEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
y Censos) has offered two defi nitions of the metropolitan area. On one hand, they gave 
the name Región Gran Buenos Aires (GBA) to the area that comprises Buenos Aires 
City plus the 24 municipalities of Buenos Aires province (see Map 1). On the other hand, 
they gave the name Aglomerado Gran Buenos Aires to the geographic area defi ned 
by demographic criteria, where the indicator is the density of urban buildings. This 
agglomerate is made up of Buenos Aires City and the 30 municipalities of Buenos Aires 
province (the ones which totally or partially conform to that territory) (INDEC, 2003).
We understand that what characterizes the metropolitan scope is not only its size, 
but also the functional importance of its activities, independent from their geographic 
proximity (Castells, 1999, p. 28). But although we adopt a vision where economic, social, 
and political factors are in mutual interdependence, for the purpose of this work we 
shall present data corresponding to the GBA, since the lack of readily available data 
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corresponding to the agglomerate leaves no alternative. We now explore the three 
boundaries issue.
3.0 THE THREE BOUNDARIES
With over 3.600 km2, the GBA represents a small percentage of the country’s territory: 
only 0.15%. In spite of this, it concentrates 31% of the country’s population: 12.8 million 
inhabitants (2390 inhabitants per km2). The economic importance of this unit is also 
remarkably greater than its geographical extension. Its economy represents 40% of 
the country’s GDP, and its territory concentrates 45% of the manufacturing activities, 
38% of commercial activities, 44% of services, and 34% of fi nancial activities (INDEC, 
2001). At the same time, the GBA’s average income is approximately 30% higher than 
the national one. However, 42.7% of its population is under the poverty line, and 15.2% 
under the extreme poverty line (INDEC, 2004).
This immense unit, then, is far from homogeneous. As we advanced in our fi rst section, 
the metropolitan area is an open umbrella that shelters noticeably different physical, 
social, economical, and political scenarios. 
MAP 1. Región Gran Buenos Aires (GBA). Buenos Aires City plus 24 municipalities. Source: 
Dirección General de Estadísticas y Censos, (Buenos Aires City Government) and INDEC 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos).
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3.1 THE NORTH-SOUTH SOCIAL BOUNDARY
As Argentina’s political and cultural heart, Buenos Aires witnessed much of the 
mutually incompatible ideas of the opposing hegemonic projects for the nation, whose 
legacies left an imprint on today’s urban confi gurations. Hence, Buenos Aires of late 
nineteenth  and early twentieth  century encompassed within its impressing buildings 
and monuments the self-confi dence of the most empowered sectors, and their high 
expectations based on the insuperable times to come for Argentina.
As the  twentieth century went by, the egalitarian principles of political movements 
such as yrigoyenism and peronism promoted the symbolic and material construction of 
a more homogeneous urbanity. This fact accounted for Argentina’s singularity among 
other Latin American countries: the existence of a widespread middle-class and low 
poverty levels. This made Buenos Aires an atypical case, closer to the European model 
of metropolis than to other major urban centers of the subcontinent such as San Pablo 
or Mexico DF, characterized by a strong social polarization, more comparable to the 
U.S. model.
However, there did exist a considerable social and economical gap within the city. 
After several regressive policies implemented by the military elites during the 1970’s, 
and  the 1990’s pro-market reforms, the difference between south and north grew 
bigger (Rovere, 2003).
This gap can be observed when comparing Buenos Aires City’s northern and southern 
administrative units (see Map 2), locally known as CGPs or CGPCs (Centros de Gestión 
y Participación), and which will soon be called Comunas, as well as Buenos Aires City 
and GBA’s municipalities, and GBA’s inner and outer  municipalities.
MAP 2. Buenos Aires City’s Centros de Gestión y Participación (CGPs). Source: Dirección 
General de Estadísticas y Censos, (Buenos Aires City Government).
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Data extracted from the 2001 National Census shows that the population with Unmet 
Basic Needs (UBN) corresponding to the southern units (CGPs 3, 4, 5 and 8) was 
between 15% and 18%, while in the northern CGPs (2N, 14E, 14O and 13), this fi gure 
was two-thirds lower:between 2 and 5%. The average UBN level for Buenos Aires 
City was of 7.8% (see Table 1). Something similar is seen in the unemployment and 
underemployment rates for the year 2003: while the average rate for the city was of 
10.5% and 12.5%, respectively, in the southern CGPs these rates were  about 21.6% 
and 14%, while in the northern they were  about 10.2% and 10.5% (see Table 1). There 
exist analogous levels of inequality in all other social indicators (health care, housing, 
and environmental conditions) (INDEC, 2003).
Also, if we compare Buenos Aires City with the all GBA’s municipalities taken as a 
single unit, indicators show similar results (see Tables 2 and 3). For the 1st semester 
of 2004, 51% of the population residing in GBA’s municipalities lived under the poverty 
line and 16.2% under the extreme poverty line, but only 15% and 5% respectively in 
Buenos Aires City (EPH INDEC, 2004). Similarly, for the 3rd quarter of 2003, 15.6% of 
the economically active population of GBA’s municipalities was unemployed, but only 
9.7% of Buenos Aires City’s population (see Table 4).
When comparing provincial municipalities, we can see that poverty levels increase 
the further we move from the central area. While the inner suburbs  have only 13.6% of 
TABLE 1 Comparison Between Northern and Southern CGPs in Buenos Aires City — 
General Socio-economic Indicators
North* South**
Unemployment Rate (%) 10.2 21.6
Average Income
(Argentine pesos) 1200 490
Basic Unmet Needs (%) 0-5 15-20
Level of Education (%)
Health Insurance (only public hospital insurance) 14.5% 51.5%
*Data corresponding to CGP 14e (neighborhood of Palermo).
**Data corresponding to CGP 8 (neighborhoods of Villa Lugano, Villa Soldati, Villa Riachuelo).
***Basic Unmet Needs refers to the existence of series of living conditions in a given household: 
overcrowding, lack of sanitary conditions, one or more children out of school and few members (1 out 
of 4) with regular income.
Source: INDEC, 2003. 
TABLE 2 Population Under the Poverty Line (%)
2nd semester 2004 2nd semester 2005
Buenos Aires City 14.7 11.5
GBA’s municipalities 44.4 36.9
Total Argentina 40.2 33.8
Source: EPH INDEC.
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their urban households under the extreme poverty line, in the outer suburbs this level 
doubles, reaching 28.3% (INDEC, 2004).
Various causes converge when it comes to explaining this social fragmentation. The fi rst 
one holds responsible  the notorious absence of state planning during the fi rst stages 
of expansion of the central built-up area in the city. As a consequence, the northern 
zones were chosen by the upper classes to reside, which favored the extension of 
goods and utilities supply nets and infrastructure, while relegating the south to be 
increasingly populated by immigrants and inhabitants from the Argentine periphery. 
The decision to leave the development of communications and utilities supply in hands 
of the private sector only helped to augment the levels of social fragmentation.
A second key explanation deals with the Yellow Fever epidemic outbreak that had a 
serious impact on the city in 1871. The southern, densely populated neighborhoods 
of La Boca, San Telmo and Monserrat were nearly depopulated and abandoned. The 
northern neighborhoods of Recoleta, Barrio Norten and Palermo started then to expand 
their construction and received important shares of public investments. After a while 
the south was progressively reoccupied, although not by its former inhabitants, but 
by new social groups coming from the periphery. This situation created a disgraceful 
image for the south, while the north embodied an abundance of positive connotations 
that pretended to represent the entire country through the wealthy, cosmopolitan, 
erudite, and liberal Buenos Aires, or, as it was called, the “Paris of Latin America.”
These conceptualizations, far from being suppressed by the authorities, were 
continually encouraged, making the virtuous circle of the north parallel to the vicious 
circle of the south.
TABLE 3 Population Under the Extreme Poverty Line (%)
2nd semester 2004 2nd semester 2005
Buenos Aires City 4 3.2
GBA’s municipalities 16.9 12.5
Total Argentina 15 12.2
Source: EPH INDEC.
TABLE 4 Employment Status (for 1st quarter 2006)
Buenos Aires City GBA’s Municipalities
Activity Rate 53.3% 47.4%
Employment Rate 48.4% 40.9%
Unemployment Rate 9.1% 13.6%
Underemployment Rate 9.8% 13.2%
Inactivity Rate 46.7% 52.6%
Source: EPH INDEC.
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3.2 THE TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY
The territorial boundary is the one that poses most constraints when it comes to 
evaluating the development of mid- and long-term comprehensive policies. On one 
side and the other of General Paz Avenue and the Riachuelo River lie the two major 
jurisdictions of the metropolitan area: Buenos Aires City and the province of Buenos 
Aires (see Map 2). At the same time, there are 24 municipalities in the metropolitan 
area belonging to the province that have governmental powers, especially for 
matters related to urban maintenance (waste management, lighting system, street 
paving, etc.). Finally, the federal government is in charge of the railway lines and their 
contiguous terrains, the federal buildings, the port, the local airport, and the subways. 
The centrality of Buenos Aires City and the province of Buenos Aires as political actors 
lies in their greater capabilities in terms of urban administration, when compared with 
the municipalities and the federal government.
The main issues affected by this boundary are the ones related to transportation, 
environment, waste management, and the articulation of a metropolitan health care 
and educational system. These subjects have raised more problems than solutions, 
and the confrontation between local and provincial authorities only generated more 
discontent and distrust, even among their civil societies. As an example, the fact that 
thousands of people from Buenos Aires province use the health care and educational 
system fi nanced by residents of Buenos Aires City generates negative feeling toward 
their neighbors. Inversely, province residents experience the same type of negative 
reaction, as the city deposits most of its waste on provincial land. 
Additionally, there are severe problems with mobility. The different processes of 
demographic concentration and dispersion verifi ed in the urban centers and their 
adjacencies intensify and complicate the supply of public utilities. Furthermore, 
Buenos Aires City and the provincial municipalities do not hold legal prerogatives to 
regulate the transport system, since transport is a federal juridical competence, which 
impedes the possibility of implementing durable solutions. Any design of policies aimed 
at building an effi cient system of transshipment terminals and logistic support centers 
need some sort of political articulation between all the relevant actors.
Although the 1990s witnessed a signifi cant dynamism in infrastructure investments, 
as soon as the privatization process took place, the inequalities became more and 
more pronounced, leaving a great portion of the population without these facilities 
(Coraggio, 1997). It is possible to observe that the farther one moves away from Buenos 
Aires City, the higher  the degradation of the sanitary, transportation, and security 
systems, to name a few. While in Buenos Aires City, as well as municipalities such as 
Vicente López, almost 100% of the population has access to potable water and sewage 
treatment, in others like Merlo these percents are of 37.2% and 20.9%, respectively 
(Fundación Ciudad, 2002).
Finally, the various environmental issues that the metropolitan arena faces show 
the need to promote all sorts of jurisdictional cooperation. Again, the coexistence of 
federal, provincial, and municipal jurisdictions generates the overlapping of numerous 
duties and obligations. This is also the case of several environmental offi ces, as we 
shall see below.
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3.3 THE POLITICAL BOUNDARY
As we fi rst stated in the introduction, the political boundaries issue stems from the 
present and past political confrontations between the federal government and Buenos 
Aires City regarding the latter’s continual search for greater degrees of autonomy. On 
one side the city acquired its autonomy from the federal government after the 1994 
and 1996 national and local constitutions, respectively, and on the other, it retained 
its status as Argentina’s capital city, with the subsequent conﬂ icts emerging from 
federal interests that still lie within its scope. This contradictory scenario becomes 
blatant when comparing the transferred prerogatives to those retained by the national 
administration, which confi gures a blurry and chaotic legal framework.
Until 1994, the Argentine Constitution stated that the territory delimited by General Paz 
Avenue, the Riachuelo River, and the De la Plata River belonged to the country’s capital 
city. Its legal status resembled that of the other 2100 Argentine municipalities, except 
in a few aspects: although the city had a mayor (intendente) and a legislative council, 
it could also choose national senators and participate in the Federal Fiscal Offi ce as 
all provinces did; it could be federally intervened by the national Congress; and fi nally, 
the mayor was not elected by the people, but appointed by the President (in fact, many 
times the mayor was not even a native of Buenos Aires). These features generated 
several contradictions, such as the fact that since the democratic transition of 1983 
the Peronist party had never won an election in the capital city (except for the 1993 
legislatives) and still the mayor belonged to that party for seven years (1989-1996).
The constitutional reform of 1994 ended with this hybrid situation. Article 129 
establishes that “the City of Buenos Aires will have an autonomus political regime, 
with legislative and jurisdictional prerogatives, and its Chief of Government will be 
elected by the people of Buenos Aires.” In observance of this, the Constitutional 
Convention of Buenos Aires signed the fi rst Constitution of the City on October 1, 
1996. But the total autonomy was not fulfi lled. Although Article 129 guarantees the 
city’s autonomy, it also establishes that there must be passed a law guaranteeing the 
preservation of the federal interests within the city, as long as it remains the capital. 
That law was approved by the Congress in 1995: it is commonly known as “Cafi ero 
Law” (Ley Cafi ero). Soon after being approved, its constitutionality was questioned by 
well known jurists, and even the city’s Constitutional Convention resolved to reject the 
restrictions on autonomy imposed by this law. 
The existence of this piece of legislation prevents the capital from having ordinary 
justice courts — which contradicts the legal prerogatives granted by the Constitution 
— and restrains its competences from creating local security forces (police and 
fi re services), the regulation and control of local public utilities, the Registry of Real 
Property (Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble) and the Superintendency of Corporations 
(Inspección General de Justicia).
Today, the decisions regarding these issues — which basically affect people from 
Buenos Aires City — have a rather weak institutional endorsement, and lack adequate 
ways to allow representation, participation, and accountability.
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The three basic sectors affected by this are penal justice, federal public utilities, and 
local public utilities.
The signing of inter-jurisdictional agreements between the federal state and the city is 
contemplated in Article 6 of the Cafi ero Law, which established that “the national state 
and the city of Buenos Aires will create agreements in order to transfer public agencies, 
duties, competences and utilities.” To this end, in 2003 the Congress approved  Law 
25.752, which ratifi ed an agreement for the transfer of penal competencies (Convenio 
de Transferencia Progresiva de Competencias Penales de la Justicia Nacional al 
Poder Judicial de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aries), subscribed in 2000 between 
the President and the local Chief of Government (Jefe de Gobierno). This agreement 
determined that the bearing of arms (by civilians) and their improper utilization 
within sporting events belong to Buenos Aires City’s ordinary justice jurisdiction. 
The importance of this agreement is that the law’s ‘desideratum’ is to achieve the 
completion of the autonomy process, granting Buenos Aires City an equivalent status 
to all other provinces.
The control over residential utilities (electricity, gas, communications) also requires an 
agreement between the city and the federal state, since this competence belongs to 
the federal jurisdiction.
The relationship between the federal state and the city determines that there exist 
exclusive competences for the latter, concurrent competences, and exclusive 
competences for the city (those that do not refer to policy planning, the establishment 
of general guidelines and inter-provincial connections), but until now the city has not 
had control over most of them.
The National Constitution allows Buenos Aires City to participate in all Federal Utility 
Regulatory Institutions (Article 42), except for the case of the ETOSS (Ente Tripartito 
de Obras y Servicios Sanitarios), the regulating entity for sanitary utilities. This general 
disposition is not actually implemented.
Even in the case of the local public utilities (local buses and subways) the federal state 
has competences that should be transferred to the city. Although these utilities were 
licensed by the federal state, this was not due to its federal competences, but to the 
fact that when the concession was done, those competences were in hands of the 
federal executive branch. However, the 1994 constitutional reform transferred these 
competences to the city. Therefore, -and given the fact that these utilities are fully 
supplied within the limits of the city-, its authorities should rule over their regulation, 
auditing and control. The exercise of these prerogatives is legally obstructed by 
anything but a de facto retention of them by the federal state.
The case of Buenos Aires’ port also evinces how far restrictions on autonomy go. 
Although Law 24.093 established that the ports would be transferred according to the 
province’s demands (and those of the formerly called Municipality of Buenos Aires 
City), Decree 1029/92 partially vetoed the articles of the law that referred to Buenos 
Aires City’s port. On its legal grounds, this decree manifested that the Municipality 
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was a decentralized branch of the federal state, and hence, it was convenient that 
its jurisdiction remained under the federal scope. However, after the city’s change of 
juridical status in 1994, there were no longer sound reasons to deny the transfer.
4.0 INSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCES IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA (GBA)
The attempts to administrate the metropolitan arena as a single unit have been 
characterized by a strong political centralization, which explains their impossibility to 
confi gure lasting institutional arenas. Additionally, there do not exist uniform criteria 
in the defi nition of the scope of the different initiatives. Although there is a certain 
degree of uniformity for many policies, the specifi cation of what is a “metropolitan 
issue” varies according to each particular topic.
FThe initiatives aimed to administrate the metropolitan area can be classifi ed under 
two basic models. On one hand, there is what is known as the Metropolitan Focalized 
Public Intervention Approach (Modelo de Gestión Metropolitana Específi ca), 
which champions the idea of designing specifi c policies and special administrative 
procedures for each metropolitan issue, according to the topic  it  attempts to manage. 
As a consequence, although interjurisdictional in essence, these thematic actions 
are taken in a fragmented manner and often remain isolated from other policy fi elds, 
since they are undertaken by public agencies exclusively dedicated to and trained in 
specifi c issues. On the other hand, there are more comprehensive approaches that 
intend to weigh  the various complexities that exist in the metropolitan scope. This is 
the case for the Metropolitan Comprehensive Public Intervention Approach, which 
aims to conduct work through supra-municipal structures, in  search of  adequate 
metropolitan governance. The most important characteristic of this model is not only 
that it seeks common solutions for all municipalities, but also that it intends to engage 
in multiple issues in a coordinated manner, such as sanitation, transportation, and 
environment An extreme version of this modality would be to fi nd a long-term solution 
by transforming the legal status of the area into one single jurisdiction. 
The institutional experiences corresponding to the fi rst model are:
• Central Market Corporation of Buenos Aires (Corporación del Mercado 
Central de Buenos Aires): created by an agreement between the federal 
government, the province of Buenos Aires, and the former Municipality 
of Buenos Aires City, as a public entity with private and public legal 
competence.
• Environmental Co-ordination of the Metropolitan Area (Coordinación 
Ecológica del Área Metropolitana Sociedad del Estado - CEAMSE), in 
charge of GBA’s solid waste management and the environmental co-
ordination between its jurisdictions.
• Tripartite Entity of Sanitation Works and Services (Ente Tripartito de Obras 
y Servicios Sanitarios - ETOSS): was constituted as an autarchic institution 
with public and private legal competence, and is made up of representatives 
of the federal executive branch, Buenos Aires City Government, and the 
province of Buenos Aires. Its purpose is to regulate  water supply and 
sewage treatment.
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• Environmental Committee for the Matanza-Riachuelo River Basin 
Management (Comité Ejecutor del Plan de Gestión Ambiental y de Manejo 
de la Cuenca Hídrica Matanza-Riachuelo). It was created by the federal 
executive branch by a decree that now has been abrogated, which 
assigned to the CEAMSE the management of the sanitation program for 
the river basin.
• Transport Regulation Entity for the Metropolitan Area (Ente para la 
Regulación del Transporte en el Área Metropolitana - ECOTAM). This body 
is made up by the federal executive branch, the executive branch of Buenos 
Aires province, Buenos Aires City Government, and the municipalities of the 
GBA. It acts at the request of any of the jurisdictions to solve controversies 
over specifi c issues, without retaining any legal competence.
• Joint Air-monitoring Agreement  for Dock Sud’s Petrochemical Complex 
(Convenio Plan de Monitoreo Conjunto del Aire para el Área del Polo 
Petroquímico Dock Sud). Its goal is to establish a coordinated net of actors 
for monitoring the quality of the air coming from fi xed sources and the 
management of the National Environment Information System (Sistema de 
Información Ambiental Nacional) for Dock Sud’s Petrochemical Complex.
Among the institutions that correspond to the second model we can cite the case 
of the National Commission for the Metropolitan Area (Comisión Nacional del Área 
Metropolitana Buenos Aires - CONAMBA), created with the purpose of undertaking 
policies and actions for the different jurisdictions, in search of a greater level of 
functional institutionalization.
This experience can be traced back to the 1984 agreement entered into by the 
province, the Municipality of Buenos Aires City, and the federal government, named 
Area Metropolitana de Buenos Aires (AMBA). This agreement stated precise ends 
and functions for its fi rst stage of development, which emphasized policies of waste 
management and the organization of all the information concerning the metropolitan 
area as well as the setting of general guidelines to carry out infrastructure initiatives, 
among others.
In 1987 the federal government made the settlement offi cial, institutionalizing the 
CONAMBA and granting the Ministry of Interior the responsibility for directing pertinent 
actions. It was then that it was constituted the Public Committee for the AMBA (Comité 
Político del AMBA), made up by one representative of the province, the Government 
Secretary (Secretario de Gobierno) of Buenos Aires City, and the Subsecretary of 
Institutional Affairs of the Ministery of Interior. Although the CONAMBA is able to 
develop duties of planning with guidelines and execute concrete projects, it has not 
carried out any of these activities (Pírez, 1994, p. 120).
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
Buenos Aires City, the province of Buenos Aires, the federal government, and the 
various national and inter-jurisdictional bodies created for developing specifi c 
policies, along with all municipalities, total more than 20 jurisdictions that comprise 
the metropolitan area. Its economic, social, and cultural characteristics confi gure a 
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complex territorial unit that is not fully contained by any institutional framework. Today 
they coexist in a multiplicity of jurisdictional levels, presenting serious obstacles to 
governance. This seems to evidence  that whenever public intervention copes with 
topics such as transportation, health care, safety, or the environment, it necessarily 
requires a special interjurisdictional approach.
This point may be easily illustrated when assessing transportation policies, for 
instance. The city hosts several millions of incoming citizens from the adjacencies, 
including three million passengers that use public transportation (Plan Estratégico, 
2005). To implement adequate policies in this fi eld for such a number demands a great 
effort at jurisdictional coordination. 
The case is no different for the health care system: 35% of hospital users in Buenos 
Aires City come from GBA (Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, 2004), which in turn 
poses constraints on the quality of the services supplied. 
Also, criminality indexes in Buenos Aires City are closely determined by the socio-
economic situation and the specifi c policies that are carried out in the Province. We 
can hardly think of reducing those indexes by taking only local and circumscribed 
actions for the city, especially considering that its government does not even legally 
control and lead its own police forces. 
Finally, the environmental issue merits  coordinated work as well. The southern boundary 
of the City, the Riachuelo River, is thoroughly polluted by more than 3000 factories 
located on the bank, corresponding to provincial territory. Since these factories play 
a crucial role in municipal economic activities, the path toward combining a healthy 
environment with sustained growth has special relevance, and it can only be reached 
through a joint effort of jurisdictions. 
Hence, it is possible to affi rm that the main factor affecting the three-fold boundary 
issue is the institutional fragmentation of the metropolitan space. This lack implies 
that  problems are faced in a segmented territorial manner. The overlapping of 
different governmental agencies reduces, in turn, the possibilities for integration, 
the same way it affects the actors’ abilities to carry out policies. Often, metropolitan 
policies favor urban interventions that put an emphasis on merely technical aspects, 
subordinating other political criteria. As a result, this type of management is incapable 
of understanding its own functioning within an aggregate political unit.
Fortunately, not everything is discouraging when dealing with Buenos Aires’ 
metropolitan issues. After several years of controversy, there exists today a fairly 
accurate diagnosis of the issues that  need to be solved exclusively by metropolitan 
concerted strategies. The various actors involved have reached a consensus that 
denotes the complexities of the area, and admit that the ‘three-fold boundary’ issue 
requires comprehensive policies. 
Its institutional materialization, however, does not share the same status. For example, 
whether or not to create a centralized authority in order to overcome the situation 
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has been profusely debated. A series of failed attempts in this respect, along with the 
diffi culties such an approach is prone to bring in terms of enforcement, raise serious 
doubts as to its pertinence. On the other hand, organisms established for specifi c 
issues, such as ECOTAM, CEAMSE or ETOSS, have not proven to work effi ciently 
concerning the metropolitan issues.
Most likely, the horizon will show the persistence and proliferation of mutual 
cooperation institutions, as has happened in the past. It is at this point that strategic 
planning becomes a critical device to build the necessary capabilities  to develop 
comprehensive policies. This means, in fi rst place, accepting the idea that current 
jurisdictions are the most important actors holding the power to intervene in the area, 
and that a suprajurisdictional district is not likely to succeed. Secondly, this means 
that mutual cooperation agencies seem not to gather enough momentum to induce 
the needed changes. As a consequence, the most effective institutional arrangement 
seems to be the conformation of an open and participative strategic planning arena, 
capable of instigating  joint action, without forcing manipulation of each district’s legal 
competences. This alone is a permanent source of conﬂ ict and political impasse.
Strategic planning guarantees a sustained action over time, one that prevents public 
policies from lacking coordination and being only partially enforced or having an 
impact as merely isolated initiatives. Participation provides the legitimacy that any 
democratic governance procedure demands, fostering views that are amicable to 
conciliatory principles, for both public and private interests.
Argentina’s institutional and political scenario is favoring the rebuilding of state 
capacities, largely undermined during the last decade. In order to dissipate, or at least 
attenuate, the multiplicity of boundaries in the metropolitan area, strategic planning 
can operate in two basic dimensions: time and space: time, by setting long-term 
policy guidelines, and space, by promoting concerted actions between all the actors 
involved. To overlook any of these dimensions is equivalent to risking the possibility of 
fi nding any kind of reliable solution.
ENDNOTES
1 Rivadavia Avenue is a traditional urban corridor that runs in an east-west direction, traversing 
the entire territory of Buenos Aires City, and dividing it into two roughly equal parts. It was built in 
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colonial times in order to connect the center with the neighborhood of Flores (in the city), and now 
connects also Morón and Moreno (in the province). It is recognized as the most important avenue 
within the metropolitan area.
2 The Riachuelo River runs in a west-east direction, from Cañuelas (a small town of Buenos Aires 
province, 64 kilometers west of Buenos Aires City) to De la Plata River, and demarcates the southern 
limit of Buenos Aires City. Along with Reconquista River these are the two biggest basins in the GBA. 
The bridges that connect the southern municipalities with the city are not properly distributed, which 
has historically caused numerous problems for access and mobility.
3 For further details on the evolution of Buenos Aires City’s federal status, see Abal Medina, 2003.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abal Medina, J. M. (2003) “Análisis comparado del desempeño institucional de tres gobiernos locales: 
una propuesta metodológica” in Desarrollo Económico, Nº 169, Vol. 43. April-June. Buenos Aires.
Badía, G. (2004) “Cambiando el foco: la descentralización de Buenos Aires y la Región Metropolitana, 
in Escolar M., Badía G. and Frederic S. (Eds.), Federalismo y descentralización en grandes ciudades: 
Buenos Aires en perspectiva comparada. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.
Castells, M. (1999) La cuestión urbana. México: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.
Consejo del Planifi cación Estratégica de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (2005) Plan Estratégico de la 
Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires.
Coraggio, J. L. (2003) “La gobernabilidad en grandes ciudades: sus condiciones económicas (con 
especial referencia a la Ciudad de Buenos Aires),” version of the article presented at the Simposium 
“Metrópolis, desigualdades socio-espaciales y gobernanza urbana: reﬂ exiones comparativas”, XXI 
National Meeting of ANPOCS, Caxambú, Minas Gerais, October, 1997. 
Giddens, A. (1995) Bases para la Teoría de la Estructuración. Buenos Aires: Amorrortu.
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (2004) Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, segundo 
trimestre.
Pírez, P. (1994) Buenos Aires Metropolitana. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina.
Rovere, M. (2003) “La Planifi cación Estratégica y la Ciudad como Sujeto,” Revista La Gran Ciudad, Nro. 
2. Buenos Aires: Fundación Metropolitana.
Sabsay, D. et al (2002) Región Metropolitana de Buenos Aires. Aporte Jurídico-institucional para su 
construcción. Buenos Aires: Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales.
Various Authors (2003) Encuesta Anual de Hogares de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. Aspectos Laborales. 
Dirección General de Estadística y Censo. Gobierno de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires.
Various Authors (2003) “La regionalización. Una alternativa para el área metropolitana Buenos Aires” 
in Revista La Gran Ciudad, N° 2, Summer. Buenos Aires: Fundación Metropolitana.
Various Authors (2002) Buenos Aires, el agua y la salud. Buenos Aires: Fundación Ciudad.
A
B
A
L 
M
ED
IN
A
, C
IN
G
O
LA
N
I, 
RO
M
ER
O
Fransje L. Hooimeijer
Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Architecture
MISMATCHED BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN THE DISCIPLINES OF 
CIVIL ENGINEERING + URBAN 
DESIGN CONSIDERING POLDER 
CITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS
135
PR
OJ
EC
TI
ON
S 
6 
M
IS
M
A
TC
H
ED
 B
O
U
N
D
A
RI
ES
ABSTRACT
The Dutch have a rich and internationally renowned tradition when it comes to the 
intimate relationship between urban design and hydraulic engineering. Their expertise 
and knowledge of hydraulic laws and ingenious technology have helped them 
successfully  make land out of water: polders. This is the story of how Dutch polder 
cities are hydraulic constructions made  by both civil engineers and urban designers, 
and the changing boundaries between these disciplines. 
The design of Dutch polder cities has been a combination of technological prosperity 
and understanding of the rules of water management: the ‘fi ne tradition.’ But the 
more problems civil engineers could solve, the less water management became a 
spatial task. This cumulative development can be ordered into six phases that are 
characterized by  specifi c boundaries between design and technology of polder cities: 
acceptation (-1000), defensive (1000-1579), offensive (1579-1814), early manipulative 
(1814-1886), manipulative (1886-1990), and adaptive manipulation (1990-). In the current 
situation wherein the change of the climate causes ﬂ ooding in polder cities, the 
solely technical approach is insuffi cient. Reintroducing the fi ne tradition, the spatial 
approach and a larger acceptation, is required. Our heritage provides evidence of 
the Dutch talent with regard to the design and construction of water. This research 
gives a representative idea of historical, current, and future relationships between 
urbanization and water management in the polder cities. The main hypothesis that 
structures this research states that ‘the fi ne tradition’ was based on a self-evident 
relation between design and technology. Innovative design of the new Dutch polder 
city is only possible if this aspect of the fi ne tradition is reinstated. There is a need for 
mismatching boundaries, to strengthen coherence between the disciplines of urban 
design and civil engineering, and to be able to go on living with the water.
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But cities are given shape by all sorts of people, by military 
engineers, for example ships’ gunners (like those who laid out the 
early British port cities of India), and by administrators and state 
offi cials, from the oikists (leaders of colonizing expeditions) who 
gave us Greek towns of Sicily and the medieval lords of England and 
France and Spain who planted hundreds of new towns or bastides 
within their territories, down to modern planning commissioners 
like Robert Moses of New York and Edmund Bacon of Philadelphia. 
[…] A survey of this extraordinary crowd, their writings and the 
tools of their trade, would make a fi rst-rate story.2 
The Dutch have a rich and internationally renowned tradition when it comes to the 
intimate relationship between urban design and hydraulic engineering. Their expertise 
and knowledge of hydraulic laws and ingenious technology have helped them 
successfully to make land out of water: polders. This is the story of how Dutch polder 
cities are hydraulic constructions made both by civil engineers and urban designers, 
and the changing boundaries between these disciplines. 
The peat polder city, the oldest polder city, has as its base higher grounds of river, 
coast, burcht, dike, mould and dam cities. This base is the fi rst important characteristic 
of the peat polder city: the higher levelled ‘dry core’ on which the settlement started. 
Prosperity and growth led to expansion of the surrounding wet soil, derived from peat 
or already prepared for cultivation but not yet prepared to be built upon. To be able to 
FIGURE 1. Peat polder structures.  Source: Karel Tomeii.
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expand, there was a need for ‘strict control,’ which was the result of the cautiousness 
with which an expansion of the polder city needed to be realized. First, the size needed 
to be determined, which did not need to comply only with the requirements of that time, 
but also with those of centuries to come. A technical plan as a second aspect was 
required to ensure that water could be discharged and controlled, and that the water 
in the city canals would maintain a constant level. In most cases fi rst an encircling 
canal was built, which was connected through the expansion area by means of a 
sequence of parallel canals. Primarily the outer canal was for drainage, but it also 
had a military function (defence) and a transport function (access to warehouses).3 By 
means of sluices and windmills the water level of the canal system was regulated and 
the excess water discharged. Subsequently the reclaimed land needed to be raised 
in order to obtain the required protection level, and it then had to be consolidated and 
prepared for building. Mud excavated from the canals was used for raising the level, 
and it was supplemented by earth, which often needed to be transported from far 
away locations. In the ground prepared for building, long foundation piles were driven 
in order to stabilize the housing in the deep-set stratum of sand.
It is superﬂ uous to observe that in the case of polder cities random development is 
absolutely out of the question when land has been reclaimed, raised, drained, and 
protected with so much effort. In polder cities one cannot speak of so-called ‘chance 
growth’ and due to the costs and efforts of building the reclaimed land, an optimal use 
was demanded4.
Dutch polder cities are a combination of what Kevin Lynch calls the practical and 
the organic model (the third is the cosmic model)5. The practical model, or the city as 
FIGURE 2. Polder city.  Source: G.L. Burke, The making of Dutch towns, 1960.
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machine, is factual, functional, and cool, not in the least bit magical. It is the concept 
that motivates colonial cities and company cities, speculative grid cities of the United 
States, Le Corbusier’s ‘Radiant City,’ and, more recently still, the inventions of the 
British Archigram group and the arcologies of the Italian Paolo Soleri. The organic 
model, or the biological city, sees the city as alive rather than as a machine. It has a 
defi nite boundary and an optimum size, a cohesive, indivisible internal structure, and a 
rhythmic behaviour that seeks, in the face of inevitable change, to maintain a balanced 
state. The creators of this model were the likes of Frederick Law Olmsted, Ebenezer 
Howard, Patrick Geddes and Lewis Mumford.’6
The magical combination of these two models - the practical model adapts all 
hydraulic rules and the organic model is the blueprint of the social order - is seen 
in the design of the polder city Amsterdam7. The practical issues of hydraulics and 
the social engagement of the organic model represent the work of people (engineers 
and surveyors) who understood both worlds, persons on the verge of the mismatched 
boundaries. The making of Dutch polder cities is, as Burke emphasis, not a matter of 
only architecture, but foremost a visionary way of dealing with the hydraulic demands 
of the wet territory8.
Over time, the designing and technical world became segregated, as mirrored in the 
design and construction of polder cities. The changing climate puts pressure on these 
cities, wherein the water system is not ﬂ exible enough to adapt to these changes. 
The question is how to bring these worlds back together and build urban hydraulic 
constructions of the future; how to mismatch the boundaries again? 
The discipline that owns the knowledge to build polder cities, civil engineering, has 
a crucial part in the design, because the civil engineer is responsible for the building 
site preparation. It is obvious that the relation between the civil engineer and the urban 
designer (a discipline that arose only in the twentieth century) is of great signifi cance. 
In this relationship, different attitudes toward dealing with the water are recognizable.9 
The following phases are used to order the relationship between civil engineering and 
urban design, the state of technology in building site preparation (source of power, 
soil mechanics, hydraulics), and the effect on the design of cities: I. Acceptance (until 
1000)10, II. Defensive (1000-1579), III. Offensive (1579-1814), IV. Early Manipulative (1800-
1886)11, V. Manipulative (1886-1990) and VI. Adaptive Manipulation (1990-today).
ACCEPTATION, DEFENSIVE, + OFFENSIVE PHASES
The dynamics of the regional water system, which include groundwater and rainwater 
in combination with surface water, are crucial for the process of development and 
urbanisation of the Dutch polders. In the phase of acceptation the inhabitants were 
subjected to the forces of water and wind and lived on higher grounds: they simply 
accepted the situation as it was. 
The defensive phase started around 1000 A.D. and is also referred to as the ‘great 
reclamation’ of agricultural grounds. Measures of defence against the water were 
taken, the most important condition of the creation of cities. The most conceptually 
interesting type of city is the dam city, like Amsterdam and Rotterdam, because of its 
tectonics: the integration between economics, technology, and beauty. 
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centuries. On the location where a dike crossed the watercourse, a dam was built. 
Apart from this dam function, the dam ensured discharge of the river water into open 
water by means of a drainage sluice. Together with tidal movements, drain water was 
used in a practical way in order to ensure the depth of the harbour as well as city 
access for sea-going vessels. The drainage sluice could support only smaller ships, so 
goods from larger vessels had to be hauled or sold on the dam. The dam turned into a 
trading market, and the estuary outside the dikes of the peat river became a sheltered 
harbour. The dam city and polder become hydraulically as well as economically 
connected.
Besides the dikes, the raising of grounds to drain and strengthening the wet and weak 
soils and foundations under buildings were demands that needed to be met to enable 
urbanity. All technology used was developed from experience-based knowledge that 
was passed down from father to son in the guilds. 
The offensive phase marks the change from guilds to a more organized approach 
toward building up a body of knowledge. The beginning of this phase is situated in the 
erection of the ‘Republic of Seven United Netherlands’ in 1579 because it meant the 
installation of an organized army where fi rst knowledge build-up was done in building 
fortifi cations, canals, bridges, surveying, etc. This way the military engineers became 
experienced in dealing with building fortifi cations and building on the wet and weak 
grounds of the Dutch territory. Also in this period appeared the fi rst scientifi c writings 
FIGURE 3. Still the highest mould in the Netherlands, Hegebeintum. Source: Fransje 
Hooimeijer.
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about soil mechanics by Charles-Augustin Coulomb (1736-1806) and Bernard Forest de 
Bélidor (1697-1761) and about ﬂ ow mechanics by Daniel Bernoulli (1700-1782).
DUTCH RENAISSANCE
The seventeenth century was a Golden Age for the Republic, when cities ﬂ ourished 
through the economic growth, and the period wherein polder expansions were built. 
The cities stepped off their “dry core” and, under “strict control,” raised and drained 
their expansions. The characteristic of modern civil society is that the future is 
consciously planned on the basis of rationality, mutual consult, and decision-making. 
The political independence is accompanied by a ﬂ ourishing of science, technology, 
and art: the Dutch Renaissance. The expression of this ﬂ ourishing in regard to urban 
design is Simon Stevin’s (1548-1620, an important military engineer!) Ideal City, as he 
described in ‘Designing Cities’ (1649), which was published posthumously. His design 
is based on existing size and structure principles of agricultural engineering and 
urban design. The perspectives of water management, derived from the pattern of the 
polders, are directly applied in his city. 
Simon Stevin is the fi rst example par excellence of the capability to integrate hydraulics 
and urban vision: urban engineer, technically trained and autodidact urban creative 
thinker, he marks the excellence that mismatching boundaries can produce.
An important characteristic of both the Dutch Renaissance and polder cities is 
the result of the strict control: the absence of any idealistic expression. Vision and 
beauty have to be paid for, and the entire budget was used preparing grounds for city 
expansion. The individualistic citizens did not see the need for an urban composition 
based on central authority, like the monumental plans in other European cities, simply 
because it did not exist in the Dutch society12. The Dutch tradition of always trying to 
reach group consensus, the so called ‘polder politics,’ is directly related to the fi ght 
against water. A count can own a lot of land but it is useless when there are no farmers 
working for him to keep it dry. This dependency the farmers are well aware off and 
they make sure that the count on the other side is aware of their interest13.
FIGURES 3-4. Left: Simon Stevin (1548-1620). Source: C. van den Heuvel, De Huysbou, 2005. 
Right: City by Simon Stevin. Source: C. van den Heuvel, De Huysbou, 2005.
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The ideal City of Simon Stevin was not built, but a city of the same conceptual calibre 
is the grachtengordel (ring of canals) of Amsterdam (build around the 1620s). It is an 
integral design of land restructuring, surveying, and water management joined into 
through the cooperation of the merchants for whom the city expansion was built, the 
city carpenter Hendrik Jackobzn Staets and the surveyor Lucas Jansz. Sinck, who 
drew up the plans. Amsterdam did not try to follow the idealistic view of a capitalistic 
city as other European cities did, but implemented this design as a blueprint of social 
and economic life, making use of technological possibilities14.
EARLY MANIPULATIVE (1814-1886) 
The phase starting in the beginning of the nineteenth century, after the French 
occupation, is characterized by an exploding population growth and industrialization 
through the transformation from hand to machine labour, made possible by the 
introduction of the steam engine. This altered strongly the shaping forces of the (urban) 
landscape15. Also, it changed hydraulic technology. It became easier to control the 
water, make it do things it would not naturally do: i.e., to manipulate it. Civil engineering 
became a more defi ned discipline (with clear tasks, education, and a discourse) at the 
end of the eighteenth century. 
TECHNOLOGY
The building of cities on wet and instable soil is dependent on three fi elds of knowledge 
that emerged in the previous phase. The fi rst fi eld is the general hydraulics of water 
management considering larger water systems like rivers, lakes, and sea. The second 
is soil mechanics, which studies the characteristics of soil to determine the carry-
capacity and to understand ground water ﬂ ows and soil. Parallel to soil mechanics 
is the development of pile foundations and of drain systems. The third fi eld considers 
the development of engine power important for the movement of soil and water and is 
crucial to the two other fi elds. 
During the French occupation (1795-1813) the bureaucratic and centrally organized 
governmental structures were superimposed on the Dutch administration. The 
engineers in the nineteenth century had a military education at the Royal Military 
Academy (started 1805) and a civil education at the Royal Academy in Delft (started 
1842). The fi rst reference book was published in 1842 by D.J. Storm Buysing. Besides 
the formal education engineers also organized themselves in the Royal Engineers 
Society (1847) and the Society of Civil Engineers (1853).16 General water management 
was the prime interest of the engineer because it was considered of national 
importance. Theory and use of technology were closely interwoven in regard to the 
Ministry of Transport and Water Management and civil engineering. Both disciplines 
were focused on technical planning according to an established pattern, with the 
difference that the military way of thinking had always been strategic. 
In soil mechanics the fi rst publication was written by C.L. Brunings (1775-1816) about 
the side pressure of soils and the measurement of walls. The article breathes of the 
Enlightenment because Brunings was convinced that the time had come wherein the 
distance between theory and practice was shrinking. This was due to the use of the 
same language in and a greater understanding between the theory of observation 
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and the practice of blind searching. An important step forward in the hydraulics of 
groundwater ﬂ ow and soil mechanics was the publication of the Law of Darcy in 1856, 
with its linear relation between velocity and hydraulic gradient, by Henri Philibert 
Gaspart Darcy (1803-1858).17 However, the union of all these fundamentals in a 
coherent discipline had to wait until the 20th century18.
The building of foundations was also inﬂ uenced greatly by the industrialization at the 
end of the 19th nineteenth century because for the driving in of foundation piles, man-
power was replaced by steam, making it possible to work faster and cheaper. The 
technology of driving piles, however, hardly changed, and this is true even up to this 
day19.
Especially in pumping water, the steam engine has been crucial. Often it is said that 
without the steam engine the Netherlands would still be more water than land. After 
Thomas Newcomen designed the fi rst practical steam engine (already in 1705!), 
and James Watt the fi rst working steam engine (1765), the fi rst steam machine in 
the Netherlands drained the polder Blijdorp in Rotterdam (1787). After the mill this 
was the most signifi cant change in technology and crucial for the early phase of 
manipulation20.
URBAN DESIGN
The spatial organization of the cities in the nineteenth century characterizes itself 
by the separation of conﬂ icting functions and the bundling of functions that belong 
together.21 Through professionalized technicians, urban design increasingly obtained 
a more technical instead of an administrative basis. The ideas about urban design 
were made to be of secondary importance, incorporated by urban engineering, and 
degenerated into a technical profession within the municipal Department of Public 
Works. The fi rst issues on the scale of the urban design were the introduction of the 
railway (1837) and hygiene issues of cities (e.g., water, housing)22.
After the completion of the grachtengordel and partially due to a period of architectural 
silence (1700-1850), no further large-scale city expansions were realized. The fi rst 
planned expansion of Rotterdam after 1850 managed to reach the conceptual calibre 
of the Ideal City and the grachtengordel. City architect and military engineer W.N. 
Rose (1801-1877) designed an urban water system independent from the polder water 
system, referred to as the Water Project, assisted by landscape architects J.D. Zocher 
and L.P. Zocher. The plan served four purposes: ﬂ ushing of the city water, lowering the 
groundwater level so that the polder expansion could be built, building a city walk, and 
developing of a residential area for wealthy citizens23. The plan is a perfect example 
of how water management, the structure of ditches and dikes, determined the layout 
of the expansion. 
In this phase the city architect was the director of Public Works. Instead of being an 
architect he was technician and manager of a government service. His task was so 
complex and extensive that he operates almost independently of the city council. Rose 
was the fi rst city architect expanding a polder city with the crucial use of steam engines 
to be able to manipulate water. Rose is the second excellent example of an urban 
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engineer. The way he combined hydraulic knowledge with city design is still a great 
example; furthermore, he marks the end of a tradition of spatial design of hydraulic 
constructions and the beginning of matching boundaries between the disciplines of 
civil engineering and urban design.
MANIPULATIVE (1886-1990) 
The combustion engine, electricity, and the development of the soil mechanics at 
the beginning of the twentieth century were the changing forces of the manipulative 
era. Besides the shifting sources of power (from steam to diesel, oil, gas, electricity) 
in the technology of draining, the hydraulic technology also changed. The scientifi c 
research in soil mechanics added to the development of better and more refi ned ways 
to building site preparation, and the enlargement of machines to move grounds made 
it possible to realise them. The control became absolute: manipulation. 
The architectural discipline took shape around the 1850s and became defi ned in 1905 
in the architecture faculty at the University of Technology in Delft. It is only then that 
the urban designers (trained architects like H.P. Berlage) became more visible within 
the spatial order. But it took until 1947 before they were well accepted as players with 
their own discourse and university department. Also, a great change in the building 
and appearance of cities was the change from building for private persons to building 
for the free market24.
BUILDING SITE PREPARATION 
In the former phase three fi elds of knowledge in building site preparation were defi ned. 
The fi eld of general hydraulics of water management professionalized in this phase. 
Different associations came about and at the universities the different departments 
for specialized knowledge development were established. The development of new 
sources of energy provoked a discussion about electrical vs. diesel drainage of the 
FIGURES 6-7. Left: Water Project 1854, Rotterdam. Source: Municipal Archives Rotterdam. 
Right: Willem Nicolaas Rose (1801-1877). Source: Municipal Archives Rotterdam. HO
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polders. During the period 1930-1939 there was a consolidation of the achievements 
and a further development of civil engineering technology, based on model-based and 
mathematical analyses and prognoses25.
The development of soil mechanics started in the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The need for the analysis of the behaviour of soils arose in many countries, often as a 
result of spectacular accidents, such as landslides and failures of building foundations26. 
Important pioneering contributions to the development of soil mechanics were made by 
Karl von Terzaghi (1883-1963) and A.S. Keverling Buisman (1890-1944). Confronted with 
new challenges, new instruments to measure and to construct were developed and 
international exchange came about. The ﬂ ight that development in methods to improve 
soil conditions for city building took after World War II was institutionalized by the 
establishment of the department of soil mechanics in the Royal Society of Engineers in 
1949. Building on territories with an insuffi cient and unknown soil condition, wet and 
weak soils, was done much more, due to the great expansions of cities.
Another step in the development of building on wet and weak soils was the introduction 
of the enforced concrete pile, the Franki-pile. The improvement over the wooden 
piles witnessed the reduction of the number of piles and the larger carry-capacity of 
concentrated weight, so the buildings could rise higher27. Also, drainage technology 
improved over the years with the use of foils and plastic drains.
Engine power became an important subject in the pumping of sites when buildings 
were under construction. The movement of sand to use as stabilization material to 
raise building sites, so that they could be built 1.20 meters above ground water level, 
was profoundly improved by the method of ‘ﬂ ushing’. This meant a scale enlargement 
in building site preparation that was used in the huge building tasks after WWII.
THE URBAN DESIGNER
Much faster than urban design did the profession of architecture slowly become a 
discipline within the spatial order. The Royal Academy in Delft offered architecture 
courses as a specialisation of the department of Road and Civil Engineering. When 
the Polytechnic School became the University of Technology in 1905, architecture 
became an independent faculty. The fi rst associations were established: the Society 
to Enhance the Art of Building (1841) and Architecura et Amicitia (1855).
Within the bounds of the architectural writings there were ideas and ideals about 
the city, however, not as a specifi c discourse. The discourse of urban design and 
the building of a theoretical foundation, started under pressure of an enormous 
urbanization tasks fi rst in Germany and England with publications R. Baumeister, 
Camillo Sitte, Joseph Stübben and Raymond Unwin28. Baumeister’s ideas about city 
expansions, were dominated by traffi c and public health. Stuben was the fi rst to 
approach urban design in its own processes and spatial context and Sittes’ argument 
aims at the artistic principles of city expansions29. Unwin emphasized scale and the 
relation between city and landscape in his designs for garden cities.
In 1880 the fi rst Dutch publication on city expansion appeared: ‘Adding to knowledge 
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of urban design, a study’ by the engineer-architect H.W. Nachenius30. He introduced 
the Dutch term for urban design ‘stedebouw’ and applied it to new expansions and old 
inner cities. He was concerned with the quality of plans: ‘Thank god there is already 
a fruitful co-operation…between professionals of different disciplines..’ because 
‘..technical, sanitary, economical and aesthetic demands are interwoven in the urban 
design…’.31
It is not a coincidence that the discourse of urban design departed at the same time 
that the discussion of the hygienic city came up, guided by the health commissions 
concerned with the hygienic conditions of cities. One important result of the fi ght for a 
hygienic city was the Dwelling Law (1901), also one on the most important administrative 
impulses for the discipline of urban design to become an independent profession with 
specialized tasks and in need of separate services, schooling, and associations32.
Even though it was foremost written to ensure the quality of new dwellings, the 
Dwelling Law also demanded an expansion plan and provided the means to prohibit 
building and to claim grounds. The expansion plan was gradually developed during the 
fi rst decades of the twentieth century into plans of usage. 
Independently from Public Works, the municipal departments of urban design were 
set up in The Hague (1918), Amsterdam (1928), and Rotterdam (1931) to develop new 
aesthetical and/or scientifi c fundamentals for the discipline. In the 1920s another 
issue came up: urban design as a science. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam there was 
an argument to set up a department independent from the technology of building and 
constructing cities (Public Works). The argument was premised on the consideration 
that urban design went beyond technical issues, and was more a social-economical, 
political, and cultural profession33. Urban design, was the general consensus, 
developed itself from a purely technical discipline into an art, the art of composing 
different components of the city in an harmonious unity. This should be done through 
the synergy of scientifi c research and designing skills.34.
FIGURES 8-9. Left: Water Project 1854, Rotterdam. Source: Municipal Archives Rotterdam. 
Right: Willem Nicolaas Rose (1801-1877). Source: Municipal Archives Rotterdam.
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MOVING BOUNDARIES
The Second Industrial Revolution erected strict boundaries between engineering and 
the maturing urban design discipline. The scale of water management, mechanical 
moving of sand, new materials (reinforced and pre-stressed concrete, riveted and 
welded metal structures), electrifi cation and rationalized building processes changed 
the organisation of water management and the building industry signifi cantly.35  
Different organisations were set up that represented different interests and different 
fi elds of knowledge. In the years 1913-1914 the Architectural Weekly Magazine 
reported the discussion of the division of labour between engineer and architect with 
regard to urban design: the engineer supplies only the utilitarian facilities, and the 
architect, an aesthetic framework36.
Emerging from engineering, around 1900 urban design was mainly connected to 
the worlds of architecture and housing - in the 1930s economics, geography and 
landscaping were added to the curriculum. In the discussion about an independent 
urban design department within the University of Technology in Delft, it was made 
clear that the urban designer had to be in charge of the more general design of the 
city, while calculating, construction, and producing had to be left to the engineer. The 
urban designer had to be well informed about engineering (roads, bridges, railway, 
sluices, channels, rivers, polders, drained lakes and harbours), but in relation to city 
design37.
In the period that the discipline became emancipated, different discussions with – and 
claims from – architecture and civil engineering came up. The architects were afraid 
that their artistic expression would be bound by the rules the urban designers set 
up. But the common idea was that besides the aesthetic architects (busy with nice 
facades) and engineers (specialised in geodesy and theoretical mechanics) social 
engineers were necessary to handle questions about sewage and water supply, the 
building of schools and improvement of labourers’ dwellings38.
When urban design moved from engineering to social issues and to a larger scale, the 
clear boundary between the disciplines of urban design and civil engineering became 
a fact. 
MATCHING BOUNDARIES
In the meantime the urban designers were philosophizing about the city, stimulated by 
various groups of architects, such as De Opbouw (1920), The 8 (1927), and the ‘Congrès 
Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne’ or CIAM (1928). At several conferences of the 
CIAM, the functional city was brought into question, containing a spatial division of 
functions. The objective was to create light, air, and space in the city. 
According to Webber and Rittel (1973) the industrial age and the idea of planning, 
in common with the idea of professionalism, was dominated by the pervasive idea 
of effi ciency. Drawing form eighteenth century physics, classical economics, and 
the principle of least-means, effi ciency was seen as a condition in which a specifi ed 
task could be performed with low inputs of resources. This powerful idea became the 
guiding concept of civil engineering, and even though the disciplines were separating, 
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it was also attached to the idea of cities. Urban design was seen as a process of 
designing problem-solutions that might be undertaken and operated cheaply39.
Because it was fairly easy to get a consensus on the nature of problems during the 
early industrial period, the task could be assigned to the technically skilled, who in turn 
could be trusted to accomplish the simplifi ed end-in-view40. This classic paradigm of 
science and engineering has underlain modern professionalism, but is not applicable 
to problems of open societal systems. “We shall want to suggest that the social 
professions were misled somewhere along the line onto assuming they could be 
applied scientists – that they could solve problems in the way scientists can solve 
their sorts of problems.”41 Webber and Rittel defi ne the problems that scientists deal 
with as ‘tame’ ones, the problem is clear and it is clear when the problem is solved. In 
contrast, the urban designer deals with open societal systems and therefore ‘wicked’ 
problems, which have no clarifying traits42.
What is fascinating about this perspective is that the master of Dutch modern urban 
design and member of CIAM, Cornelis van Eesteren, designed the General Expansion 
Plan for Amsterdam (AUP, 1934) that fi t perfectly into this scientifi c approach, while at 
the same time he did place great emphasis on the (hydraulic) context because it had 
so much impact on the design of the city. 
Van Eesteren stated in his explanation of the plan that “everything is controlled by 
the level of raising: the layout of the waterway system, the water storage surface, 
the sluice system, and pumping stations. A city laid out as an outlet waterway city 
must be designed differently than a polder city that lowered its groundwater table.’’43 
The lower levelled polder city was to be connected to the outlet water level of the 
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grachtengordel of Amsterdam. Van Eesteren mainly considered the connection of the 
road and water system a complex design assignment (as in all the later designs of the 
area [car] mobility was the primary starting point). The ongoing roads needed to be 
connected by means of slopes, canals needed to be connected by means of sluices, 
and a solution had to be found to refresh the lower levelled water.
The person of Van Eesteren, an architect who approached his task scientifi cally, marks 
the matching boundaries between civil engineering and urban design (even though as 
an exception in the fi eld) and is the third example of an urban engineer: aware of the 
inﬂ uence of hydraulics on the realization of an urban vision. 
URBANISM
The key words of the second half of the twentieth century were advanced technology, 
welfare state, and disintegration. Old religious, political, and moral values and 
certainties started to waver. Technology became more and more dominated by 
measurement and prognosis. 
Besides the boundaries drawn between the disciplines, the construction of the city and 
its structure fell apart in housing, infrastructure, and green areas. In the grachtengordel 
and the Water Project all these structures together orchestrated the city’s ensemble. 
Now the main structuring element was (car) mobility. 
The breaking up of the various structures illustrates the segregation between 
engineering and urban design44. The designers of the grachtengordel and the Water 
Project were military engineers, and they developed their own vision of urban design. At 
the beginning of the twentieth century urban design became an autonomous discipline 
and the tasks were divided. Civil engineers solved the water issues in such a fashion 
that the urban designer never even knew that they had been dealt with. Technological 
progress, such as improved pumps and calculation methods, made the preparation of 
a larger site possible by raising it with sand. This meant that in combination with an 
underground drainage system, signifi cantly less surface water was needed.
In the end the urban designer considered water a waste product, to be situated on the 
outskirts of districts or integrated into the infrastructure or the green space system. 
The water system as designed by civil engineers cannot be recognised as such, since 
underground pipelines alternate with the surface water. Moreover, the sand package 
provides urban designers with a tabula rasa on which each required urban design can 
be realised without any concern for the water system. Where in cities up until 1940 the 
total surface of the city contained 12%-15% water, in post-war city expansions, this 
percentage was often reduced to less than 5%. 
TOWARDS ADAPTIVE MANIPULATION (1990-TODAY) 
The refi nement of technology in the last decades of the twentieth century has made 
it possible not only to maintain that which is threatened, but also to elect for an 
increasingly vulnerable place in the game between water and land. The awareness 
that this high technology makes us lose sight of what is vulnerable marks a cultural 
change at the end of the 1970s towards greater attention to the environment and 
H
O
O
IM
EIJER
FIGURE 11. Too much water, Source: Volkskrant 14 august 2006.
149
PR
OJ
EC
TI
ON
S 
6 
M
IS
M
A
TC
H
ED
 B
O
U
N
D
A
RI
ES
ecology. The notion of integral water management is brought up and it is assumed 
that ground and surface water must be managed in a physical sense as well-founded 
systems (physically, chemically, and biologically). Integral water management means 
a shift in regime for civil engineering. It leads to new objectives requiring new designs 
and working methods. It also means a strategic regrouping, as together with civil 
engineers, biologists, and ecologists have also become players in the fi eld45.
In many countries there are similar institutes and consulting companies that specialize 
in soil mechanics. Usually they also deal with foundation engineering, which is 
concerned with the application of soil mechanics principle to the design and the 
construction of foundations in engineering practice. Soil mechanics and foundation 
engineering together are often denoted as Geotechnics. 
Many different piles and techniques to drive them in have been developed, and 
new techniques for building preparation have come into use. The use of lightweight 
materials such as polystyrene foam and granules has the advantage that building can 
start immediately and that little subsidence occurs afterwards.
Webber and Rittel mark the change, the end of the idea of effi ciency, at the end of 
the 1970s when the urban context was reintroduced. In response to the technocratic 
approach to urban design in the 1950s, it was in the 1970s that the ecology of water 
returned to the attention of the urban designer.
This phase started in the 1970s but from the 1990s on, due to the fact that the climate 
changes caused many problems, an awareness arose that the Netherlands is a water 
machine that needs to be approached spatially, not only technically. Urban designers 
took great interest in working with the water task as the basis of their urban design. On 
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FIGURE 11. Too much water. Source: Volkskrant 14 August 2006.
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the other side civil engineers needed to let go of their strict control and start to adapt 
to the natural rules of the water. 
MISMATCHED BOUNDARIES
Surveying the historical relationship between technology and the design of polder 
cities one can only observe a closeness that has been dominated by technological 
prosperity. The more the civil engineers could solve, the less water management was 
a spatial task. Also, the urban designers were happy to work on a layer of sand, offering 
them the tabula rasa on which they could draw any ideal urban plan. 
This technical approach of management has led to the current situation wherein the 
change of the climate (with more extreme storm water) causes ﬂ ooding in the polder 
cities. The days of the use of pipes and pumps (the work of the civil engineers) are 
over. The water needs to be reintroduced into the urban design of the cities. The 
water system of the future should be ﬂ exible and self-cleaning. This requires a spatial 
approach where ﬂ uctuations in water supply and ecological water systems have 
to be taken into account. A larger acceptation is required with regard to the rules 
and regulations related to water: return to the fi rst phase of acceptation. We shall 
need to adapt to even more wet surroundings and to use this to our advantage. The 
Netherlands is a water machine all of whose cogs are connected to each other. 
Projects like the grachtengordel and the Water Project illustrate that the ancient 
Dutch talent with regard to the design and construction of water does fi nd its base in 
a combination of urban vision and civil engineering. There is a need for mismatching 
boundaries, to strengthen coherence between the disciplines urban design and civil 
engineering and to be able to go on living with the water.
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FIGURE 12. Grachtengordel Amsterdam. Source: Fransje Hooimeijer.
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ENDNOTES
1 The term “urban design” is used as the most direct translation of the Dutch term ‘stedenbouw’ and the 
Dutch practice so it must be seen from a specifi c Dutch perspective. The profession in the Netherlands 
uses the design of the built environment to orchestrate and facilitate urban forces (economics, politics, 
social issues, etc.), instead of planning and adding form in two separate worlds, as in the U.S., where 
urban planning and urban design are two separate contributions to the city. For more information 
on the American situation, which is not elaborated in this article, see Jerold S. Kayden, What’s the 
mission of Harvard Urban Planning program? In: Harvard Design Magazine spring/summer 2005, and 
most articles in the spring/summer 2006 issue of Harvard Design Magazine. 
2 Kostov 1991, 11-12.
3 Burke 1956.
4 Burke 1956.
5 Lynch 1981.
6 Kostov 1991, 15.
7 Mumford (1961): It was ‘[… ] a miracle of spaciousness, compactness, intelligible order. It accepted 
all that was valid in baroque planning, with just suffi cient variation in the individual unites, combined 
with the rich tracery of trees boarding the canals, to take the curse off the military regimentation of 
baroque classicism. The successful breaks in the direction of the spider- web plan keep the distant 
vista from being empty and oppressive.’
8 Burke 1956.
9 Based on Van der Ham 2002.
10 Alvin Tofﬂ er.
11 Based on Van der Ham author has refi ned his defi ned periodic in the following three phases. 
12 De Wit 2003 p. 11.
13 Lendering 2005
14 Wagenaar 1993, pp. 9-12.
15 Van der Ham 2002 
16 Lintsen 1980, 39-58
17  
                  v = total specifi c ﬂ ow rate m/s 
       k = Effective permeability coeffi cient m/s 
        i = gradient of water pressure 
The Law of Darcy describes the ﬂ ow of a ﬂ uid through a porous medium. The model predicted that the 
extravasation risk was decreased when the cement viscosity, bone pore size, bone permeability and 
bone porosity were increased, and when the diameter of the extravasation path and the viscosity of the 
marrow were decreased. Experimentally, the effect of marrow viscosity and extravasation path could 
be evidenced. Therefore, the model was believed to be an adequate approximation of the experimental 
behaviour. In conclusion, the experimental results demonstrated that the model was adequate and that 
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the best practical way to decrease the risk of extravasation is to increase the cement viscosity.
18 Verruijt 2001.
19 De Vet 1994, 21-22.
20 The Industrial Revolution (mass production and steam driven engines) took over the Netherlands 
much later than the neighbouring countries. It started after 1850 (in England 1760) and took a ﬂ ight in 
the 1890s after the depression (1880s). More than 150 years after its actual invention, the steam engine, 
in the 1850s, ended the era of the windmill and made large scale pumping and dredging possible by the 
construction of a high-pressure steam engine.
21 Van der Woud 1987.
22 Van der Woud 1987, 377.
23 Hooimeijer and Kamphuis 2001.
24 De Vet 1994, 10.
25 Schot 1998, 178 and 203.
26 De Vet 1994, 10.
27 De Vet 1994, 8.
28 Respectively ‘Stadt-Erweiterungen in technischen; baupolizeilicher und wirthschaftlicher 
Beziebung’ (1876), ‘Die Städtebau nach seinen künstlerichen Grundsätzen’ (1889), ‘Städtebau’ (1890) 
and ‘Town planning in practice, An introduction to the art of designing cities and suburbs’ (1909).
29 De Jong and Meyer 1999, 17.
30 Nachenius emphasises the functional aspects, like technical sanitary and economical, of urban 
design. The publication titled ‘Contemporary urban design’, written by J.P. Fockema Andreae, appears 
in 1912 and a year later a dissertation by W.B. Peteri about the intervention of the government, both not 
as complete as the German and English literature. ‘Urban Design’ (1926) by J.M. de Casseres also does 
not match the conceptual quality of the foreign books.
31 Nachenius 1880.
32 Ibelings 1999, 6-20.
33 De Jong and Meyer 1999, 23.
34 De Jong and Meyer 1999, 30.
35 Schot 1998, 59-63.
36 Ibelings 1999, 22.
37 Van Lohuizen 1942.
38 De Jong and Meyer 1999, 39.
39 Webber en Rittel 1973, 158.
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40 Webber en Rittel 1973, 158.
41 Webber en Rittel 1973, 160.
42 It is interesting for this story that Webber and Rittel made the connection to the military system-
approach, since that is one of the foundations of the discipline of urban design: “The classical systems-
approach of the military and the space programs is based on the assumption that a planning project 
can be organised into distinct phases: ‘understand the problem or the mission’, ‘gather information,’ 
‘analyse the information’, ‘synthesize information and wait for the creative leap’, ‘work out solution’ or 
the like. For wicked problems, however, this type of scheme does not work. One cannot understand the 
problem without knowing about its context [..].” 
43 Van Eesteren 1934, 159.
44 Van Eijk 2002.
45 Schot 1998, 63 and 181-192.
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DERRY/LONDON + LONDONDERRY : 
CITIZENSHIP + PUBLIC SPACE IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND
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ABSTRACT
Politically charged symbols such as place names, signs, and murals have had hugely 
potent effects on Northern Ireland’s territorialized urban landscape. As ideas of 
citizenship evolve with the Northern Irish peace process -- as exemplifi ed in the 
revision of the Irish Constitution to redefi ne the Nation from territory to the people 
living in that territory -- so the signs and symbols that frame public spaces begin to 
change and be  changed, and so too their effects on society. The effi cacy of signs 
and symbols to shape landscape should not be underestimated: their power lies in 
staging and setting up frameworks for public negotiations rather than in neutralizing 
or negating them.
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FIGURES 1-2. Signs to Londonderry, 2005.
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It is not unusual for road signs to Londonderry, Northern Ireland’s second city, to be 
shortened with spray paint to “derry” (see Figure 1). Typically, those who support the 
union with the United Kingdom  — Unionists — refer to the city by its offi cial name, 
Londonderry, while those sympathetic to the goal of a United Ireland — Nationalists 
-— prefer to call it Derry1. On the road from Belfast to Derry today, the driver is 
confronted with several signs directing him or her toward “London” (see Figure 2) 
even though London is in the other direction and on another island. The satirical spirit 
behind spraying out “derry” in favor of London and the fact that these signs have not 
been cleaned or replaced for at least two years is illustrative of an emergent post-
conﬂ ict Ireland. The conﬂ ict, commonly known as the “troubles,” which had plagued 
the province for over thirty years, was fi rmly rooted in ideas of national allegiance and 
cultural identity, and it produced very defi nite spatial consequences2.
The struggle over the place of Northern Ireland within a United Kingdom or a United 
Ireland was played out on a local level not just with place names as in Derry/
Londonderry but through political murals, national ﬂ ags, painted curbstones, and 
marches. Society was divided and this division was reﬂ ected in public space. Derry is 
a very graphic illustration of the divided landscape: the western bank of the River Foyle 
became almost exclusively Catholic, and the eastern bank, mostly Protestant. Today 
the territorial boundaries are breaking down (see Figure 4).
Derry/Londonderry became segregated; the boundaries are, however, blurring.
The “troubles” began in Derry in the late 1960s and it is where my mother would take 
my brother and me to watch the regular Saturday afternoon riots in the 1980s, albeit 
from a safe distance. Public space in Derry can be very powerful, taking much of its 
power from political murals that frame, and even create, public spaces.
FIGURE 3. The six counties of Northern Ireland are part of the United Kingdom.
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If anyone needs proof 
that a wall painting can 
have as much an effect 
in transforming public 
space than, say, a ten-
million dollar project, then 
that person should come 
to Derry. The painting of 
a mural has the power 
to radically transform a 
space. A gable wall in 
an impoverished housing 
estate, for example, 
suddenly becomes a focus 
of attention, a rallying 
ground, a meeting place. 
Often a mural is used as 
a backdrop for television 
interviews with politicians 
anxious to promote and 
identify with its message. 
Using sometimes sinister 
graphics (see Figure 5), 
murals vie for attention 
as they assert or attempt 
to assert control over the 
physical, political, and 
cultural landscape. New 
murals were at times a FIGURE 5. Unionist Mural, Waterside, Derry.
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FIGURE 4. Curbstones are often painted with the colors of national ﬂ ags defi ning respective 
territories: green, white, and orange indicating Nationalist areas and red, white, and blue 
Unionist areas. 
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response to provocations of the other tradition: if murals could speak, they would be 
having a heated dialogue over space and time3.
Since the 1998 Peace Agreement, the debate over whether or not to neutralize 
existing murals has intensifi ed. Some see their touristic value, and “alternative” 
tours of segregated areas are popular4. Meanwhile, newspaper reports announce a 
Government-funded scheme to depoliticize the most extreme murals: “They are about 
our troubled past. We are a society moving forwards”, said a representative of the 
Northern Ireland’s Arts Council.5 Terrorist heroes are being replaced with cultural 
heroes. Bill Rolston, who has extensively documented Northern Ireland’s murals, 
observes that although murals are adopting a new language, their power to shape 
society remains: “They were a product of conﬂ ict … However, it appears they have 
the potential to become part of conﬂ ict transformation”.6.
Commercial advertisements now adopt the media of murals. The famous “Free Derry” 
mural (Figure 6) has been the prototype for the “You Are Now Entering Derry Journal 
Country” - the language of the iconic mural has been borrowed to promote sales of 
a local newspaper. Across the province, commercial murals now promote alcohol, 
businesses, and newspapers, using similar language and style as their political 
forebears and reﬂ ecting a society based more on the conﬂ icts of consumption than 
those of political allegiance.
One of the main bones of contention of the Northern Irish conﬂ ict was the Republic 
of Ireland’s territorial claim over Northern Ireland. Until 1998, Articles 2 and 3 of the 
FIGURE 6. Free Derry Corner.
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Republic’s Constitution stated that: “The National territory consists of the whole island 
of Ireland, its islands and the territorial seas,” clearly including Northern Ireland, 
a position Unionists naturally found offensive. Following the 1998 Agreement, a 
Constitutional amendment was carried in the Republic with 93% of the vote, redefi ning 
the concept of nationhood from territory to - critically - the people born in a territory. 
The Constitution was changed to read: “It is the entitlement and birthright of every 
person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part 
of the Irish nation.”7 The territorial claim over Northern Ireland was lifted but Irish 
citizenship is still available to those who want it.
Not unlike the German 1913 Auslandsdeutche law that changed the criteria for 
German citizenship from territory and residence to a community based on descent, 
Irish citizenship is now a cultural rather than a territorial construct8. Unlike the German 
case, where naturalization necessitated giving up original citizenship9, in Northern 
Ireland one can choose to be British or Irish, or both. Citizenship has become a 
matter of choice, convenience, or opportunism. Indeed, Irishness and Britishness are 
increasingly being rediscovered as a part of each other’s identity.10 As the British-Irish 
national conﬂ icts are deﬂ ected and the economy grows, the recent inﬂ ux of foreign 
workers into Ireland, many from Eastern Europe, will perhaps in time feel the need to 
create and demarcate their own territories.
The politically charged and polarized community that emerged during the thirty years 
of Northern Irish “troubles” is perhaps synoptic of contemporary urban society: full of 
FIGURE 7. Derry Journal advertisement.
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contradictions and disparity (albeit an extreme example). Political murals demonstrate 
the effi cacy of landscape not just to be shaped by culture and identity, but also to 
shape them. Strategic interventions like murals point toward ways of managing and 
intervening in urban landscape, not by attempting to resolve urban differences, but by 
staging them or shifting their focus. Because once urban conﬂ icts are negated, what 
type of public space do we have? 
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ENDNOTES
1 Derry is the anglicized version of the Gaelic name, Doire, which means Oak Grove. Derry was given 
the prefi x of London in honor of the Guilds of London who, in the seventeenth century, rebuilt the Gaelic 
settlement in the style of an English garrison. The new city form allegedly was an inspiration for William 
Penn when he laid out Philadelphia.
2 See: Brubaker, R. (1992) Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. Brubaker discusses the difference between French citizenship law, which is based 
largely on territory (jus soli) and the polar opposite of Germany’s laws, which are based on descent 
(jus sanguinis). French citizenship can be achieved through cultural assimilation, whereas German 
citizenship is mostly conferred by one’s lineage. Some parallels can be drawn to Irish citizenship, 
which is closer now to the German concept.
3 Jarman, N. (1998) Painting Landscapes: The Place of Murals in the Symbolic Construction of Urban 
Space in Buckley, Anthony D. (ed.) Symbols in Northern Ireland, Belfast: Queens University Press, pp 
81-98. 
4 See: http://www.freederry.net (accessed July 14, 2006). Brown, J.M. (2005, August 27). Bus Trips 
Shed Some Light on the Dark Side of Northern Ireland. Financial Times, London. p.4: John Murray 
Brown cites Philip Robertson, a tourism lecturer at the University of Ulster, who studies what he terms 
“dark tourism,” and maintains that for every tourist who wants to see the political murals, two tourists 
are repelled by them. 
5 Bowcott, O. (2006, July 12). Gables’ End Murals to be Replaced. The Guardian, London. p.4.
6 As cited in: McKay, S. (2006, March 4). Taking Paramilitaries off the Walls. The Irish Times, Dublin. 
p.4. Also see, Rolston, B. (1992) Drawing Support: Murals in the North of Ireland. Belfast: Beyond the 
Pale Publications.
7 Bunreacht na hÉireann/Constitution of Ireland was further changed by referendum in 2004 to restrict 
citizenship to those who have at least one parent lawfully resident in the State for three of the previous 
four years. 
8 Brubaker (1992), p.115.
9 Ibid. p.144.
10  Recent examples of this rediscovery include the Belfast City Council offi cially celebrating St. Patrick’s 
Day for the fi rst time in 2006 with a 90,000 GBP ($166,000) carnival parade and open-air concert. The 
Council has traditionally had a Unionist majority. See: Kennan, D. (2006, March 18). Thousands Turn 
Out for Fanfare of Noise and Colour. The Irish Times, Dublin. p.8. Meanwhile, the Irish Government 
commemorated on a large scale for the fi rst time the World War I Battle of the Somme. This was once 
unthinkable in the Republic since the 3,500 Irish who died fought for the British Army (even though it 
was pre-independence). See Marlowe, L. (2006, July 3). Surprises at Somme Commemoration. The Irish 
Times, Dublin. p.6. 
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INCOMPATIBLE ZONE SYSTEMS
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ABSTRACT
Artifi cial zonal boundaries superimposed over complicated social systems and built 
environments impel planners to perform “spatial data transformation” — the practice 
of transforming geographic data from one set of zones to a different set of zones with 
incompatible boundaries — to analyze and present data for targeted local analyses. 
The fi ndings of a survey of Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) — which 
confi rm an assessment of the literature — suggest that practicing planners tend to 
use simple Geographic Information Systems (GIS) methods for performing spatial 
data transformation in lieu of more complex geographic procedures that have greater 
accuracy.  To help close the gap between research and application in the use of GIS 
in practice, planners should seek more advanced GIS training and education about 
geographic theory that underlies common GIS procedures.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of artifi cial boundaries masks the uniqueness of the social landscape and 
the built environment within a given geographic area.  Consider the example of three 
distinct neighborhoods enclosed within the same census tract: a world-class medical 
campus located adjacent to a low-income neighborhood and a struggling industrial 
corridor (See Figure 1).  Medical campus employees, low-income neighbors, and 
business owners visualize the places and surrounding communities differently due 
to the neighborhoods’ various social and economic trajectories, and the artifi cial 
demarcation of boundaries can introduce political tensions when various groups lay 
claims to resources or contemplate divergent urban planning interventions.  
Such artifi cial territorial demarcation routinely causes places to be divided into 
communities, neighborhoods, districts, and regions according to a wide array of 
spatial dimensions.  Planners may wish to study the effects of urban and environmental 
phenomena on various polygons — for example, census tracts, zip codes, transportation 
analysis zones (TAZs), air quality districts, planning districts, elections wards, school 
districts, water districts, soil regions, emergency response areas, land use zones — 
containing population and housing.  The zonal boundaries of such “incompatible zone 
systems” rarely coincide and their confi gurations often change over time, making 
H
ESS
FIGURE 1. Adjacent neighborhoods.
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it diffi cult to directly compare or combine data collected or aggregated  by various 
agencies.  
The complexities that arise from combining data that use incompatible zone systems 
are encountered regularly in urban and regional analysis.  Procedures to integrate 
data from disparate zone systems, however, can be complex because of differences in 
underlying zonal geography.  To overcome the problem of incompatible zone systems, 
planners and geographers perform “spatial data transformation” to interpolate or 
derive data for a desired set of zones (the “target” zones) from data that are available 
only for a set of incompatible zones (the “source” zones)1 (See Figure 2).  
H
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FIGURE 2. Incompatible zone systems.
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BACKGROUND
Geographic analysis is complex, and previous literature about spatial data transformation 
suggests an apparent disconnect between knowledge and practice.  On the theoretical 
front, sophisticated approaches for allocating data from source zones to target zones 
are evident in the geographical and regional science literature, and various methods 
— including control zones, raster modeling, surface modeling, fuzzy logic, and 
advanced spatial modeling methods — are used alone or in combination (Anas Arnott 
and Small 1998, Bracken and Martin 1995, Flowerdew and Openshaw 1987, Flowerdew 
and Green 1994, Flowerdew et al 1991, Goodchild et al 1993, Openshaw 1996, Waddell 
2002, Wegener 1994).  Most studies published in scholarly journals include evaluations 
of various spatial data transformation methods, comparing the merits of a chosen 
method with more rudimentary or less time-consuming approaches.  These studies 
usually attempt to evaluate the outcome of a spatial data transformation procedure by 
comparing interpolated values to known values as a means of measuring error and to 
provide insight into strengths and weaknesses of various spatial analysis methods and 
suggestions about appropriate circumstances for their use.  
Such theoretical  approaches, however, differ from applications of spatial data 
transformation methods reported in urban planning literature and in conference 
proceedings.  The planning studies tend to undertake simpler approaches involving 
point-in-polygon conversion, polygon overlays, and re-aggregation from smaller 
spatial units.2  For example, spatial data transformation is frequently used to create 
buffer polygons for measuring access to public transit or identifying “walkable zones,” 
to characterize land uses in pedestrian sheds surrounding transit corridors to evaluate 
pedestrian safety, and to quantify the intensity of commercial development around 
neighborhoods.  The planning studies often rely upon uncertain geographic theory, 
such as an assumption of uniform distribution of elements in source zones, and they 
seldom provide evaluations to determine whether a chosen method produces the least 
error among alternative methods.
Lacking knowledge about appropriate procedures for performing spatial data 
transformation, planners may inaccurately assign data from source zones to target 
zones, miscalculate the sociodemographic characteristics within zones, or incorrectly 
designate buffer areas for measuring access to basic needs (Clifton and Handy 2001). 
Inaccurate spatial data transformation, or spatial analysis that fails to account for 
fragmented land uses within zones, poses the threat that planners may unknowingly 
misrepresent data used to justify capital and operational improvements.  This 
misrepresentation could potentially result in ill-informed policy and funding decisions 
that cause some populations to be underserved by urban infrastructure.
Prior to the popular use of geographic information systems (GIS) for performing spatial 
analysis, Nina Siu-Ngan Lam (1983, p. 138) argued that “ironically, the abundant use 
of interpolation procedures found in the fi eld of cartography is associated with scanty 
research on the reliability of the specifi c interpolation method used.”  This problem 
persists in urban planning research and practice.  Many planners perform spatial 
analysis using commercial GIS software packages  without knowing the underlying 
theory of a spatial data transformation method or whether there is an alternative 
method better suited to the analysis at hand.  
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A SURVEY OF PLANNERS
A return-mail questionnaire was sent to all 346 metropolitan planning organizations 
(MPOs) in the United States, and 154 completed surveys were returned, for a response 
rate of 45 percent (Hess 2002, Hess forthcoming).  The 13-page survey included 
questions about the structure of zone systems, compatibility of various zone systems 
used for spatial analysis, and the frequency and nature of spatial data transformation. 
Using survey results, models were developed to explain MPOs’ proclivities for 
performing spatial data transformation using various methods.
The survey results support the argument that there is a disconnect between more 
sophisticated methods and methods commonly used in practice by planners.  More 
than 60 percent of MPOs perform spatial data transformation more than once per year, 
and the simplest, most error-prone methods for performing spatial data transformation 
are used far more frequently than the more sophisticated methods, despite previous 
research that demonstrates that sophisticated methods result in greater accuracy and 
less error for spatially interpolated data.  More than any other method, transportation 
planners simply reallocate smaller spatial units to form equivalencies that approximate 
new, larger zone systems to produce data for aggregated polygons that are usually 
noncoterminous with a new zone system.  The next most frequently used method is 
the area ratio method.  However, while the assumption that households and people are 
evenly distributed within source zones may be valid for parts of urban areas, it likely 
obscures important variations in an urban landscape.  
In urban planning research, scholars — motivated to improve planning practice 
— often investigate barriers to improved planning methods.  With this in mind, the 
credibility and effectiveness of GIS analyses can be improved when planners use 
the most accurate spatial analysis procedures to inform decision-making.  There is 
room for improvement in the methods that practicing planners use to perform spatial 
data transformations, and more sophisticated methods of spatial data transformation 
can lead to high-quality analyses with the least possible error.  For example, area-
based  spatial data transformation has only limited relevance in applied policy analysis 
contexts; to overcome this weakness, planners should seek to develop custom 
solutions to spatial data transformation for particular applications, and results from 
these custom methods should be validated regularly as part of the practice of spatial 
analysis (Anselin 1998).
Although GIS is now widely used in urban planning, planners tend to use GIS in relatively 
simple ways that fall short of its analytical potential. Given the lag in application of 
new GIS techniques among planners, it is perhaps not surprising that practicing 
planners tend to favor simpler methods of spatial data transformation despite the 
widely documented shortcomings of such techniques.  To help close the gap between 
research and application in the utilization of GIS in planning practice, planners should 
seek more advanced GIS training in addition to education about geographic theory 
that underlies common GIS procedures.  
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ENDNOTES
1 Methods commonly used for assigning spatial data from source zones to target zones include 
reassembling from small spatial units (data is assigned to an intersecting target zone only if the target 
zone overlays in part or in whole the source zone), area ratio transformation (data is assigned based 
on the ratio of the area of a source zone-target zone overlap to the area of the source zone in assigning 
data to a target zone) area ratio with auxiliary variable (the ratio of the value of an auxiliary variable 
(such as street network density of land use designation) in an overlap area to the value of the auxiliary 
variable in a source zone is used to estimate the amount of the source zone attribute assigned to a 
target zone) and the raster method (data from a source zone is allocated to raster cells, a fi ne-grained 
grid in continuous space, based on the area ratio of overlap area, and then the data in the raster cells 
are re-allocated to target zones).  
2 Comparative studies of various spatial analysis methods are provided in Hess (1999), Lam (1983), 
O’Neill et al. (1992), Openshaw and Taylor (1981), Openshaw (1996), Peng and Dueker (1993), Schlossberg 
(2003), Zhao (1998), and Zhao et al. (2003).
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ABSTRACT
Desires of dynamic populations resulting from urban tourism have marked territories 
in cities: “Desirescapes” and “Borderscapes.” Desirescapes fulfi ll the infi nitely 
expanding desires of tourists in urban settings and facilitate the daily desires of 
residents. Borderscapes provide boundary conditions that direct and keep tourists 
within Desirescapes as well as secure residents who produce, nurture, and develop 
the Desirescapes. In this research brief, the tension between Desirescape and 
Borderscape and the implicit negotiations between tourists and residents through 
major urban destinations (Venice, Barcelona, the Ginza district in Tokyo, and the Strip 
in Las Vegas) are revealed.
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INTRODUCTION
The desires to experience an alternative lifestyle, to visit historical monuments of a 
past civilization, or to shop for rare fi nds in a city, are the forces driving tourists to 
visit urban destinations. The number of tourists, those who visit a place for pleasure 
for a short period, signifi cantly increased in urban cities in the 1990s (statistics). The 
territory of the cities’ dynamic population keeps expanding to accommodate their 
ever-growing desires as well as disposing of anything but desires. In this essay, the 
territories that fulfi lls these desires in urban settings is described as “Desirescapes,” 
where  “Borderscapes” are boundary conditions such as street signs or structural 
forms to direct and keep tourists within Desirescapes (Figure 1).
A desirescape not only facilitates the 
desires of tourists but also of residents, 
those who see a place as a daily base 
for the long term. According to urban 
economists, successful cities “need 
to think about providing lifestyle, or 
consumption, advantages to their 
residents (Glaeser, 2004, p.2).” Thus, a 
Desirescape enriches the experience 
of tourists as well as of residents. The 
elements of a Desirescape — history, 
entertainment, culture, and nature 
— are discovered and constructed through the passage of time by residents. A 
fourteenth century historian, Ibn Kahn, claims that  the Bedouins who stay in one place 
for the short term as tourists leave little culture for the city, compared to a sedentary 
culture that remains for a long time. Because of their limited time of stay, tourists rarely 
contribute to production but instead contribute purely to consumption. 
Even though more people wish to live in urban areas today, there has been documented 
and sustained urban ﬂ ight (Glaeser, 2006, p2.). In the case of Barcelona, where urban 
tourism rapidly grew after the Olympic Games in 1992, the increase in the number 
of emigrants has been greater than that of immigrants (Figure 2), especially in areas 
with a high density of tourist attractions (Figure 3). Urban tourism has led to dynamic 
population movements in the touristy cities, which are increasingly at risk of being 
overconsumed.
In order to avoid being completely consumed and thus rendered obsolete, cities not 
only need to continue to foster Desirescapes but also to create a distinct boundary, 
a Borderscape, to secure residents who produce and nurture the elements of a 
Desirescape. 
In this essay, I attempt to reveal the tension between Desirescapes and Borderscapes 
and the implicit negotiations between tourists and residents. I chose three urban 
destinations, Venice, Barcelona, and the Ginza district in Tokyo, where the cities 
utilize existing infrastructure for tourism, and one destination, The Strip in Las Vegas, 
where tourism led to the growth of the area. They all display the major elements of a 
FIGURE 1. Desirescape/borderscape diagram.
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Desirescape and the tension and negotiation between residents and tourists in their 
own ways. 
FIGURES 2-3. Top: Evolution Graph of Immigrants and Emigrants in Barcelona.  Source: 
Statistical Yearbook of Barcelona City, 2005.  Bottom: Map of Population Movement and 
Tourists’ Territory.  Source: Statistical Yearbook of Barcelona City, 2005.
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CASE STUDIES
VENICE, ITALY
Venice, given its rich history, has always been a major tourist destination. In this city, 
the tension between tourists and residents is upfront and visible. Due to the high cost 
of accommodation, the majority of tourists are day-trippers from neighboring suburbs, 
which makes the temporality of dynamic tourists even greater. The territory of 
residents is often claimed through objects related to daily life such as clotheslines and 
FIGURE 4. Play Toys at the Plaza Claiming the Territory of the Residents. Source: Nicole Vlado.
FIGURES 5-6. Top: Clothesline Claming the Presence of the Residents, Venice, Italy. Source: 
Nicole Vlado. Bottom: Arrow Signs Funneling Tourists, Venice, Italy.  Source: Midori Taki.
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play toys (Figures 4, 5). Urban spaces are negotiated by residents allowing tourists to 
experience and glimpse into their lives. Signage indicating major monuments funnels 
tourists along certain set paths (Figure 6). 
Due to the diffi culty of living with water as well as the overﬂ ow of tourists, a signifi cant 
number of residents who have shaped Venetian life are moving out of the city. Losing 
its highlight of tourism — visiting Venice to experience the daily life of a Venetian 
(Figures 7, 8), the city is challenged against reproducing their own cultures for the 
sake of fulfi lling the tourists’ desires (Figure 9).
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FIGURES 7-8. Top: Restaurant along Canal Simulating Venetian Life, Venice, Italy. Bottom: A 
Market on the Boat Giving a Glimpse of Venetian Life, Venice, Italy.  Source: Midori Taki. 
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BARCELONA, SPAIN
Since Barcelona began to receive signifi cant numbers of  tourists after the Olympic 
Games in 1992, the impact of the tourism on the city has become more apparent. 
Barcelona possesses a rich history represented by different styles of architecture, 
fi ne cultures that world-renowned artists once enjoyed and cultivated (Figure 10, 11). 
The city is bounded by the natural features of the Mediterranean Sea on the south 
and  Tibidabo Mountain on the north (Figure 12). Moreover, the city offers various 
entertainments such as shopping, a theme park, and soccer games. Tourists are 
directed through the town by wide streets with wide sidewalks and lines of trees 
(Figure 13). Trees also create a vertical separation between the ground-oriented 
activities of tourists and the upper ﬂ oors of residences (Figure 14).
In 2005, the city invented the event Culture Forum, with the hope of reproducing the 
phenomenon of the 1992 Olympics, where the city rejuvenated underdeveloped parts 
of the city. At the time of the Forum, however, the city erected walls between the 
Forum venues and the nearby underdeveloped areas that did not represent appropriate 
desires for the city (Figure 15). 
GINZA, TOKYO, JAPAN
The Ginza district in Tokyo is a place for experiencing unlimited consumption of 
any architectural style from traditional to contemporary and of any form, including 
the forms of ﬂ owers and plants (Figures 16, 17). New residential constructions in the 
district, which are greatly desired despite their high price, are promoted, as their 
FIGURE 9. A Souvenir Store Selling Reproduced Carnival Masks, Venice, Italy. Source: 
Midori Taki.
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FIGURES 10-11. Left: Cathedral; Historical Experience, Barcelona, Spain. Right: Sagrada 
Familia; Cultural Experience, Barcelona, Spain. Source: Midori Taki. TA
KI
FIGURES 13-14. Top left: Nova Icaria Beach; Natural Experience, Barcelona, Spain. Top right: 
Lines of Trees in the Avenue Marking Desirescape in Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain. Bottom: 
Diagram of Vertical Borderscape in Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain.  Source: Midori Taki.
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FIGURE 15. The Wall at the Forum Excluding Anything but Desirescape, Barcelona, Spain. 
Source: Midori Taki.
FIGURES 16-19. Top left: Kabuki-za for Historical and Cultural Experience, Ginza, Tokyo, Japan. 
Source: http://homepage.mac.com/kohatchan/iblog/images/about/kabukiza.jpg.  Retrieved 
November 17, 2006.  Top right: Retail Stores Offering Infi nite Consumption, Ginza, Tokyo, Japan. 
Source: Midori Taki.  Bottom left: Raised Highway Marking Borderscape, Ginza, Tokyo, Japan. 
Source: http://www2s.biglobe.ne.jp/~kaoruhme/photo/photo5.htm. Retrieved May 3, 2006. 
Bottom right: The River Marking Other Borderscape, Sumida River, Tokyo, Japan.  Source: 
http://www2s.biglobe.ne.jp/~kaoruhme/photo/photo5.htm. Retrieved May 3, 2006.
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neighboring shops and entertainment   satisfy not only visitors but also residents. The 
raised highway, considered a distraction from the view, contributes to contain the 
Desirescape within the district as well as to create a border (Figure 18). The river 
creates another border, beyond which the residential areas are located (Figure 19). 
THE STRIP, LAS VEGAS, USA
Unlike the previous three cities, where tourism grew after their cultures had 
matured, the Strip in Las Vegas was developed specifi cally for tourism, especially 
entertainment. Desires are contained within a series of hotels, which include all the 
forms of entertainment and amenities one could imagine, from gaming to shopping to 
high-end shows (Figures 20, 21). Night illuminations create a distinct boundary of the 
Desirescape, which is evident from night aerial photographs (Figure 22). Moreover, 
the public monorail connecting the hotels at the back runs along the boundary (Figure 
23). 
This entertainment town has begun to shift its focus from kitsch attractions to high-
quality consumption. It is evident in the architecture forms that the hotels were once 
TA
KI
FIGURES 22-23. Left: The Lines of Light Marking Desirescape, Las Vegas, USA.  Source: http://
www.chuckhawks.com/strip.jpg. Retrieved  April 24, 2005.  Right: The Monorail Running at 
Borderscape, Las Vegas, USA.  Source: http://www.matthewweathers.com/year2004/images/
lv_mono2.jpg.  Retrieved May 5, 2005.
FIGURES 20-21. Left: Casino; Entertainment Desire, Las Vegas, USA.  Right: Fine Cuisine; 
Cultural Desire, Las Vegas, USA. Source: Midori Taki.
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reproductions of historical monuments, but the new hotel by MGM Mirage Inc. was 
designed by a respected architect, Cesar Pelli, with pure architectural aesthetics. 
With this shift began an authentic urban experience, which attracts people to live in 
Las Vegas. In fact, the town has started to receive residents who are able to shape and 
defi ne it. The Strip is challenging whether a Desirescape can grow and be nurtured 
in a place where nothing was originally from the town but all things were imported or 
reproduced.
CONCLUSION
A Desirescape, which infi nitely expands and discards anything but desires, is 
necessarily contained by a Borderscape to limit its territory and maintain a balance 
between tourists and residents in the cities. The residents include not only those 
who produce and consume desires but also those who serve desires, who are mostly 
paid low wages and largely  immigrants. However, the workers are often considered 
invisible since their presence is not  desirable. Nevertheless, indefi nite desires link 
people beyond social and economic status, which provides the fundamental fabric of 
an urban environment.
The impact of urban tourism on the built environment is evident, yet neither urban 
planners nor architects have critically responded to it. It seems imperative to respond 
with expertise to enhance the territorial structure for a better environment. John 
Habraken, an architect and educator who has investigated methods and theory of 
architecture and urban design, states, “We cannot shape the world, but we may help 
cultivate it” (Andrews).
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ESProjections 7, proposes to highlight the role of institutional innovations in developing 
countries that have played an important role in economic and social development. 
The volume will focus on empirical studies as well as theoretical discourse regarding 
institutional changes and how they might facilitate development in developing and 
transition countries.  We are interested in papers relating to three broad tracks for this 
volume and welcome contributions focusing on different regions of the world.  Cross-
country or regional comparisons are encouraged but are not required. The tracks are 
as follows:
1) Role of Technological Innovations in Development
2) Role of Land Markets in Development and Poverty Alleviation
3) Role of Infrastructure and Trade Facilitation in Economic Development
Visit http://web.mit.edu/dusp/projections for information on recent Projections 
journals.
